Owens v. Comprehensive Health Mgmt.
| Decision Date | 02 March 2020 |
| Docket Number | Case No. 3:17-CV-1391-NJR |
| Parties | DANYALE OWENS, Plaintiff, v. COMPREHENSIVE HEALTH MANAGEMENT, INC., Defendants. |
| Court | U.S. District Court — Southern District of Illinois |
Plaintiff Danyale Owens, proceeding pro se, filed this employment discrimination action on December 27, 2017 (Doc. 2). Now pending before the Court is the Motion for Summary Judgment filed by Defendant Comprehensive Health Management, Inc. (CHMI), incorrectly named as Wellcare Health Plans (Doc. 47).1 For the reasons set forth below, the motion is granted.
The following facts are not genuinely disputed. Plaintiff Danyale Owens began working for CHMI in August 2014 as a Clinical HEDIS Practice Advisor (CHPA) (Doc. 47-1 at p. 3). In her role as a CHPA, Owens would receive raw data from medical providers, abstract and compile the data, quality check the data, and provide the data to the National Committee on Quality Assurance (Id. at p. 4). There were two other CHPAs, one blackwoman named Myrtle Parnell and one white woman named Patricia Foote. Owens was based in Edwardsville, Illinois, and worked out of her home while the rest of her department was based in Chicago (Id. at p. 6).
Around March 2016, Marie Baker became Owens's supervisor (Id. at p. 8). Baker asked all CHPAs to begin submitting a form that tracked their daily activities (Id. at p. 10). She also informed all three CHPAs that paid time off (PTO) would be limited during "HEDIS season," which ran from January or February to May or June each year (Id. at pp. 4, 11). Owens needed to take PTO on Friday, April 15, 2016, however, due to an illness (Id. at p. 11). She also requested to take PTO the following Monday and Tuesday, but the request initially was denied by Baker (Id. at pp. 11-12). In an email to Owens, Baker stated: (Id. at p. 13). Baker copied another CHMI employee, Rose Harrison, on the email; Owens claims Baker did not have permission to share her personal health information with Harrison (Id. at pp. 13-14). Baker ultimately stated that if there was a medical situation that prevented Owens from working from home, Baker would need to see a physician's note (Id. at p. 12). When Owens provided a doctor's note on Monday, April 18, Baker approved her PTO request and told her to check in on Wednesday regarding her health status (Id.).
On April 29, 2016, Baker had a phone call with Owens during which Baker criticized Owens's work performance in front of two co-workers (Id. at p. 18). After the conversation, Owens sent Baker an email stating that Baker had been disrespectful and that she did not appreciate Baker talking to her that way (Id.). Later that same day, Bakergave Owens a written warning called a Performance Improvement Plan (PIP) (Id. at pp. 18, 32-34). The PIP stated that Baker had five previous conversations with Owens in April 2016 about her unsatisfactory performance (Id. at p. 32). The PIP further detailed that: Owens's HEDIS submissions had not met CHMI's requirements, requiring re-work by Owens and the Quality Improvement team; Owens was not receptive to helping team members pick up medical records at a hospital in her area; Owens was not receptive to performance feedback; and Owens had been verbally warned that regular attendance at scheduled meetings was required, as was timely documentation of HEDIS status (Id.). Owens believes that the PIP was written in retaliation for that morning's phone call and the email she sent to Baker (Id. at p. 28).
On May 3, 2016, Owens emailed Robert Hilliard, CHMI's Illinois market President and Baker's supervisor (Id. at pp. 18-19). Owens complained about Baker's management and communication style and lack of professionalism (Id. at p. 38). She did not, however, complain that Baker was treating her differently due to her race, any disability, or any protected activity (Id.). Hilliard referred Owens to Nina Gaines in CHMI's Employee Relations group (Id. at p. 19), and Owens sent Gaines copies of several emails between herself and Baker.
On June 3, 2016, Owens requested FMLA leave to care for her ill mother (Id. at pp. 39-44). CHMI approved Owens's FMLA leave from June 6 to August 5, 2016, and later approved an extension through August 26, 2016 (Id. at p. 22). On August 9, 2016, while still on FMLA leave, Owens emailed Gaines to ask for the result of her formal complaint regarding Baker (Id.). Gaines responded that same day and advised that CHMI policywas not to discuss such matters with an employee on leave (Id. at p. 45). Gaines informed Owens that she would be provided with an update upon her return to work (Id.).
Owens was scheduled to return to work from FMLA leave on August 29, 2016, but instead she asked to use a floating holiday so she could take her mother to an appointment (Id. at p. 23). Baker approved the request (Id.). On August 30, 2016, rather than returning to work, Owens submitted a resignation letter stating: (Id. at p. 47). Owens testified she resigned because she thought Baker would terminate her if she returned to work (Id. at p. 26). Upon receiving the letter, Baker accepted Owens's resignation, effective immediately (Id. at p. 24).
Also on August 30, 2016, prior to submitting her resignation letter, Owens tried to call Gaines to learn the results of the investigation regarding Baker's conduct, but Gaines was no longer working at CHMI (Id.).
On February 15, 2017, Owens filed an EEOC Charge claiming that she was wrongfully terminated, was asked her to provide doctor's notes in order to take PTO, and was treated in a disparate manner compared to other employees regarding time off requests (Id. at p. 48). She also complained that her supervisor shared her confidential medical information (Id.). Despite company policy that her concerns would be investigated within fifteen days of a complaint, she never received the results of the investigation (Id.). Furthermore, she claimed that upon her return to work, the investigation still was not complete (Id.). Due to her employer's failure to take anyremedial action, she had no choice but to separate from the company (Id.). Owens claimed she was retaliated and discriminated against" because of [her] disability and by association with another with a disability in violation of the Americans with Disabilities Act" (Id.). Owens did not suffer from any disability during her employment with CHMI (Id. at p. 29). Owens did not assert race discrimination in her EEOC Charge (Id. at p. 48).
The EEOC was unable to conclude that any statute was violated and issued Owens a Right to Sue letter on September 28, 2017 (Doc. 2-1). Owens then initiated this lawsuit against both CHMI and Baker on December 27, 2017 (Doc. 2). Baker was later dismissed because neither Title VII nor the ADA provide a cause of action against Baker individually (Doc. 21).
In her complaint, Owens claims that she had "no recourse but to resign" because CHMI did not perform a thorough investigation of her claim against Baker (Doc. 2). She asserts that CHMI, through Baker's actions, harassed her, retaliated against her, and discriminated against her by threatening to terminate her, writing her up on falsified grounds, making negative comments about her work performance to Owens's co-workers, refusing to allow her to use PTO for sick days without a doctor's note, and discussing her personal health information with a co-worker without her permission.
CHMI filed this motion for summary judgment on August 30, 2019 (Doc. 47). Owens's response was due on October 3, 2019, but she failed to respond by the deadline. On February 26, 2020, Owens filed an untimely response stating that she had no recourse but to resign from her employment as her rights were violated by Defendant's harassment, discrimination, and retaliation (Doc. 53). She further alleges that Bakerthreatened her with termination and falsified information in order to give her an unjustified write-up (Id.). Owens cites to the bonus she was awarded a month prior to being placed on PIP and an award she received in 2015 for increased HEDIS rates (Id.). Owens further claims there were two other African American women in the department that were harassed and discriminated against by Baker (Id.). Owens testified, however, that Baker also was critical of Patricia Foote—a white employee (Doc. 47-1 at p. 29).
Owens did not cite to any evidence in the record to support her claims, nor did she properly address CHMI's assertions of fact. See FED. R. CIV. P. 56. Accordingly, the Court considers CHMI's facts undisputed for the purposes of its motion. Id.
The court shall grant summary judgment "if the movant shows that there is no genuine dispute as to any material fact and the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law." Spurling v. C & M Fine Pack, Inc., 739 F.3d 1055, 1060 (7th Cir. 2014) (quoting FED. R. CIV. P. 56(a)). Once the moving party has set forth the basis for summary judgment, the burden then shifts to the nonmoving party who must go beyond mere allegations and offer specific facts showing that there is a genuine issue of fact for trial. FED. R. CIV. P. 56(e); see Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 232-24 (1986). Stated another way, the nonmoving party must offer more than "[c]onclusory allegations, unsupported by specific facts," to establish a genuine issue of material fact. Payne v. Pauley, 337 F.3d 767, 773 (7th Cir. 2003) (citing Lujan v. Nat'l Wildlife Fed'n, 497 U.S. 871, 888 (1990)).
In determining whether a genuine issue of fact exists, the Court must view the evidence...
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