Owino v. CoreCivic, Inc.
| Decision Date | 01 April 2020 |
| Docket Number | Case No.: 17-CV-1112 JLS (NLS) |
| Court | U.S. District Court — Southern District of California |
| Parties | SYLVESTER OWINO and JONATHAN GOMEZ, on behalf of themselves and all others similarly situated, Plaintiffs, v. CORECIVIC, INC., a Maryland corporation, Defendant. CORECIVIC, INC., Counter-Claimant, v. SYLVESTER OWINO and JONATHAN GOMEZ, on behalf of themselves and all others similarly situated, Counter-Defendants. |
ORDER: (1) DENYING WITHOUT PREJUDICE PLAINTIFFS' MOTION FOR PARTIAL SUMMARY JUDGMENT, (2) DENYING DEFENDANT'S MOTION FOR JUDGMENT ON THE PLEADINGS, (3) DENYING AS MOOT PLAINTIFFS' MOTION TO EXCLUDE, AND (4) GRANTING IN PART AND DENYING IN PART PLAINTIFFS' MOTION FOR CLASS CERTIFICATION
Presently before the Court are Plaintiffs and Counter-Defendants Sylvester Owino and Jonathan Gomez's Motion for Class Certification ("Cert. Mot.," ECF No. 84), Motion for Partial Summary Judgment ("MPSJ," ECF No. 97), and Motion to Exclude Evidence from Class Certification Decision ("Mot. to Exclude," ECF No. 128), as well as Defendant and Cross-Claimant CoreCivic, Inc.'s Motion for Judgment on the Pleadings ("MJP," ECF No. 117). The Court held a hearing on December 19, 2019. See ECF Nos. 154, 159 ("Tr."). Having carefully considered the Parties' arguments, the evidence, and the law, the Court DENIES WITHOUT PREJUDICE Plaintiffs' Motion for Partial Summary Judgment (ECF No. 97), DENIES Defendant's Motion for Judgment on the Pleadings (ECF No. 117), DENIES AS MOOT Plaintiffs' Motion to Exclude (ECF No. 128), and GRANTS IN PART AND DENIES IN PART Plaintiffs' Motion for Class Certification (ECF No. 84), as follows.
Plaintiffs are civil immigration detainees who are involuntary confined at Defendant's detention facilities under the custody of Immigration and Customs Enforcement ("ICE"). See Pls.' Stmt. of Facts, ECF Nos. 97-2, 99-1 (sealed), ¶¶ 1, 37, 41. During their period of detention, Plaintiffs and other ICE detainees performed work for Defendant through a Voluntary Work Program ("VWP"). Id. Defendant paid those participating in the VWP between $0.75 and $1.50 per day, id. ¶ 18, which is less than California's minimum wage. See id. ¶ 35. Defendant also coerced detainees to perform additional, uncompensated work under threat of punishment. See id. ¶¶ 11, 13, 16.
Plaintiffs filed this putative class action on May 1, 2017, alleging seven causes of action for (1) forced labor and violation of the Trafficking Victims Protection Act ("TVPA"), 18 U.S.C. §§ 1589 et seq.; (2) forced labor and violation of the CaliforniaTVPA, Cal. Civ. Code § 52.5; (3) unfair competition, Cal. Bus & Prof. Code §§ 17200 et seq.; (4) violations of the California Labor Code; (5) violation of California Industrial Welfare Commission ("IWC") Orders; (6) negligence; and (7) unjust enrichment. See generally ECF No. 1. Plaintiffs alleged that the action was being brought on behalf of three classes: (1) a "Nationwide Forced Labor Class" comprised of "[a]ll civil immigration detainees who performed Forced Labor uncompensated work for CoreCivic at any Detention Facility owned or operated by it between November 2, 2004[,] to the applicable opt-out date, inclusive"; (2) a "California Forced Labor Class" comprised of "[a]ll civil immigration detainees who performed Forced Labor uncompensated work for CoreCivic at any Detention Facility located in California owned or operated by it at [any] time during the period from November 2, 2004[,] to the applicable op-out date, inclusive"; and (3) a "California Labor Law Class" comprised of "[a]ll civil immigration detainees who performed Dollar-A-Day Work for CoreCivic and were paid one dollar ($1) per day at any Detention Facility located in California owned or operated by it at any time between November 2, 2004[,] to the applicable op-out date, inclusive." Id. ¶ 30.
On August 11, 2017, Defendant moved to dismiss for failure to state a claim under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6), see generally ECF No. 18, a motion that the Court later granted in part and denied in part. See generally ECF No. 38. Defendant then answered Plaintiffs' complaint, "admit[ting] that jurisdiction is proper in this Court." See ECF No. 44 ¶¶ 2-3, 5. Although Defendant raised several affirmative defenses, it did not raise any jurisdictional defenses. See id. at 21-27.
On September 11, 2018, Plaintiffs moved to file an amended complaint "for the purpose of adding a claim for violations of the Private Attorney General Act ("PAGA"), Cal. Labor Code §§ 2698, et seq.," ECF No. 64, a request Defendant did not oppose. See ECF No. 65. The Court therefore granted Plaintiffs' motion, see ECF No. 66, and Plaintiffs filed their First Amended Complaint on October 12, 2018, see generally ECF No. 67 ("FAC"), adding a new cause of action for violation of PAGA "[o]n [b]ehalf of Plaintiffs [i]ndividually and the Class." See id. ¶¶ 129-38. Again, Plaintiffs alleged three classes: aNationwide Forced Labor Class, a California Forced Labor Class, and a California Labor Law Class. See id. ¶ 30.
Defendant answered Plaintiffs' First Amended Complaint on October 26, 2018. See generally ECF No. 70. For the first time, Defendant "admit[ted] only that this Court has specific personal jurisdiction over CoreCivic as to the claims arising out of CoreCivic's California facilities" and "denie[d] that this Court has general personal jurisdiction over CoreCivic as to claims arising out of CoreCivic's non-California facilities." Id. ¶ 5; see also id. ¶ 31 (). CoreCivic also raised a new affirmative defense in its answer to Plaintiffs' First Amended Complaint: "As a separate defense, and in the alternative, CoreCivic alleges that this Court lacks personal jurisdiction over CoreCivic as to Plaintiffs' claims arising out of Plaintiffs' non-California facilities." Id. at 22 ¶ 8.
On April 15, 2019, Plaintiffs filed their Certification Motion, seeking to certify five classes, see generally ECF No. 84, and Plaintiffs filed their Motion for Partial Summary Judgment, seeking summary adjudication as to whether Plaintiffs are employees under California law and on Plaintiffs' claims for violation of California Labor Code sections 226 and 1194, on June 5, 2019. See generally ECF No. 97. On July 11, 2019, Defendant filed its Motion for Judgment on the Pleadings, "mov[ing] this Court, pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(c) to grant judgment on the pleadings and dismiss all putative class claims that arose outside of California for lack of personal jurisdiction." See ECF No. 117 at 2. Plaintiffs moved to exclude certain evidence Defendant introduced in its opposition to their Certification Motion on August 1, 2019, "on the grounds that Defendant violated this Court's scheduling order regarding class discovery, as well as two of the Court's discovery orders," by producing documents "to Plaintiffs for the first time months after the close of class discovery." See ECF No. 128 at 2.
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Under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 56(a), a party may move for summary judgment as to a claim or defense or part of a claim or defense. Summary judgment, or partial summary judgment, is appropriate where the Court is satisfied that there is "no genuine dispute as to any material fact and the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law." Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a); Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 322 (1986). Material facts are those that may affect the outcome of the case. Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 248 (1986). A genuine dispute of material fact exists only if "the evidence is such that a reasonable jury could return a verdict for the nonmoving party." Id. When the Court considers the evidence presented by the parties, "[t]he evidence of the non-movant is to be believed, and all justifiable inferences are to be drawn in his favor." Id. at 255.
The initial burden of establishing the absence of a genuine issue of material fact falls on the moving party. Celotex, 477 U.S. at 323. The moving party may meet this burden by identifying the "portions of 'the pleadings, depositions, answers to interrogatories, and admissions on file, together with the affidavits, if any,'" that show an absence of dispute regarding a material fact. Id. When a plaintiff seeks summary judgment as to an element for which it bears the burden of proof, "it must come forward with evidence which would entitle it to a directed verdict if the evidence went uncontroverted at trial." C.A.R. Transp. Brokerage Co. v. Darden Rests., Inc., 213 F.3d 474, 480 (9th Cir. 2000) (quoting Houghton v. South, 965 F.2d 1532, 1536 (9th Cir. 1992)).
Once the moving party satisfies this initial burden, the nonmoving party must identify specific facts showing that there is a genuine dispute for trial. Celotex, 477 U.S. at 324. This requires "more than simply show[ing] that there is some metaphysical doubt as to the material facts." Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574, 586 (1986). Rather, to survive summary judgment, the nonmoving party must "by her own affidavits, or by the 'depositions, answers to interrogatories, and admissions on file,'designate 'specific facts'" that would allow a reasonable fact finder to return a verdict for the non-moving party. Celotex, 477 U.S. at 324; Anderson, 477 U.S. at 248. The non-moving party cannot oppose a properly supported summary judgment motion by "rest[ing] on mere allegations or denials of his pleadings." Anderson, 477 U.S. at 256.
Plaintiffs seek summary adjudication as to (1) their status as "employees" under California law, and (2) Defendant's liability to them under California Labor Code sections 226 and 1194 and ...
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