Owens v. Mason
| Decision Date | 21 October 2016 |
| Docket Number | Case No. 16-cv-774-MJR |
| Parties | TYRONE OWENS, # B-09385, Plaintiff, v. MS. MASON, MARCUS MYERS, CAROL McBRIDE, JACQUELINE LASHBROOK, JOHN BALDWIN, WEXFORD MEDICAL SERVICES, LARUE LOVE, C/O URASKI, MEDICAL DIRECTOR (IDOC), and MR. FLATT, Defendants. |
| Court | U.S. District Court — Southern District of Illinois |
Plaintiff, currently incarcerated at Pinckneyville Correctional Center ("Pinckneyville"), has brought this pro se civil rights action pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983. Plaintiff claims that various Defendants wrongly punished him with segregation for conduct related to his serious mental illness, violated HIPAA by disclosing his mental health writings to security staff, and retaliated against him. This case is now before the Court for a preliminary review of the complaint pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915A. Also before the Court are several motions filed by Plaintiff, including a motion seeking a temporary restraining order ("TRO") and preliminary injunction (Docs. 10 and 12), a "Motion in Addendum" (Doc. 11), and a "Motion to Fast Track" (Doc. 13).
Under § 1915A, the Court is required to screen prisoner complaints to filter out non-meritorious claims. See 28 U.S.C. § 1915A(a). The Court must dismiss any portion of the complaint that is legally frivolous, malicious, fails to state a claim upon which relief may be granted, or asks for money damages from a defendant who by law is immune from such relief. 28 U.S.C. § 1915A(b).
An action or claim is frivolous if "it lacks an arguable basis either in law or in fact." Neitzke v. Williams, 490 U.S. 319, 325 (1989). Frivolousness is an objective standard that refers to a claim that "no reasonable person could suppose to have any merit." Lee v. Clinton, 209 F.3d 1025, 1026-27 (7th Cir. 2000). An action fails to state a claim upon which relief can be granted if it does not plead "enough facts to state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face." Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570 (2007). The claim of entitlement to relief must cross "the line between possibility and plausibility." Id. at 557. Conversely, a complaint is plausible on its face "when the plaintiff pleads factual content that allows the court to draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged." Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009). Although the Court is obligated to accept factual allegations as true, see Smith v. Peters, 631 F.3d 418, 419 (7th Cir. 2011), some factual allegations may be so sketchy or implausible that they fail to provide sufficient notice of a plaintiff's claim. Brooks v. Ross, 578 F.3d 574, 581 (7th Cir. 2009). Additionally, Courts "should not accept as adequate abstract recitations of the elements of a cause of action or conclusory legal statements." Id. At the same time, however, the factual allegations of a pro se complaint are to be liberally construed. See Arnett v. Webster, 658 F.3d 742, 751 (7th Cir. 2011); Rodriguez v. Plymouth Ambulance Serv., 577 F.3d 816, 821 (7th Cir. 2009).
Applying these standards, the Court finds that one of Plaintiff's claims survives threshold review under § 1915A.
On May 11, 2016, Plaintiff wrote a kite to tell mental health staff that he was hearing voices. Defendant Mason (a mental health worker) gave the document to Defendant Uraski (Intelligence Officer) (Doc. 1, p. 7). The kite allegedly said that Plaintiff Id. Plaintiff claims that the note had been altered to make it appear that he was actually threatening to kill a staff member; instead, he was seeking help from mental health staff. Plaintiff has been hearing voices since he was 13 years old and has been diagnosed with serious mental illness. He has written to Mental Health at Pinckneyville over 50 times, and has told Defendant Mason about these voices on many occasions. He maintains that he would not and could not do what the voices instructed him to do, and what the voices told him in his head was not a "threat." (Doc. 1, pp. 7, 9).
Based on that kite, Plaintiff was charged with a disciplinary violation and, he claims, was punished with six months in segregation. The complaint articulates several claims. First, Defendants Mason, Myers, McBride, Lashbrook, Baldwin, Wexford Medical Services, Love, Uraski, Flatt, and the Medical Director of the IDOC all conspired to violate the HIPAA law, by creating a policy instructing mental health workers to disclose mental health writings to security staff. These Defendants further conspired to violate Plaintiff's rights by instituting a policy to retaliate against seriously mentally ill inmates by placing them in segregation for lengthy periods, and requiring them to remain in their cells for 24 hours a day despite a settlement agreement to stop that policy.
Plaintiff claims that his due process rights were violated because two of the officers who conducted his disciplinary hearing (Defendants McBride and Myers) are bothBlack, and IDOC policy states that two people of the same race should not serve on a hearing committee (Doc. 1, p. 8). Just before the hearing, Defendant McBride stabbed Plaintiff in the chest with a tightly-rolled wad of papers and verbally threatened him. The incident was witnessed by Defendants Myers and Pearce. During the hearing, Plaintiff was asked, "How do you plea?" but was not allowed to explain, nor was his ticket read to him. Plaintiff later learned that he was given six months in segregation. He now suffers from severe headaches and has suicidal thoughts because he is kept in the cell 24 hours a day, which he claims is too long for a seriously mentally ill inmate (Doc. 1, p. 8). These conditions cause the voices to occur constantly. Plaintiff wrote four grievances over these matters, but Defendant Flatt refuses to answer them.
On July 7, 2016, Plaintiff received another ticket issued by Defendant Uraski, based on another kite he had written to Defendant Mason. As with the first ticket, Plaintiff wrote about the voices he hears, and Defendant Mason turned the note over to security. Plaintiff was told he would get another six months in segregation. Defendant Mason explained that according to Defendant Wexford, she was required to inform security about the voices. Plaintiff asserts that now that he is required to be treated by the prison mental health providers, and is covered by a proposed settlement agreement regarding mental health treatment, the mental health workers at Pinckneyville are retaliating by giving his mental health documents to security (Doc. 1, p. 9). Plaintiff summarizes several provisions of the settlement agreement in Rasho v. Baldwin, et al., Case No. 07-cv-1298-MMM (C.D. Ill. filed Nov. 7, 2007), and includes as an exhibit the proposed settlement notice he received as a class member (Doc. 1, pp. 9, 16-17).
Plaintiff also provided a copy of the adjustment committee report on the May 11, 2016, disciplinary action (Doc. 1, pp. 13-14). This document reflects that Plaintiff was chargedwith "206 - Intimidation or Threats," and pled guilty to the conduct of writing a note describing voices that told him to kill a staff member. Mental Health staff were contacted, and recommended a segregation term of no more than three months because of Plaintiff's serious mental illness. According to this document, Plaintiff was in fact punished with three months in segregation, and lost one month of good conduct credits. Plaintiff did not include any documentation relating to the July 7, 2016, disciplinary ticket with his complaint.
Plaintiff seeks compensatory and punitive damages, as well as a temporary restraining order and preliminary injunction ordering his release from segregation (Doc. 1, p. 10).
The TRO/Preliminary Injunction motion at Doc. 10 is identical to the second TRO/PI motion filed at Doc. 12, with the exception that Plaintiff included three pages of exhibits with Doc. 10 that were not included with the motion at Doc. 12. In this motion, Plaintiff asserts that he has been punished with segregation time for a total of nine months, which will not end until February 4, 2017. He includes other new allegations that were not contained in the complaint, including a claim that he was placed in segregation simply because he is seriously mentally ill, and because he continues to file grievances and lawsuits (Doc. 10, p. 1). He further alleges that Dr. Thakur (psychiatrist) instructed Defendant Mason to take action to get Plaintiff out of segregation, and attempted along with Ms. Hayes (another mental health worker) to convince security officials and Defendant Love to release Plaintiff from segregation, to no avail. He states that Dr. Thakur told Defendant Mason that giving Plaintiff's kite to security was improper (Doc. 10, p. 2).
Plaintiff's exhibits include a "Treatment Review Committee Hearing Summary"from June 20, 2016, noting that the committee considered whether to forcibly medicate Plaintiff, but decided such action was not necessary (Doc. 10, pp. 6-7). He also attaches another copy of the Notice of Proposed Settlement from Rasho v. Baldwin.
This document includes more factual allegations that were not presented in Plaintiff's complaint, and presents several pages of additional exhibits, which it appears that Plaintiff wants to add to his complaint. He states that grievances he had filed over the incidents in the complaint were not answered in a timely fashion, violating his due process rights. He asserts that he exhausted his administrative remedies (Doc. 11, pp. 1-2). Referring to the tickets he received on July 6, 2016, he claims that he was subjected to double jeopardy because the same ticket was heard twice, and he was allegedly given six...
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