Owens v. Donahoe
| Decision Date | 21 December 2012 |
| Docket Number | Civil Action No. 10–cv–01886–WJM–KLM. |
| Parties | Frances M. OWENS, Plaintiff, v. Patrick R. DONAHOE, Postmaster General, Defendant. |
| Court | U.S. District Court — District of Colorado |
OPINION TEXT STARTS HERE
Kevin C. Flesch, Law Office of Kevin C. Flesch, LLC, Englewood, CO, for Plaintiff.
Timothy Bart Jafek, U.S. Attorney's Office, Denver, CO, for Defendant.
ORDER GRANTING DEFENDANT'S MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT
Plaintiff Frances M. Owens (“Plaintiff”) brings claims against her former employer, the Postal Service (“Defendant”) for racial discrimination. Before the Court is Defendant's Motion for Summary Judgment (“Motion”). (ECF No. 68.) Plaintiff Owens (“Plaintiff”) has filed a Response to this Motion (ECF No. 72) and Defendant has filed a Reply. (ECF No. 73). The Motion is ripe for adjudication.
For the reasons set forth below, the Motion is granted.
Summary judgment is appropriate only if there is no genuine issue of material fact and the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. Fed.R.Civ.P. 56(c); Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 322, 106 S.Ct. 2548, 91 L.Ed.2d 265 (1986); Henderson v. Inter–Chem Coal Co., Inc., 41 F.3d 567, 569 (10th Cir.1994). Whether there is a genuine dispute as to a material fact depends upon whether the evidence presents a sufficient disagreement to require submission to a jury or conversely, is so one-sided that one party must prevail as a matter of law. Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, 477 U.S. 242, 248–49, 106 S.Ct. 2505, 91 L.Ed.2d 202 (1986); Stone v. Autoliv ASP, Inc., 210 F.3d 1132 (10th Cir.2000); Carey v. U.S. Postal Service, 812 F.2d 621, 623 (10th Cir.1987).
A fact is “material” if it pertains to an element of a claim or defense; a factual dispute is “genuine” if the evidence is so contradictory that if the matter went to trial, a reasonable party could return a verdict for either party. Anderson, 477 U.S. at 248, 106 S.Ct. 2505. The Court must resolve factual ambiguities against the moving party, thus favoring the right to a trial. Quaker State Minit–Lube, Inc. v. Fireman's Fund Ins. Co., 52 F.3d 1522, 1527 (10th Cir.1995); Houston v. Nat'l General Ins. Co., 817 F.2d 83, 85 (10th Cir.1987).
In mid–2009, the Postal Service reorganized. (Small Decl. (ECF No. 68–3) ¶ 2.) Plaintiff's position was to be eliminated and she applied for several new positions, three of which are at issue in this case: (1) a Strategic Account Manager (“SAM”) position, (2) a Shipping Solutions Specialist (“SSS”) position, and (3) a Business Solutions Specialist (“BSS”) position. Facts relevant to this Motion, with respect to each position, are as follows. ( Id.) 1
For most of 2009, Plaintiff was employed as a National Accounts Manager (“NAM”) at the Postal Service. (Pl.'s Dep. (ECF No. 68–1) at 17). During that time, and in that position, Plaintiff earned a salary of $85,033 and her grade was EAS–21. ( Id. at 18–19).
Several months into the year, the Postal Service announced that a reorganization would take place in mid–2009. (Small Decl. ¶ 2.) As a result of that reorganization, sales positions would be eliminated and the employees in those positions would be required to apply for new positions, including the SAM position. ( Id. ¶ 3).
Rodney Small, a Postal Service employee, was the selecting official for the SAM position. (Small Dep. (ECF No. 68–4) at 31). This was one of the positions Plaintiff applied for. The duties and responsibilities of the SAM position were different from the NAM position. ( Id.) The SAM position was to require more operational knowledge, which was reflected in its higher pay grade: EAS–23. (Small Decl. ¶ 5).
Small interviewed Plaintiff for the SAM position. (Small Dep. at 14). Plaintiff does not recall that any of Small's interview questions were inappropriate. (Pl.'s Dep. at 26). Plaintiff does not know of anything in the interview where Small was taking race into account in his selection. (Pl.'s Dep. at 27–28).
Small decided not to offer the SAM position to Plaintiff because she did not demonstrateto him that she had met the requirements of the position. (Small Dep. at 33). Specifically, Small believed that Plaintiff did not demonstrate an adequate understanding of operations. ( Id.) This included someone who had the knowledge, skills, and abilities to understand complex situations within a strategic account and be able to resolve those operational issues. ( Id. at 33–34).
On about August 20, 2009, Small requested that the SAM position be reposted to solicit candidates for the SAM position again. (Small Decl. ¶ 7). On about August 24, 2009, Small received a request for a noncompetitive lateral transfer into the SAM position from Pattie Herrera. ( Id. ¶ 8). At the time, Herrera was a Customer Support Program Analyst with a grade of EAS–23; the same grade required of the SAM position. ( Id. ¶ 9). Small considered Herrera's noncompetitive lateral transfer into the SAM position to be proper based on ELM–312, a Postal Service policy handbook. ( Id. ¶ 11). Small believed that the policy applied notwithstanding the reorganization of sales positions in mid–2009. ( Id.)
Small interviewed Herrera and considered her better qualified than Plaintiff for the SAM position because Herrera had substantial prior experience in operations; for example, as a Business Service Network Team Leader. ( Id. ¶ 12). Herrera was assigned to the SAM position in late August 2009. ( Id.)
Plaintiff also applied for the SSS position in early October 2009. After applying for the SSS position, however, Plaintiff was notified that she was not recommended as a finalist for the SSS position. (ECF No. 68–5). The board for reviewing applications for the SSS position consisted of Sally Wiltshire, Shavon Keys, and William Lloyd (the “Review Board”). At the time the applications were being reviewed, each member of the Review Board did not know Plaintiff and did not know her race. (Wiltshire Decl. (ECF No. 68–7) ¶¶ 4–5; Keys Decl. (ECF No. 68–8) ¶ 2.; Lloyd Decl. (ECF No. 68–9) ¶ 2). The Review Board scored each candidate's qualifications as listed in the candidate's application against the qualifications for the position as posted in the job announcement. (Wiltshire Decl. ¶¶ 8–9). The Review Board assigned Plaintiff a score of 6. ( Id. ¶ 11). Of the 12 candidates scored by the review board for SSS, seven scored higher than Plaintiff. ( Id. ¶¶ 12–13). The three highest scoring candidates scored 13, 12, and 10. ( Id.) The Review Board did not advance Plaintiff for an interview with Sheila Sandhagen, who was the selecting official for the SSS position. (Sandhagen Decl. (ECF No. 68–10) ¶¶ 3–6).
Based on her interviews of those candidates advanced for interviews by the Review Board, Sandhagen selected Eileen Brieck for the SSS position. ( Id. ¶ 9). Sandhagen believed that Brieck was the best qualified of the candidates with respect to the requirements set forth in the SSS position announcement. ( Id. ¶ 10).
Plaintiff also applied for the BSS position, and was appointed to that role on October 10, 2009. (ECF No. 68–11). Plaintiff's grade in the BSS position was EAS–21, and her salary amounted to $85,033. ( Id.) After Plaintiff obtained the BSS position, she could have applied for EAS–23 if a position became available, but she retired shortly thereafter on January 1, 2010. (Pl. Dep. at 67).
Plaintiff's Complaint originally pled three claims under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964. (ECF No. 1) (“Title VII”). On December 12, 2011, 2011 WL 6152961, this Court dismissed the Plaintiff's harassment and retaliation claims. (ECF No. 53 at 14). The Court held that Plaintiff's claims were limited to the “three discrete alleged adverse employment actions” based on race. (Id.) It is those claims that are now subject to the present Motion for Summary Judgment. (ECF. No. 68).
The familiar McDonnell Douglas burden-shifting test applies to each of Plaintiff's remaining claims. McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792, 802, 93 S.Ct. 1817, 36 L.Ed.2d 668 (1973); see also Garrett v. Hewlett–Packard Co., 305 F.3d 1210, 1216 (10th Cir.2002). Under McDonnell Douglas, Plaintiff must first establish a prima facie case of employment discrimination. Garrett, 305 F.3d at 1216. If Plaintiff makes out a prima facie case, the burden shifts to Defendant to come forward with a legitimate, non-discriminatory basis for its employment decision. Id. If Defendant does so, the inference of discrimination drops out and the burden shifts back to Plaintiff and he must offer evidence to show that race was a determinative factor in the employment decision, or that Defendant's non-discriminatory reason was merely pretext. Id.
Defendant moves for summary judgment as to three discrete alleged adverse employment claims, involving (1) the SAM position, (2) the SSS position, and (3) BSS position. The Court will discuss each in turn below.
To prevail on a disparate treatment claim under Title VII, a plaintiff must show that her employer intentionally discriminated against her for a reason prohibited by the statute. Salguero v. City of Clovis, 366 F.3d 1168, 1178 (10th Cir.2004)(“[Title VII] prohibits only intentional discrimination based upon an employee's protected class characteristics.”) See also Rivera v. City & County of Denver, 365 F.3d 912, 920 (10th Cir.2004).
For the purposes of this claim, Defendant admits that Plaintiff meets the prima facie case. However, Defendant argues that Small had legitimate, nondiscriminatory reasons for not offering Plaintiff the SAM position. Small explains in his deposition that Plaintiff was not offered the position because she did not demonstrate to him that she had met the requirements of the position. (Small Dep. at 33–37.) Additionally, Defendant explains that any offer to...
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