Owens v. United States
Citation | 130 F. 279 |
Decision Date | 23 May 1904 |
Docket Number | 978. |
Parties | OWENS v. UNITED STATES. |
Court | United States Courts of Appeals. United States Court of Appeals (9th Circuit) |
Louis K. Pratt, for plaintiff in error.
Marshall B. Woodworth and Nathan V. Harlan, U.S. Attys.
Before GILBERT and ROSS, Circuit Judges, and HAWLEY, District Judge.
The plaintiff in error was charged by indictment with having killed one Carl Christensen, 'purposely and of his deliberate and premeditated malice,' by cutting and stabbing him with a knife, and, after trial, was convicted of murder in the second degree, upon which conviction he was sentenced to imprisonment. The homicide was the result of a combat with knives between the deceased and the plaintiff in error, in a cabin occupied by the latter, at a remote spot in the territory of Alaska. No one was present but the participants. At the trial the plaintiff in error testified in his own behalf to the effect that the deceased commenced the fight by attacking and cutting him with a knife, and that, to protect his own life, he was compelled to, and did inflict the wounds resulting in the death of Christensen. In considering the instructions given by the court below, to which exceptions were taken by the plaintiff in error, it must, of course, be assumed that the jury may have believed that testimony of the defendant; and upon that point of self-defense, which was, indeed, the only defense interposed the court below instructed the jury as follows:
'Applying the foregoing principles of law to this case, if you find from the evidence, or entertain a reasonable doubt whether or not it is true, that at the time mentioned in the indictment the deceased, Christensen, attacked the defendant in his cabin or dwelling place with a butcher knife, and the same being a dangerous weapon, with which death or great bodily harm could have been inflicted upon the defendant by Christensen, and that Christensen then and there endeavored to kill or do great bodily harm to the defendant with such knife, then defendant was not obliged to retreat, but had the lawful right to stand his ground and defend himself against such attack, and had the right to continue such defense and pursue Christensen until he (defendant) was entirely out of danger; and if, in making such defense, Christensen met his death, it was justifiable homicide, and you should find the defendant not guilty.
'The court instructs the jury that, when a person is attached by another with a deadly weapon, he has the right to act upon the appearance of things as they appear to him at the time and, as long as he honestly and in good faith believes that his antagonist is about to inflict death or great bodily harm upon him, he has the right to continue his defense.
'The law of self-defense, however, will not permit the one attached to pursue the attacking opponent further than is necessary to protect himself, and, if you shall find and believe from the evidence in this case that Christensen did attack the defendant, this would not justify the defendant in Killing him, without such killing was necessary to protect himself; and of the necessity thereof you are to judge, and not the defendant, and you are to judge from the evidence in the case.
'You are instructed that the law of self-defense was as much the right of the deceased, Christensen, as it was that of the defendant; and if you shall find and believe from the evidence in this case, beyond a reasonable doubt, that the deceased was attached by the defendant when the deceased was attempting to retreat to and through the open door of the house where the homicide happened, and would have so retreated but for the attack of the defendant, then I instruct you that the defendant is not entitled to be acquitted on the ground of self-defense.
'It is for you to determine, gentlemen of the jury, from the evidence in this case, and upon these instructions, whether or not the accused killed the deceased in self-defense, or whether he killed him without justification or excuse.
'You are instructed that no mere threats made by the deceased before or at the time of the killing unaccompanied at the time of the killing with any attempt to carry them into execution, are sufficient to justify the killing, or reduce it to a lower degree of homicide than murder; and if you find that the defendant cut and stabbed and killed the deceased because of such threats, and because the defendant thought such threats would justify him in killing the deceased, and that when he cut and killed him he was in no immediate or imminent danger, he is guilty of murder.
'The law of self-defense will justify one in killing another in the protection of his own life, but it will not justify him in killing another where there is no reasonable danger to himself, nor will it justify or excuse him in using greater force than is reasonably necessary to protect himself; and if you shall find and believe from the evidence in this case that the accused was not acting in self-defense when he killed the deceased, Carl Christensen, and was acting as an unjustifiable assailant, and not in the defense of his own person, he would not be excused on the plea of self-defense.'
Much that was there said by the trial court was correct. The difficulty is that in at least one place in these instructions the court ignored the well-settled doctrine that, where one is attached by another with a deadly weapon, the party attached may, if he does so honestly and in good faith, safely act in the light of his surroundings, and on the appearances to him at the time, for the court distinctly and specifically instructed the jury that of the necessity of the defendant's protecting himself 'you are to judge, and not the defendant, and you are to judge from the evidence in case'; that is to say, upon the evidence given at the trial the jury was to determine whether or not it was necessary for the defendant to kill the deceased in order to protect himself, without reference to the appearances to the defendant of existing conditions at the time of the encounter. The law upon the subject is well stated in the case of State v. Ferguson, 9 Nve. 106, 116, where the court said:
By the frequent use of the words 'absolutely necessary,' as found in the instructions and charge, the jurors may have drawn the inference that, before they would be justified in acquitting the defendant, it must...
To continue reading
Request your trial-
Frank v. United States
...met his death, it was justifiable homicide in self-defense, and you should find the defendant not guilty. * * *" In Owens v. United States (C. C. A.) 130 F. 279, 281, the instruction therein set forth, after stating circumstances justifying self-defense, "Applying the foregoing principle of......
-
Bridges v. United States
...Dewey Mead (page 3998), Oscar W. Pearson (page 4036), all prominent men in their various vocations and professions. 22 Owens v. United States, 9 Cir., 1904, 130 F. 279; Griggs v. United States, 9 Cir., 1908, 158 F. 572; Louie Ding v. United States, 9 Cir., 1917, 246 F. 80; United States v. ......
-
State v. Taylor
...v. State, 34 Neb. 236, 51 N.W. 837; State v. Cohen, 108 Iowa 208, 78 N.W. 857; Siberry v. State, 133 Ind. 677, 33 N.E. 681; Owens v. United States, 9 Cir., 130 F. 279; State v. Parks, 96 N.J.L. 360, 115 A. 305; Gilcoat v. State, 155 Ark. 455, 244 S.W. 723; Pettine v. Territory of New Mexico......
-
Pettine v. Territory of New Mexico
...201 F. 489 PETTINE v. TERRITORY OF NEW MEXICO. No. 3,617.United States Court of Appeals, Eighth Circuit.October 21, 1912 [201 F. 490] ... T. B. Catron, of Santa ... above named. On the other hand, this instruction has been ... held to be fatal error in Owens v. United States, ... 130 F. 279, 283, 64 C.C.A. 525, 529, Siberry v ... State, 133 Ind. 677, 33 ... ...
-
ON REASONABLENESS: THE MANY MEANINGS OF LAW'S MOST UBIQUITOUS CONCEPT.
...(2d Cir. 1950) (Frank, J., dissenting); Pettine v. Territory of New Mexico, 201 F. 489, 495-97 (8th Cir. 1912); Owens v. United States, 130 F. 279, 283 (9th Cir. (21.) Jackson v. Virginia, 443 U.S. 307, 317 (1979) (emphasis added). (22.) See United States v. Fatico, 458 F. Supp. 388, 405-06......