Owens v. Bos. Sci. Corp.
| Decision Date | 23 November 2022 |
| Docket Number | 4:22-cv-00625-SRC |
| Parties | MELISSA OWENS, Plaintiff, v. BOSTON SCIENTIFIC CORP., et al., Defendants. |
| Court | U.S. District Court — Eastern District of Missouri |
Melissa Owens sued Boston Scientific Corporation and its sales representative Shawn Lynch in Missouri state court, alleging that Boston Scientific defectively designed and manufactured its Obtryx II Sling System and that Boston Scientific and Lynch failed to warn about the defects. Doc. 4. Boston Scientific removed to this Court, arguing that Owens had fraudulently joined Lynch to defeat diversity, Doc. 1; Lynch moved to dismiss the one count against him, Doc. 7; and Owens moved to remand, Doc. 9. Because Owens's claim against Lynch relies on conclusory allegations, the Court finds no reasonable basis in fact or law for holding Lynch liable. The Court therefore denies Owens's [9] motion for remand and grants Lynch's [7] motion to dismiss count 4.
Owens filed a four-count petition in Missouri state court regarding alleged defects in the Obtryx II, which she had surgically implanted in August 2016, and from which she allegedly suffered side-effects. See generally Doc. 4. In count 4, Owens sues Lynch for negligent failure to warn alleging that Lynch participated in the sale and implementation of Owens's Obtryx II device, that his job included advising hospitals and surgeons on Obtryx II's risks, and that he knew or should have known of the defects that harmed Owens. Doc. 4 at pp. 6-7.
Boston Scientific removed the case, invoking diversity jurisdiction and arguing that Owens had fraudulently joined Lynch, whose Missouri citizenship would otherwise defeat diversity. Doc. 1 at pp. 2-7. Lynch then moved to dismiss for failure to state a claim, Doc. 7, and Owens moved to remand, Doc. 9. The parties fully briefed both motions. Docs. 8, 10, 1315.
A defendant may remove to federal court any state-court civil action over which the federal court could exercise original jurisdiction. 28 U.S.C. § 1441(a). “The [removing] defendant bears the burden of establishing federal jurisdiction by a preponderance of the evidence.” In re Prempro Prod. Liab. Litig., 591 F.3d 613, 620 (8th Cir. 2010). Because “[t]he threshold requirement in every federal case is jurisdiction,” the Eighth Circuit has admonished district courts “to be attentive to a satisfaction of jurisdictional requirements in all cases.” Sanders v. Clemco Indus., 823 F.2d 214, 216 (8th Cir. 1987) (citation omitted). “Federal courts are to resolve all doubts about federal jurisdiction in favor of remand and are strictly to construe legislation permitting removal.” Dahl v. R.J. Reynolds Tobacco Co., 478 F.3d 965, 968 (8th Cir. 2007) (quotation marks omitted). But when a federal court does have jurisdiction over a case properly before it, it has a “virtually unflagging obligation to exercise it.” Holbein v. TAW Enterprises, Inc., 983 F.3d 1049, 1060 (8th Cir. 2020) (en banc) (quotation marks omitted).
In its notice of removal, Boston Scientific argues that the Court could have exercised original jurisdiction over this case under 28 U.S.C. § 1332(a)(1), which gives district courts Diversity jurisdiction requires complete diversity of citizenship among the parties, meaning “no defendant holds citizenship in the same state where any plaintiff holds citizenship.” OnePoint Sols., LLC v. Borchert, 486 F.3d 342, 346 (8th Cir. 2007) (citing Owen Equip. & Erection Co. v. Kroger, 437 U.S. 365, 373 (1978)). “In the case of a removed action, diversity [of citizenship] must exist both when the state petition is filed and when the petition for removal is filed.” Knudson v. Sys. Painters, Inc., 634 F.3d 968, 975 (8th Cir. 2011) (quoting Ryan ex rel. Ryan v. Schneider Nat. Carriers, Inc., 263 F.3d 816, 819 (8th Cir. 2001)).
Here, Lynch and Owens were both Missouri citizens at the time of filing. See Doc. 1 at ¶ 10 (); Doc. 1-3 at ¶ 2 (). Unless an exception to the “time-of-filing” rule applies, this lack of diversity defeats jurisdiction. Defendants argue that one such exception-fraudulent joinder-applies here. The Court agrees.
“[A] plaintiff cannot defeat a defendant's ‘right of removal' by fraudulently joining a defendant who has ‘no real connection with the controversy.'” Knudson, 634 F.3d at 976 (quoting Chesapeake & Ohio Ry. Co. v. Cockrell, 232 U.S. 146, 152 (1914)). To prove fraudulent joinder, a defendant must show that the plaintiffs claim against the non-diverse defendant has “no reasonable basis in fact and law.” Knudson, 634 F.3d at 977 (citing Filla v. Norfolk S. Ry. Co., 336 F.3d 806, 810 (8th Cir. 2003)). In other words, “if it is clear under governing state law that the complaint does not state a cause of action against the non-diverse defendant, the joinder is fraudulent and federal jurisdiction of the case should be retained.” Knudson, 634 F.3d at 980 (quoting Filla, 336 F.3d at 810).
On the other hand, “joinder is not fraudulent where ‘there is arguably a reasonable basis for predicting that the state law might impose liability based upon the facts involved.'” Knudson, 634 F.3d at 980 (quoting Filla, 336 F.3d at 811). This standard “require[s] the defendant to do more than merely prove that the plaintiff's claim should be dismissed pursuant to a Rule 12(b)(6) motion.” Knudson, 634 F.3d at 980 (quoting Junk v. Terminix Int'l Co., 628 F.3d 439, 445 (8th Cir. 2010)). If a “colorable” cause of action exists, then the joinder is not fraudulent. Filla, 336 F.3d at 810. The Court resolves all facts and ambiguities in the plaintiff's favor, and if the sufficiency of the complaint is questionable, the “better practice” is to remand the case and leave the question for the state court. Id. at 811; see also Wilkinson v. Shackelford, 478 F.3d 957, 964 (8th Cir. 2007) .
Defendants argue that Owens fraudulently joined Lynch, the only non-diverse defendant, because Owens does not have a colorable negligence claim against him. Doc. 14 at p. 1. Under Missouri law, a negligence claim requires (1) a duty of care owed by the defendant to the plaintiff, (2) a breach of that duty, and (3) an injury proximately caused by the breach. See Cleek v. Ameristar Casino Kansas City, LLC, 47 F.4th 629, 635-36 (8th Cir. 2022) (applying Missouri law). The Court discerns two distinct theories of potential liability in Owens's argument that Missouri law could impose liability on Lynch. Doc. 8 at pp. 2-4. First, Owens implies that, by participating in the implantation process, Lynch assumed a duty to advise the implanting physician with reasonable care and that he breached this duty by not warning the physician about the risks he knew or should have known about. Id. at p. 2. Second, Owens implies that Lynch had an independent duty, as a “reasonably prudent seller” of the device, to warn users of the device about dangers he “should have discovered before selling the product” and that, again, Lynch breached this duty by not warning the physician of the risks he knew or should have known about. Id. at p. 3. Both theories rely on the allegation that Lynch “knew or should have known” about the risks associated with the Obtryx II. Doc. 4 at p. 7. Because this allegation is conclusory, both theories fail to show a reasonable basis for Lynch's liability under Missouri law.
In defending the sufficiency of the allegations in her petition, Owens assumes that state pleading standards control. See Doc. 8 at p. 7. But even in cases removed from state court, federal courts “apply federal pleading standards-Rules 8 and 12(b)(6)-to the state substantive law to determine if a complaint makes out a claim under state law.” Karnatcheva v. JPMorgan Chase Bank, N.A., 704 F.3d 545, 548 (8th Cir. 2013). And the same pleading standards apply to allegations used to oppose a claim of fraudulent joinder. See Henson v. Union Pac. R.R. Co., 3 F.4th 1075, 1080 (8th Cir. 2021). Thus, if a plaintiff relies on “conclusory allegations, which are insufficient to state a claim against [the non-diverse defendant,] . . . [dismissal on the basis of fraudulent joinder [is] proper.” Id.; see also Block v. Toyota Motor Corp., 665 F.3d 944, 950 (8th Cir. 2011) ( that “conclusory allegations in the complaint . . . are insufficient” to establish a reasonable basis for liability under state law).
The key allegation in Owens's petition regards Lynch's actual or constructive knowledge of the alleged defects: “On or before the date of implantation, 8/11/16, Defendant Lynch knew or had [sic] should have known of the following dangerous conditions of the Obtryx II . . . .” Doc. 4 at p. 7. The petition contains no allegations of specific facts that would support this allegation. Without more Owens's “bare assertion[]” of Lynch's actual or constructive knowledge “amount[s] to nothing more than a formulaic recitation of [an] element[]” needed to support her negligence claim. See Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 681 (2009) (internal quotation marks and citations omitted). “As such, the allegation[] [is] conclusory and not entitled to be assumed true.” Id. ...
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