Oxford Tp. v. Michigan Dept. of Social Services
| Court | Court of Appeal of Michigan |
| Writing for the Court | ALLEN |
| Citation | Oxford Tp. v. Michigan Dept. of Social Services, 327 N.W.2d 409, 120 Mich.App. 103 (Mich. App. 1983) |
| Decision Date | 06 January 1983 |
| Docket Number | Docket No. 57579 |
| Parties | TOWNSHIP OF OXFORD, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. MICHIGAN DEPARTMENT OF SOCIAL SERVICES, John T. Dempsey, Director of the Department of Social Services, Michigan Department of Mental Health, Frank M. Ochberg, Director of the Department of Mental Health, Lakeville Manor, Inc., and Richard Weber, Jointly and Severally, Defendants-Appellees. 120 Mich.App. 103, 327 N.W.2d 409 |
[120 MICHAPP 104] Siudara, Rentrop & Martin by Gary R. Rentrop and Jeffrey K. Haynes, Bloomfield Hills, for plaintiff-appellant.
Frank J. Kelley, Atty. Gen., Louis J. Caruso, Sol. Gen., and Janis Meija and William K. Basinger, Asst. Attys. Gen., for defendants Dept. of Social Services, Dept. of Mental Health, John T. Dempsey and Frank M. Ochberg.
Mars C. Riopelle, P.C., Rochester, for defendants-appellees Richard Weber and Lakeville Manor, Inc.
Jon T. Garrett, Detroit, for amicus curiae, Metropolitan Detroit Public Interest Law Center.
Before ALLEN, P.J., and CYNAR and MARTIN, * JJ.
Plaintiff appeals from an April 20, 1981, order of summary judgment which permits operation of a foster care home for the mentally ill in Oxford Township.
Michigan Department of Social Services granted a license to Lakeville Manor, Inc., a nonprofit business, for the operation of a foster care small-group home, pursuant to the Adult Foster Care Facilities Licensing Act, M.C.L. Sec. 400.701 et seq.; M.S.A. Sec. 16.610(51) et seq. The facility provides care for six adult mentally ill women who were former patients of a state hospital. Such a facility is not a permitted use in a single-family residential district under Oxford Township's zoning ordinance.
[120 MICHAPP 105] On January 6, 1981, the township brought an action for injunctive and declaratory relief, alleging: (1) Sec. 16a of the Township Rural Zoning Act, M.C.L. Sec. 125.286a; M.S.A. Sec. 5.2963(16a), does not exempt adult foster care facilities licensed under the Adult Foster Care Facilities Licensing Act from compliance with the Oxford Township zoning ordinance; and (2) the Adult Foster Care Facilities Licensing Act prohibits the placement of the mentally ill in adult foster care small-group homes. On April 20, 1981, the trial court granted defendants' motion for summary judgment finding that neither allegation stated a cause of action. Plaintiff appeals as of right from the order of summary judgment. We affirm.
As to plaintiff's first allegation, for the reason set forth in Brandon Twp. v. North-Oakland Residential Services, Inc., 110 Mich.App. 300, 306-309, 312 N.W.2d 238 (1981), we conclude that Sec. 16a of the Township Rural Zoning Act, M.C.L. Sec. 125.286a; M.S.A. Sec. 5.2963(16a), exempts adult care facilities, including small-group homes, from compliance with local zoning ordinances. Consequently, plaintiff failed to state a cause of action for violation of the Oxford Township zoning ordinance.
Plaintiff's second allegation, that a foster care small-group home may not provide care for mentally ill adults under the Adult Foster Care Facilities Licensing Act, presents an issue of statutory construction of first impression.
An "adult foster care facility" is generally defined as:
M.C.L. Sec. 400.703(4); M.S.A. Sec. 16.610(53)(4). (Emphasis added.)
There are basically four types of adult foster care facilities distinguished in part by the number of adults for which each is licensed to provide foster care. Each facility or home is defined as follows:
[120 MICHAPP 107] "(b) Mental illness, developmental disability, or physical handicap, or a combination of mental illness, developmental disability, or physical handicap." M.C.L. Sec. 400.703(3); M.S.A. Sec. 16.610(53)(3). (Emphasis added.)
M.C.L. Sec. 400.703(5); M.S.A. Sec. 16.610(53)(5).
"(b) Mental illness, developmental disability, or physical handicap, or a combination of mental illness, developmental disability, or physical handicap." M.C.L. Sec. 400.703(6); M.S.A. Sec. 16.610(53)(6). (Emphasis added.)
" 'Adult foster care small group home' means an adult foster care facility with the approved capacity to receive 12 or fewer adults who shall be provided foster care." M.C.L. Sec. 400.703(7); M.S.A. Sec. 16.610(53)(7).
Relying on the emphasized phrases above, plaintiff argues the Legislature intended to prohibit placement of mentally ill persons in adult foster care small-group homes. First, plaintiff contends that an adult foster care facility as defined in M.C.L. Sec. 400.703(4); M.S.A. Sec. 16.610(53)(4), provides foster care to the aged, emotionally disturbed, developmentally disabled or physically handicapped, but not to the mentally ill, because the condition is not listed in the statute. Next, plaintiff asserts that the definition of adult foster care small group home, M.C.L. Sec. 400.703(7); M.S.A. Sec. 16.610(53)(7), incorporates the general definition of adult foster care facility and, therefore, a small-group home is intended to provide foster care only to those with the conditions specifically listed under the general definition of adult foster care facility. Since mental illness is not one of the enumerated conditions, such persons are excluded from small-group homes. Further, plaintiff contends that mentally ill persons were intended to reside only in the larger congregate facilities or large-group homes, as established by the express mention of the mentally ill, as opposed to emotionally disturbed, in those provisions, M.C.L. Sec. 400.703 subds. (3) and (6); M.S.A. Sec. 16.610 subds. (53) (3) and (6). Plaintiff argues that limiting placement of the mentally ill to large institutions effectuates sound public policy. Plaintiff reasons that the larger facilities would necessarily[120 MICHAPP 108] require sizable buildings in order to accommodate such a number of adults for foster care purposes. Such buildings would be found in areas zoned for institutions or hospitals and away from single-family residential neighborhoods, thus protecting these residents from dangerous mentally ill patients. We find plaintiff's arguments untenable for several reasons.
The cardinal rule of statutory construction is to ascertain and give effect to the intent of the Legislature. Melia v. Employment Security Comm., 346 Mich. 544, 562, 78 N.W.2d 273 (1956). In ascertaining intent, we first look to the language of a statute. People v. Dunn, 104 Mich.App. 419, 426, 304 N.W.2d 856 (1981). Legislative intent must be determined from consideration of all provisions of the enactment in question, Braden v. Spencer, 100 Mich.App. 523, 530, 299 N.W.2d 65 (1980). Each word, sentence, and provision should be read together to harmonize the meaning, giving effect to the act as a whole. General Motors Corp. v. Erves (On Rehearing), 399 Mich. 241, 255, 249 N.W.2d 41 (1976).
Plaintiff's attempt to interpret the act as permitting placement of mentally ill individuals in congregate facilities and large-group homes, but not in small-group homes and family homes, is contrary to the clear statutory language. All four types of facilities are "adult foster care facilities", and as such, may care for individuals who are disabled, aged, emotionally disturbed, developmentally disabled or physically handicapped. We reject plaintiff's argument that placement of the mentally ill in foster care facilities is prohibited since the condition is not listed in the statute. To reiterate, an adult foster facility is defined as:
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