Owens v. School Committee of Boston

• Decision Date: 21 October 1969
• Docket Number: Civ. A. No. 69-934-F.
• Citation: 304 F. Supp. 1327
• Parties: William OWENS et al., Plaintiffs, v. SCHOOL COMMITTEE OF BOSTON et al., Defendants.
• Court: U.S. District Court — District of Massachusetts

304 F. Supp. 1327

William OWENS et al., Plaintiffs, v. SCHOOL COMMITTEE OF BOSTON et al., Defendants.

Civ. A. No. 69-934-F.

United States District Court D. Massachusetts.

October 21, 1969.

MEMORANDUM OF DECISION ON MOTION FOR PRELIMINARY INJUNCTION

FRANCIS J. W. FORD, District Judge.

Plaintiffs in this action, who include black voters, black pupils in Boston public schools and their parents and former black candidates for the Boston School Committee, allege in their complaint that the present method of electing the Boston School Committee deprives them of their rights under the Fourteenth and Fifteenth Amendments to the Constitution of the United States.

Plaintiffs at this time move for a preliminary injunction enjoining for the defendants from conducting an election for members of the School Committee scheduled to be held on November 4, 1969. Briefs have been submitted and arguments heard on the question of issuance of the injunction. Both parties are in apparent agreement that before a preliminary injunction can issue, plaintiffs must show a reasonable probability of ultimate success on the merits, and must also make a showing of irreparable harm to plaintiffs, resulting from the holding of the election, sufficient in the light of the injury to defendants if relief is granted, to justify the exercise of the equitable powers of this court.

Under the provisions of § 18 of the Boston City Charter the School Committee is composed of five members elected at large for a term of two years. A preliminary election is held at which ten candidates are chosen to appear on the ballot at the final election at which five are chosen who will constitute the School Committee for the succeeding two years from the January following the election. Each voter is entitled to vote for five candidates both in the preliminary and final elections. The preliminary election was held on September 23, 1969 and the final election is to be held on November 4, 1969.

The at-large system of electing the School Committee has been used in Boston continuously since 1875 and the number of members has been fixed at five since 1905.

Plaintiffs purport to sue on behalf of themselves and of all black citizens of Boston, who are alleged to constitute at the present time about 13% of the total population of the city, most of whom are concentrated in one geographic area of the city. Plaintiffs' contention is that they constitute a definite racial minority group within the city who in an at-large election cannot elect by their own votes alone a member of their race or a candidate of any race favorable to their interests, while in an election by districts they might in one or more districts have enough votes to elect a candidate to represent them who would be favorable to their interests.

It should be noted that there is no claim here that any eligible citizen in Boston is being denied the right to cast his vote in any election. Nor is there any claim that the "one man, one vote" principle, as such, is being violated. Clearly in the present system each vote has exactly the same weight as any other. Nor does the mere fact that no candidate for whom an elector casts his ballot is successful in the election mean that the elector has been unconstitutionally deprived of an effective right to vote. Such a result is merely the almost inevitable result in a democratic election in which the choice of the majority prevails over that of the minority.

The system of electing members of a governmental board in an at-large election is, of course, a device quite commonly used. There are advantages and disadvantages to the use of either the at-large or the district system of election. One supposedly ensures the election of the type of official who can command a wide support throughout the whole community and will be representative of and responsive to the needs of the community as a whole. The other is designed to ensure representation of the particular interests of the separate geographical segments of the community, perhaps at the expense of the general interest. It is true that the same persons who would be elected under one system would not necessarily be able to win election under the other system. There are many justifiable considerations which may lead a city to adopt one method of election rather than the other.

The essential question here is whether a city which has for a long time and for sound reasons used the at-large system is under a constitutional compulsion to adopt a district system in order to better the chances of a minority group to secure representation of their own particular interests. There is no case that clearly holds that there is such a requirement in the situation presented here. It has been clearly held that the at-large system is not per se unconstitutional. Dusch v. Davis, 387 U.S. 112, 87 S.Ct. 1554, 18 L.Ed.2d 656. Fortson v. Dorsey, 379 U.S. 433, 85 S.Ct. 498, 13 L.Ed.2d 401. It is true that dicta in those cases indicate that in some circumstances an at-large system might be invalid. Clearly this might be so if it were deliberately adopted for the purpose of minimizing the voting influence of some group within the electorate. But plaintiffs do not argue, and hardly could argue that a system adopted in 1875 was intentionally aimed at them. And it is rather fanciful to contend that because the change to an at-large system in 1875 was, conjecturally, aimed at some other then minority group, the system should be banned as having been infected ab initio with an unconstitutional taint.

The situation most closely resembling that in the present case is the one involved in the recent case of Chavis v. Whitcomb, 305 F.Supp. 1364 decided July 28, 1969...