Owens v. US, 94-CF-518

• Decision Date: 30 December 1996
• Docket Number: 95-CO-1440 and 94-CF-472.,No. 94-CF-518,94-CF-518
• Citation: Owens v. US, 688 A.2d 399 (D.C. 1996)
• Parties: Tyrone OWENS, Appellant, and Norman Williams, Appellant, v. UNITED STATES, Appellee.
• Court: D.C. Court of Appeals

688 A.2d 399

Tyrone OWENS, Appellant, and Norman Williams, Appellant, v. UNITED STATES, Appellee.

Nos. 94-CF-518, 95-CO-1440 and 94-CF-472.

District of Columbia Court of Appeals.

Argued November 12, 1996.

Decided December 30, 1996.

George E. Rickman, for appellant Tyrone Owens.

James G. Walker, Washington, for appellant Norman Williams.

John Crabb, Jr., Assistant United States Attorney, with whom Eric H. Holder, Jr., United States Attorney, and John R. Fisher, Thomas J. Tourish, Jr., and Jennifer M. Anderson, Assistant United States Attorneys, were on the brief, for appellee.

Before SCHWELB and RUIZ, Associate Judges, and PRYOR, Senior Judge.

PRYOR, Senior Judge:

Appellants Tyrone Owens and Norman Williams were convicted by a jury of distribution of a controlled substance and possession with intent to distribute (PWID), in violation of D.C.Code § 33-541(a)(1) (1993 Repl.). On appeal appellants advance a litany of errors regarding multiplicity of charges, sufficiency of the evidence, sentencing, and a series of contentions challenging the exercise of the trial judge's discretion. We affirm.

I.

In September 1993, shortly after noon, undercover officer Larry Hale parked near the corner of 16th and E Streets, Northeast. When he exited his car, appellant Owens beckoned to him and asked Hale if he wanted to buy drugs. Hale responded he wanted to buy $20 worth of crack. Owens then led Hale to the 400 block of 18th Street near the intersection with D Street. There Owens said, "Give me your money." Hale gave him a twenty dollar bill from which he had previously transcribed the serial number. Owens took the money and walked over to appellant Williams, who pulled a brown bag out of his pants. Williams took a small object from the bag and handed it to Owens, who gave him the money. Owens then returned to Hale and handed him a blue "ziplock" bag containing crack. Hale took the crack, returned to his car, and broadcast a lookout for the appellants. The arrest team apprehended Williams. Hale later drove by and identified him. Williams had $221 in cash, including the prerecorded $20 bill that Hale had given to Owens, and two blue "ziplock" bags containing crack. Appellant Owens was later apprehended by the arrest team.

II.

A. Insufficiency of the Evidence

Both appellants contend the evidence was legally insufficient to support their convictions for possession of a controlled substance with intent to distribute. In particular, appellant Owens asserts that the evidence was inadequate to convict him as an aider and abetter.

We begin with the familiar premise that this court must view the evidence in the light most favorable to the government and affirm if "there was sufficient evidence `from which a reasonable mind might fairly infer guilt beyond a reasonable doubt.'" Blakeney v. United States, 653 A.2d 365, 369 n. 3 (D.C. 1995) (quoting Gayden v. United States, 584 A.2d 578, 580 (D.C.1990), cert. denied, 502 U.S. 843, 112 S.Ct. 137, 116 L.Ed.2d 104 (1991)). All reasonable inferences must be drawn in favor of the government, and deference must be given to the jury's right to determine credibility and weigh evidence. Id.

The evidence shows that appellant Williams had multiple packages of cocaine on his person, one of which was sold to a stranger introduced by appellant Owens. After the sale, at the time of arrest, Williams possessed two additional bags of crack and a large sum of money, including Officer Hale's pre-recorded currency. From these circumstances, along with the expert testimony, a jury could readily conclude that Williams was in possession of the drugs with intent to distribute them. See Edmonds v. United States, 609 A.2d 1131 (D.C.1992) (evidence deemed sufficient in circumstances where defendant possessed five small "ziplock" bags of drugs), cert. denied, 508 U.S. 980, 113 S.Ct. 2983, 125 L.Ed.2d 679 (1993).

With respect to appellant Owens, we consider the government's theory of aiding and abetting as it overlays the sufficiency question. In general, one may be convicted on a theory of aiding and abetting if one knowingly associates oneself with a criminal venture and engages in conduct in furtherance of the offense. See, e.g., Wright v. United States, 508 A.2d 915, 918 (D.C.1986); United States v. Monroe, 301 U.S.App.D.C. 100, 990 F.2d 1370 (1993). It is not necessary that such an accomplice personally do all the acts necessary for commission of the offense. See Monroe, 990 F.2d at 1374 ("`all that is necessary is to show some affirmative participation which at least encourages the principal offender to commit the offense'").

Appellant Owens asserts that if we exclude the evidence of the initial sale, and view the case thus, there is inadequate evidence to prove that he intended to participate in a future sale. In this instance, Owens encountered a stranger on the street, who happened to be an undercover police officer, and initiated a drug sale. He led the officer at least three city blocks to the site of the sale. He received money from the officer and ultimately handed the drugs to the officer. As stated, when arrested, appellant's co-defendant possessed other packets of drugs and over two hundred dollars.

The offense of which appellant was convicted, possession of narcotics with intent to distribute them, like some forms of assault, attempt, and conspiracy, is an inchoate offense. Thus it is contemplated that the violation can occur without completion of the objective. Although it is true that in Allen v. United States, 580 A.2d 653 (D.C.1990), defendant was observed reaching out to a prospective buyer with a tinfoil packet in hand, and in United States v. Monroe, supra, defendant, after completing a sale, offered to assist the buyer to make a second purchase from another seller, it does not follow that evidence of an initial sale must or should be excluded from consideration of a subsequent PWID charge. Rather, the appropriate inquiry is whether appellant Owens knowingly associated himself with intended future sales and took action in furtherance of it. Thus, the court, in Monroe, supra, 990 F.2d at 1374, noted that one may "abet" this particular offense by maintaining the market, procuring customers, or acting as a broker. At bottom, Owens asks us to alter the sufficiency principle to support his factual challenge in this case. We decline to do so.

We conclude the jury may properly consider all of the material circumstances bearing on an accused's conduct relevant to the PWID charge including evidence of the sale for which Owens was convicted of distribution. Applying the sufficiency test to the instant evidence, including the expert testimony,¹ we conclude that although the evidence was not overwhelming that Owens intended to assist Williams in further sales of crack, a reasonable juror could, but is not compelled to, find guilt under the circumstances. Thus the evidence in this case is sufficient as to appellant Owens.²

B. Abuse of Discretion

Appellants raise a number of issues challenging the trial court's discretion. Because we find that the court did not abuse its discretion regarding any of the following issues, we find these arguments to be without merit.

Appellants assert the trial court erred in allowing the government expert to testify. The admission of expert testimony lies within the trial court's discretion. Blakeney, supra, 653 A.2d at 369. Expert testimony is admissible if it will help the jury understand the facts of the case or understand "matters `beyond the ken of the average layperson.'" Griggs v. United States, 611 A.2d 526, 528 (D.C.1992) (citations omitted). Here the expert, a detective with the Metropolitan Police Department, explained how police test and handle drugs that they seize. He also stated his opinion why he thought that the crack taken from Williams was packaged for sale. Finally, he explained how "runners" and "holders" work together to sell drugs. We find the trial court did not abuse its discretion when it allowed this testimony.³

Appellants also challenge the trial court's refusal to allow an eight-year-old child to testify. The determination of the competency of a witness to testify lies within the discretion of the trial court and will not be disturbed unless it is plainly wrong. Howard v. United States, 663 A.2d 524, 530 (D.C.1995). Here, the trial court conducted a voir dire of an eight-year-old prospective witness. See Barnes v. United States, 600 A.2d 821, 823 (D.C.1991) (noting a preliminary examination is appropriate for a young witness to determine if she can recall the events about which she will testify and whether she understands the difference between the truth and a falsehood). During the voir dire the child was unable to fully recall the pertinent events. She specifically stated that she did not understand the difference between the truth and a lie. Accordingly, the judge's determination that she was not competent to testify was not an abuse of discretion.⁴

Appellant Williams claims there was prosecutorial misconduct during closing argument when the prosecutor asserted it was undisputed that drugs were found on Williams. It is urged that this assertion violated his Fifth Amendment right not to testify. In reviewing allegations of prosecutorial misconduct, this court first determines whether the action actually constituted misconduct and, second, weighs several factors to determine if the misconduct requires reversal of the conviction. Gray v. United States, 589 A.2d 912, 916 (D.C.1991). Because we find there was no prosecutorial misconduct, we need not move to the second stage of the analysis. Appellant Williams does not cite anything in the record that rises to the level of prosecutorial misconduct. Even if the prosecutor's statement is construed as stating Williams' possession of the drugs was uncontradicted, it would still have been proper. See Jackson v. United States, 623 A.2d 571 (D.C.), cert. denied, 510 U.S. 1030, ...