Owens v. State

• Decision Date: 01 January 1871
• Parties: FRANK OWENS v. THE STATE.
• Court: Texas Supreme Court

35 Tex. 361

FRANK OWENS

v.THE STATE.

Supreme Court of Texas.

1871.

1. On a trial for robbery the only evidence against the accused was the testimony of the prosecuting witness, and he was directly contradicted by numerous witnesses and on material points. Held, that a new trial should have been granted on the defendant's motion.

2. In this case the district courts are urgently admonished to relax the rigor of their practice in respect of new trials, especially in criminal cases. As they have the jury and the witnesses before them, they should grant a new trial whenever it appears that justice has not been done, or that the verdict is against the weight of the evidence, or when the evidence is so weak as to leave doubt of the guilt of the accused. The stringent rules by which this court governs its own practice with respect to granting new trials are not applicable to the district courts.

APPEAL from Harrison. Tried below before the Hon. J. B. Williamson. The parties were freedmen. The defense claimed to have won the money at cards, and not by robbery.

W. Stedman and W. M. Walton, for the appellant.

Wm. Alexander, Attorney General, for the state.

WALKER, J.

The appellant was indicted on a charge of robbery, preferred by Ned. Johnson. Had the prosecuting witness been on trial, the evidence would have been conclusive to convict him of perjury. His statement is unsupported in any material point, and he is impeached by overwhelming evidence. He denies playing at cards with defendant on the day of the alleged robbery; six witnesses swear positively to their playing; some of them to the fact of Johnson's telling Owens that he had won all except forty dollars of his money, and at the same time insisting upon continuing the play. Every syllable of the evidence is consistent with this theory of the case, except that of the prosecuting witness. No evidence remained, worthy of belief, to settle the guilt of the appellant.

The verdict of the jury is without evidence that any intelligent man ought to have believed. And we suggest here, that it would in our opinion be better practice, and more in accordance with law, should the district courts adopt a more liberal rule in granting new trials. We have never considered that the same rule applied in the district court which repeated decisions have laid down for the government of this court.

We do not disturb the finding of a jury unless we are clearly convinced that they are wrong, and unsupported by any reasonable amount of evidence. But the district...