Owners Ins. Co. v. Craig
Decision Date | 04 April 2017 |
Docket Number | No. SC 95843,SC 95843 |
Citation | 514 S.W.3d 614 |
Parties | OWNERS INSURANCE COMPANY, Appellant, v. Vicki CRAIG and Chris Craig, Respondents. |
Court | Missouri Supreme Court |
Owners was represented by Russell F. Watters and T. Michael Ward of Brown & James PC in St. Louis, (314) 421-3400.
The Craigs were represented by Jeffrey M. Bauer and Steven B. Garner of Strong, Garner, Bauer PC in Springfield, (417) 887-4300.
Owners Insurance Company appeals a summary judgment entered in favor of its policyholders Vicki Craig and Chris Craig that denied Owners the right to reduce the amount paid pursuant to its underinsured motorist ("UIM") coverage by the amount paid by the at-fault motorist's liability insurer. Because the policy at issue unambiguously provides for such set-off, the circuit court's judgment is reversed and the case is remanded.
Owners issued the Craigs a policy with UIM coverage.1 The policy's declarations list "$250,000 per person" as the UIM "limit," but the "Limit of Liability" section in the UIM endorsement states:
The policy then contains "set-off" provisions:
This language clearly provides that Owners will pay the declarations' listed limit amount minus what is paid by the underinsured motorist's policy if damages exceed the declarations' listed limit amount, or damages minus what is paid by the underinsured motorist's policy if damages do not exceed the declarations' listed limit amount. As such, these provisions ensure Owners will never be obligated to pay the full amount the declarations list as the UIM "limit."2
With this policy in place, Vicki was injured in an accident when her vehicle was struck by one driven by another motorist; she incurred damages exceeding $300,000. Because the at-fault motorist was insured under a Shelter Insurance policy with a liability limit of $50,000, Shelter Insurance paid the Craigs $50,000. The Craigs then turned to Owners, seeking $250,000, the declarations' listed UIM limit amount. Instead, Owners paid the Craigs $200,000, citing the set-off provisions that allowed them to deduct the $50,000 Shelter Insurance paid on behalf of the at-fault motorist. Owners then sought a declaratory judgment over the disputed $50,000, and both sides moved for summary judgment with a joint stipulation of facts. The circuit court ruled the policy was ambiguous and entered summary judgment in favor of the Craigs. Owners appealed and, pursuant to article V, § 10 of the Missouri Constitution, the case was transferred to this Court by certification of a dissenting judge after opinion by the court of appeals.
"Whether to grant summary judgment is an issue of law that this Court determines de novo. " Seeck v. Geico Gen. Ins. Co. , 212 S.W.3d 129, 132 (Mo. banc 2007). "The interpretation of an insurance policy is a question of law that this Court also determines de novo. " Id.
Owners argues that the policy unambiguously provides for the $50,000 set-off, that the policy never promises to pay up to the full amount listed in the declarations but expressly states in the UIM endorsement that such amount is for reference purposes only, and that the declarations alone do not promise coverage. The Craigs argue the policy is ambiguous because, despite the language in the UIM endorsement, the declarations list $250,000 as the UIM limit and other portions of the policy reference the declarations as containing or describing the policy's limits of liability.3
Seeck , 212 S.W.3d at 132 (internal quotations omitted). Additionally, "it is well-settled that where one section of an insurance policy promises coverage and another takes it away, the contract is ambiguous." Ritchie v. Allied Prop. & Cas. Ins. Co. , 307 S.W.3d 132, 140–41 (Mo. banc 2009). An insured cannot create an ambiguity by reading only a part of the policy and claiming that, read in isolation, that portion of the policy suggests a level of coverage greater than the policy actually provides when read as a whole. Such a request for a Dutton v. Am. Family Mut. Ins. Co. , 454 S.W.3d 319, 323-24 (Mo. banc 2015) ; accord Ritchie , 307 S.W.3d at 135 ( ). Any ambiguity is resolved in favor of the insured. Id. But "[a]bsent an ambiguity, an insurance policy must be enforced according to its terms." Seeck , 212 S.W.3d at 132.
In the UIM context, this Court has previously held that an ambiguity exists when the policy contains both: (1) express language indicating the insurer will indeed pay up to the declarations' listed limit amount; and (2) set-off provisions ensuring the insurer will never be obligated to pay such amount. See Manner , 393 S.W.3d at 66 ; Ritchie , 307 S.W.3d at 140–41 ; Jones v. Mid-Century Ins. Co. , 287 S.W.3d 687, 690–93 (Mo. banc 2009). The ambiguity arises from the fact that both statements cannot be true; either the insurer will sometimes pay up to the declarations listed limit, or the amount it will pay always will be limited by the amount paid by the underinsured motorist. Here, there is no such internal inconsistency or contradiction as, unlike in cases such as Jones , the policy contains no express language indicating the insurer will pay up to the declarations' listed limit amount. In fact, the "Limit of Liability" section in the UIM endorsement contains the opposite, stating the declarations' listed limit amount is "for reference purposes only" and "[u]nder no circumstances" will Owners have a duty to pay that entire amount. Essentially, this policy takes a form that this Court previously suggested would be enforceable:
A policy that plainly states it only will pay the difference between the amount recovered from the underinsured motorist and the [declarations' listed limit amount] is enforceable. In such a case, the mere fact that [the declarations' listed limit amount] will never be paid out is not misleading, for the policy never suggests that this is its liability limit and never implies that it may pay out that amount.
Ritchie , 307 S.W.3d at 141 n.10.
While the Craigs point to the declarations' listed limit amount and other portions of the policy that make bare, general references to the declarations containing the limit of liability, the declarations "are introductory only and subject to refinement and definition in the body of the policy." Peters v. Farmers Ins. Co. , 726 S.W.2d 749, 751 (Mo. banc 1987). The declarations Floyd-Tunnell v. Shelter Mut. Ins. Co. , 439 S.W.3d 215, 221 (Mo. banc 2014).
Evaluating the policy as a whole, it unambiguously provides that the declarations' listed limit amount serves only as a reference point for use with the set-off provisions, which are likewise unambiguous.4
The circuit court's judgment is reversed and the case is remanded.
I concur in the principal opinion's holding reaffirming the principle that insurance companies may issue policies with set-off provisions. However, I respectfully dissent because I would find that Owners Insurance Company's (hereinafter, "Owners") underinsured motorist coverage policy (hereinafter, "UIM") issued to Vicki and Chris Craig (hereinafter and collectively, "Insured") contained ambiguous provisions. Therefore, I would affirm the trial court's judgment.
Courts do not read provisions of an insurance contract in isolation but rather evaluate the entire policy as a whole. Manner v. Schiermeier , 393 S.W.3d 58, 65 (Mo. banc 2013). "Interpretation of an insurance policy and the determination of whether provisions are ambiguous are questions of law, subject to de novo review." Taylor v. Bar Plan Mut. Ins. Co. , 457 S.W.3d 340, 344 (Mo. banc 2015). "In construing the terms of an insurance policy, this Court applies ‘the meaning which would be attached by an ordinary person of average understanding if purchasing insurance,’ and resolves ambiguities in favor of the insured." Jones v. Mid-Century Ins. Co. , 287 S.W.3d 687, 690 (Mo. banc 2009) (quoting ...
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