Owens v. La. State Univ.
| Docket Number | Civil Action 21-242-WBV-SDJ |
| Decision Date | 22 December 2023 |
| Parties | ABBY OWENS, ET AL. v. LOUISIANA STATE UNIVERSITY, ET AL. |
| Court | U.S. District Court — Middle District of Louisiana |
ORDER AND REASONS
Before the Court is Defendant's Motion for Summary Judgment No 2: Samantha Brennan, filed by the Board of Supervisors of Louisiana State University and Agricultural and Mechanical College (the “Board of Supervisors”).[1] Plaintiffs oppose the Motion,[2] and the Board of Supervisors has filed a Reply.[3] After careful consideration of the parties' memoranda and the applicable law, the Motion is DENIED.
This case involves allegations by ten former students of Louisiana State University and Agricultural and Mechanical College (“LSU”) that LSU and its Athletic Department funded and implemented a purposefully deficient sexual misconduct and Title IX reporting scheme separate from LSU's official Title IX office to keep sexual assault claims within the Athletic Department.[5] The instant Motion concerns the Title IX heightened risk claims asserted by plaintiff Samantha Brennan against the Board of Supervisors, which survived the Court's March 31, 2023 Order and Reasons granting in part and denying in part the Board of Supervisors' Motion to Dismiss the Second Amended Complaint.[6]
The Court limits its recitation of the facts alleged in the Second Amended Complaint to those alleged by Plaintiff Samantha Brennan, the facts asserted in the Complaint by other plaintiffs which Brennan relies on in support of her claims, and the facts set out in the Board's Statement of Undisputed Material Facts that Brennan admits are true in her Opposing Statement of Material Facts.[7] In the Second Amended Complaint, Plaintiffs allege that on July 9, 2016, Brennan went out with a friend who worked for the media department of the LSU football team, and that the friend introduced her to John Doe, a well-known member of LSU's football team.[8] Plaintiffs allege that John Doe drove Brennan home that night and that John Doe took a nude photograph of Brennan without her consent while she was incapacitated.[9] Plaintiffs allege that on or around July 22, 2016, Brennan's coworker told her that John Doe had taken a nude photo of her and had shared it with the football team.[10] Brennan met with LSU officials about it on July 22, 2016, including Sharon Lewis and Miriam Segar.[11] Sharon Lewis was the Associate Athletics Director of Football Recruiting and Alumni Relations in 2021,[12] and Segar is the Senior Associate Athletics Director and Senior Woman Administrator for LSU, and previously served as Assistant Athletics Director and Associate Athletics Director for Student Services.[13] Plaintiffs allege that Segar was a “Responsible Employee” required to report all disclosures of sexual assault to the Title IX office.[14]
Plaintiffs further allege that when Brennan met with Lewis and Segar, Segar had actual knowledge of John Doe's prior rape of at least one other LSU student, specifically, plaintiff Ashlyn Mize-Robertson.[15] Plaintiffs allege that Lewis asked Brennan if she wanted to initiate a police investigation or if she wanted LSU “to handle it internally,” and that Brennan said she wanted LSU to handle it internally.[16]
On April 26, 2021, Brennan, along with nine other plaintiffs, filed suit against the Board of Supervisors as well as various LSU officials asserting, among other claims, Title IX violations.[17] In the Second Amended Complaint, Brennan asserted seven claims as follows: Count I, Violation of Title IX, Deliberate Indifference to Sex Discrimination in violation of 20 U.S.C. §§ 1681, et seq.; Count II, Violation of Title IX, Hostile Environment in violation of 20 U.S.C. §§ 1681, et seq.; Count III, Violation of Title IX, Heightened Risk in violation of 20 U.S.C. §§ 1681, et seq.; Count IV, Violation of Title IX, Retaliation by Withholding Protection Otherwise Conferred by Title IX in violation of 20 U.S.C. §§ 1681, et seq.;[18] Count V, Violation of Title IX, First Amendment Retaliation in violation of 42 U.S.C. § 1983 and the First Amendment;[19] Count VI, Denial of Equal Protection in violation of 42 U.S.C. § 1983 and the Fourteenth Amendment;[20] and Count VII, Denial of Substantive and Procedural Due Process in violation of 42 U.S.C. § 1983 and the Fourteenth Amendment.[21]
In response to a Motion to Dismiss filed by the Board of Supervisors, the Court dismissed Brennan's deliberate indifference, hostile environment, and retaliation claims against the Board of Supervisors.[22] Thus, the only remaining claim asserted by Brennan against the Board of Supervisors is her heightened risk claim asserted in Count III.
In Count III of the Second Amended Complaint, Plaintiffs allege that the Board of Supervisors created a heightened risk of sex-based discrimination on LSU's campus by mishandling and discouraging reports of sexual assault.[23] Plaintiffs specifically allege that LSU created a heightened risk of sexual misconduct on campus for John Doe's victims, including Brennan, because LSU failed to properly record John Doe as Mize-Robertson's assailant or to properly investigate Mize-Robertson's report, thereby allowing a known rapist to remain on campus with unfettered access to the student body.[24] Plaintiffs allege that LSU “knew or should have known that this substantially heightened Brennan's risk of victimization.”[25] Ignoring her request, Plaintiffs allege that Segar took Brennan to the LSU Police Department to file a report, and that an officer tried to coerce her into pressing charges against John Doe.[26] Plaintiffs allege that Brennan never received notice from LSU about whether a Title IX investigation was conducted, that Brennan was never contacted by anyone in the Title IX office or any other school officials about any potential investigation of her report, and that no one at LSU ever offered Brennan any support, resources, accommodations, or interim measures.[27]
In the instant Motion, the Board of Supervisors seeks summary judgment on Brennan's perpetrator-based heightened risk claim, arguing that her claim fails as a matter of law because Brennan cannot meet any of the five necessary elements of her claim.[28] The Board of Supervisors further asserts that to the extent Plaintiff has asserted a heightened risk claim based on LSU's policy of deliberate indifference to sexual misconduct, that claim “is unavailable as a matter of law.”[29] The Board of Supervisors also asserts that Brennan's heightened risk claims are prescribed as a matter of law.[30] Plaintiffs argue that genuine issues of material fact preclude summary judgment on both of Brennan's heightened risk claims, including whether the claims are timely.[31] In response, the Board of Supervisors maintains that it is entitled to summary judgment on Brennan's heightened risk claims.[32]
Summary judgment is appropriate where there is no genuine disputed issue as to any material fact, and the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.[33] When assessing whether a dispute regarding any material fact exists, the reference” the arguments and evidence submitted in support of its Motion, as well as the arguments and evidence submitted in support of the Board's nine other reply memoranda. R. Doc. 492 at p. 1, n.1. It appears the Board of Supervisors used this tactic to avoid seeking leave to exceed the page limits applicable to supporting memoranda and reply briefs. See, Local Civil Rule 7(g) of the Local Rules of the United States District Court for the Middle District of Louisiana. Plaintiffs employ a similar tactic, cross-referencing portions of other opposition briefs they filed in response to the nine other motions for summary judgment filed by the Board of Supervisors, likely as a means to avoid requesting leave to exceed the page limit. See, generally, R. Doc. 481. The Court looks with extreme disfavor on motions that incorporate other motions, especially after discussing with counsel that it would allow individually filed briefing addressing each plaintiff's claims. “Rule 56 does not impose Court considers “all of the evidence in the record but refrain[s] from making credibility determinations or weighing the evidence.”[34] While all reasonable inferences must be drawn in favor of the nonmoving party, a party cannot defeat summary judgment with conclusory allegations, unsubstantiated assertions or “only a scintilla of evidence.”[35] Instead, summary judgment is appropriate if a reasonable jury could not return a verdict for the nonmoving party.[36] Where, as here, the nonmoving party will bear the burden of proof at trial on the dispositive issue, the moving party may satisfy its burden by merely pointing out that the evidence in the record is insufficient with respect to an essential element of the nonmoving party's claim.[37] The burden then shifts to the nonmoving party who must go beyond the pleadings and, “by her own affidavits, or by the ‘depositions, answers to interrogatories, and admissions on file,' designate ‘specific facts showing that there is a genuine issue for trial.'”[38]
“Congress enacted Title IX in 1972 with two principal objectives in mind: ‘[T]o avoid the use of federal resources to support discriminatory practices' and ‘to provide individual citizens effective protection against those practices.'”[39] In line with those objectives, Title IX provides that, “No person in the United States shall, on the basis of sex, be excluded from participation in, be denied the benefits of, or be subjected to discrimination under any education program or activity receiving Federal financial...
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