Owens v. Liff.

• Decision Date: 25 April 1949
• Docket Number: No. 782.,782.
• Citation: 65 A.2d 921
• Court: D.C. Court of Appeals
• Parties: OWENS v. LIFF.

65 A.2d 921

OWENS

v.LIFF.

No. 782.

Municipal Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia.

April 25, 1949.

Appeal from the Municipal Court for the the District of Columbia, Civil Division.

Action by George A. Owens against Charles P. Liff to obtain possession of housing accommodations. From a judgment for defendant, plaintiff appeals.

Affirmed.

Raymond E. Gable and Ernest F. Henry, both of Washington, D. C. (Jerome F. Barnard, of Washington, D. C., on the brief), for appellant.

Joseph L. Rauh, Jr., of Washington, D. C. (Irving J. Levy and Paul A. Porter, both of Washington, D. C., on the brief), for appellee.

Before CAYTON, Chief Judge, and HOOD and CLAGETT, Associate Judges.

CLAGETT, Associate Judge.

This appeal involves the right to possession of an apartment in Naylor Gardens, a large development in southeast Washington, which was built originally by a United States government agency and subsequently sold to Veterans Cooperative Housing Association. Appellee Liff has resided in the project as a tenant since May 1943 and desires to continue to live there. Appellant Owens is a member of Veterans Cooperative and filed suit under that section of the District of Columbia Emergency Rent Act which permits a landlord (in the absence of a valid lease) to gain possession of housing accommodations upon establishing that he seeks such possession in good faith for his immediate and personal use and occupancy as a dwelling. ¹ Appellee claims the right to remain in the apartment until the end of government rent control by reason of an amended lease made prior to the transfer of the property to Veterans Cooperative. This appeal is brought from a judgment of the trial court upholding the tenant's claim.

Unlike previous controversies in this jurisdiction involving cooperative apartments, ² decision of the present case is not made to turn upon whether appellant Owens is a ‘landlord’ within the meaning of the local Rent Act. This appeal depends rather upon the legal effect of a series of contracts and transfers of title affecting the project as a whole and the individual apartment over which this contest is waged.

Appellee Liff went into possession under a lease made to him by Defense Homes Corporation, a governmental agency, by which it was agreed that he became a tenant by the month. Such lease was made in 1943, which was after the effective date of the Emergency Rent Act. ³

On January 15, 1947, the government signed a contract to sell the entire project to Veterans Cooperative Housing Association, a non-profit corporation organized pursuant to the District of Columbia Cooperative Association Act. ⁴ This contract contained various provisions for the protection of tenants already in the project, including appellee Liff. One such provision was: ‘Prior to January 1, 1948, or the date of termination of Rent Control in the District of Columbia (whichever date is the later) the Association [Veterans Cooperative] shall not: (1) Evict any tenant occupying the project on the date of the conveyance as aforesaid except for causes recognized by courts of law which justify eviction because of breach of tenancy contract * * *.’ An identical provision for the protection of tenants was inserted in a draft of deed of trust, which it was agreed Veterans Cooperative would give in part payment for the property. ⁵

Subsequent to the making of this sale agreement between the government and Veterans Cooperative, or on November 22, 1947, appellant Owens signed a ‘mutual ownership’ contract with Veterans Cooperative. This contract is the sole basis for his claim that he is a landlord entitled to possession of the apartment. The following provision is included in such contract: ‘The Association agrees to deliver the Perpetual Use [of the apartment] to the Member as of the date of the deed conveying the project to the Association to be executed and delivered by the Defense Homes Corporation (hereinafter called the Government’), pursuant to the provisions of a certain Purchase and Sales Contract between the Government and the Association dated January 15, 1947.' (Emphasis supplied.)

Subsequently negotiations took place to further insure the protection of the tenants then in the project and an agreement was reached between the Defense Homes Corporation (representing the government), the Veterans Cooperative, and an organization representing the tenants in possession, by which the provision for continuing tenancy was eliminated from the sale agreement between the government and Veterans Cooperative and from the draft of the deed of the trust, and in lieu thereof separate agreements were made between the government agency and the individual tenants including appellee Liff. The new arrangement was incorporated in a written offer and acceptance between appellee and the government dated January 2, 1948, by which there was inserted in appellee's lease the following provisions:

‘If no default occurs on the part of the Tenant in any of the covenants or conditions of the Lease, then the term thereof shall be automatically renewable from month to month at the option of the Tenant until the termination of rent...