Owens v. Addison

• Decision Date: 30 April 2013
• Docket Number: Case No. 12-CV-0117-CVE-FHM
• Parties: KEYNON MICHAEL OWENS, Petitioner, v. MIKE ADDISON, Warden, Respondent.
• Court: U.S. District Court — Northern District of Oklahoma

KEYNON MICHAEL OWENS, Petitioner,

v.MIKE ADDISON, Warden, Respondent.

Case No. 12-CV-0117-CVE-FHM

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF OKLAHOMA

DATED: April 30, 2013

OPINION AND ORDER

Before the Court is the petition for writ of habeas corpus (Dkt. # 1) filed by Petitioner Keynon Michael Owens, a state inmate appearing pro se. Respondent filed a response (Dkt. # 11) and provided the state court records (Dkt. ## 11 and 12) necessary for adjudication of Petitioner's claims. Petitioner filed a reply (Dkt. # 13). For the reasons discussed below, the petition for writ of habeas corpus shall be denied.

BACKGROUND

On May 19, 2006, two Hispanic men, cousins Javier and Jesus Carranza, went to Show Place, a "gentlemen's club," located in Tulsa, Oklahoma. While at the club, the two men arranged to meet one of the dancers, Brandi Lindsey, a/k/a Dallas, after the club closed for the purpose of having sex. Lindsey called her boyfriend, Joe Gene Sanders, and told him about the two men. Sanders told Lindsey they should rob the men. After the club closed at 2:00 a.m. on May 20, 2006, Javier and Jesus followed Lindsey and her friend and fellow club employee, Triston Fleetwood, to the apartment complex where Lindsey lived with Sanders. Lindsey was driving Fleetwood's car. The men got out of their vehicle and followed Lindsey and Fleetwood into the complex. As they began to round a corner, two black men, later identified as Sanders and Keynon Owens, Petitionerherein, appeared. Sanders said "give me your money." Javier and Jesus began to run. Sanders, armed with a handgun, shot both men in the back. Jesus went down and remained still. Owens went through Jesus's pockets and took his wallet and keys. Javier continued to resist. Sanders stood over Javier, and while shooting him at point blank range, said "I told you not to run." Sanders then took Javier's wallet and keys from his pockets. Lindsey, Fleetwood, Sanders, and Owens all ran from the scene and went to Lindsey and Sanders' apartment. Jesus survived. Javier died at the scene.

The next day, Lindsey and Fleetwood, along with Sanders' sister, Tan, went to Sanders' home town, Redbird, Oklahoma. After dropping Tan off at the Sanders' family home, Lindsey and Fleetwood disposed of the wallets, Sanders' clothes, and the handgun, as directed by Sanders. They returned to Tulsa. Lindsey called 911 because she and Fleetwood knew the police had impounded Fleetwood's car after the shooting. Police detectives arrived and took Lindsey and Fleetwood to the Detective Division where they were interviewed separately. Although the two women had agreed to lie and tell the police that two unknown black men appeared from nowhere and robbed Jesus and Javier, they eventually told police what happened and identified Sanders and Owens as the robbers.

Based on those events, Petitioner Keynon Owens, and his co-defendants, Joe Gene Sanders and Brandi Nicole Lindsey, were charged with multiple felonies in Tulsa County District Court,Case No. CF-2006-2341.¹ Petitioner was charged with First Degree Felony Murder (Count II), Shooting With Intent to Kill (Count III), Robbery With a Dangerous Weapon (Count IV), and Robbery With a Dangerous Weapon (Count V). Javier Carranza was the victim in Counts II and IV. Jesus Carranza was the victim in Counts III and V. Petitioner and Sanders were tried jointly. At the conclusion of the trial, Petitioner was found guilty of Counts II and V, but was acquitted of Counts III and IV. In accordance with the jury's recommendations, the trial judge sentenced Petitioner to life imprisonment on Count II and to ten (10) years imprisonment on Count V, to be served consecutively. At trial, Petitioner was represented by attorney Larry Edwards.

Petitioner appealed his convictions and sentences to the Oklahoma Court of Criminal Appeals (OCCA). On direct appeal, Petitioner was represented by attorney Bill Zuhdi. On May 12, 2009, in Case No. F-2007-1151, the OCCA affirmed the judgment and sentence as to the conviction for Robbery With a Dangerous Weapon, but reversed and remanded for a new trial Petitioner's Count II conviction for First Degree Felony Murder. See Dkt. # 16. The OCCA determined that plain error occurred when the jury returned inconsistent verdicts, i.e., guilty of felony murder (Count II) and not guilty of Robbery With a Dangerous Weapon (Javier) (Count IV), the felony underlyingthe felony murder charge. Id. The OCCA further determined that the inconsistent verdicts resulted from improper jury instructions coupled with the trial judge's failure to comply with Okla. Stat. tit. 22, § 894 (requiring trial judge to bring jury back into court to address a question on a point of law), upon his receipt of notes from the jury clearly reflecting confusion regarding the relationship between Counts II and IV. See Dkt. # 16.

Petitioner returned to Tulsa County District Court to be retried as to Count II, First Degree Felony Murder. He was again represented by attorney Larry Edwards. Prior to his second trial, Petitioner filed a motion to dismiss, arguing that the legal principles of double jeopardy and collateral estoppel precluded a second trial on a charge of felony murder for the death of Javier Carranza because he had been acquitted of the underlying felony supporting the felony murder charge. The motion to dismiss was denied and Petitioner proceeded to be retried by a jury. Counsel for Petitioner continued to object throughout the trial that the retrial was barred by double jeopardy and collateral estoppel. His objections were overruled. At the conclusion of his second jury trial, Petitioner was again found guilty and the jury recommended a sentence of life imprisonment. On December 7, 2009, the trial judge sentenced Petitioner to life imprisonment.

Petitioner appealed. Represented by attorney Kristi Christopher, he raised eight (8) propositions of error, as follows:

Proposition 1: Because Mr. Owens was acquitted of the underlying felony supporting his felony murder charge, his conviction and sentence for felony murder violate the double jeopardy provisions of the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments of the United States Constitution and Article II, § 21 of the Oklahoma Constitution and must be reversed and remanded with instructions to dismiss.

A. Standard of review.

B. Facts pertinent to claim.

C. Traditional double jeopardy.

D. Collateral estoppel.

E. Conclusion.

Proposition 2: The admission of testimony and evidence regarding the charges Mr. Owens's first jury found him not guilty of was a violation of the collateral estoppel component of the double jeopardy provisions of the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments of the United States Constitution and Article II, § 21 of the Oklahoma Constitution.

Proposition 3: The prejudicial introduction of evidence at trial not provided to the defense during discovery deprived Mr. Owens of a fair trial in violation of the due process clause of the Fourteenth Amendment to the United States Constitution and Article II, Sections 7 and 20 of the Oklahoma Constitution.

Proposition 4: The trial court committed reversible error by failing to instruct the jury that the testimony of an informer should be examined and weighed with greater care than that of an ordinary witness. By failing to give this instruction regarding the testimony of Brandi Lindsey and Triston Fleetwood, the court violated Mr. Owens's rights under the Fifth, Sixth, and Fourteenth Amendments of the United States Constitution and Article II, §§ 7 and 20 of the Oklahoma Constitution.

Proposition 5: Mr. Owens was denied his right to a fair trial because the trial court did not instruct the jury that Triston Fleetwood was an accomplice as a matter of law and did not issue the proper corroboration instruction.

Proposition 6: Mr. Owens received ineffective assistance of counsel, in violation of the Sixth and Fourteenth Amendments of the United States Constitution and Article II, §§ 7, 9, and 20 of the Oklahoma Constitution.

A. Failure to request required instructions.

B. Failure to adequately investigate and present additional evidence of innocence.

1. Elizabeth Millican

2. DNA evidence

C. Conclusion.

Proposition 7: Under the circumstances of this case, Mr. Owens's sentence was excessive in violation of the Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments and the corollary provisions of the Oklahoma Constitution found in Article 2, Sections Seven and Nine.

Proposition 8: The accumulation of error in this case deprived Mr. Owens of due process of law and necessitates reversal pursuant to the Fourteenth Amendment to the United States Constitution and Article II, § 7 of the Oklahoma Constitution.

(Dkt. # 11, Ex. 1). In an unpublished summary opinion, filed March 25, 2011, in Case No. F-2009-1143 (Dkt. # 11, Ex. 3), the OCCA affirmed the Judgment and Sentence of the district court.

Petitioner commenced the instant habeas corpus action by filing his petition on March 6, 2012. See Dkt. # 1. In his petition, he identifies the following grounds of error:

Ground 1: Because Mr. Owens was acquitted of the underlying felony supporting his felony murder charge, his conviction and sentence for felony murder violate the double jeopardy provisions of the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments of the United States Constitution and Article II, § 21 of the Oklahoma Constitution.

Ground 2: The admission of testimony and evidence regarding the charges Mr. Owens's first jury found him not guilty of was a violation of the collateral estoppel component of the double jeopardy provisions of the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments of the United States Constitution and Article II, § 21 of the Oklahoma Constitution.

Ground 3: Mr. Owens was wrongly sentenced and incarcerated by the trial court in violation of the Eighth Amendment of the United States Constitution.

Ground 4: Mr. Owens received ineffective assistance of counsel, in violation of the Sixth and Fourteenth Amendments of the United States Constitution and Article II, §§ 7, 9, and 20 of the

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