Oxley v. Mine & Smelter Supply Co.

• Court: Wyoming Supreme Court
• Writing for the Court: PARKER
• Citation: Oxley v. Mine & Smelter Supply Co., 439 P.2d 661 (Wyo. 1968)
• Decision Date: 18 April 1968
• Docket Number: No. 3631,3631
• Parties: John T. OXLEY and W. R. Jensen, Appellants (Defendants below), and Process Engineering Development and Equipment Company, Inc., a/k/a Pedeco, Inc., et al. (Defendants below), v. MINE AND SMELTER SUPPLY CO. et al., Appellees (Plaintiffs below).

Page 661

439 P.2d 661

John T. OXLEY and W. R. Jensen, Appellants (Defendants below) and Process Engineering Development and Equipment Company, Inc., a/k/a Pedeco, Inc., et al. (Defendants below), v. MINE AND SMELTER SUPPLY CO. et al., Appellees (Plaintiffs below).

No. 3631.

Supreme Court of Wyoming.

April 18, 1968.

David Norman Burns, of Burns & Hunt, Jackson, for appellants.

Robert B. Ranck, of Simpson, Kepler, Simpson & Ranck, Floyd R. King, Jackson, for appellees.

Before HARNSBERGER, C. J., and GRAY, McINTYRE, and PARKER, JJ.

Mr. Justice PARKER delivered the opinion of the court.

This is an appeal by John T. Oxley and W. R. Jensen from the decree of foreclosure entered in two mining lien cases which had been consolidated for trial. The complaints in essence alleged that the defendants had some claim or interest in certain Crystal Claims, Teton County, Wyoming (recorded in Book 9, p. 390 ff., County Clerk, Teton County), and that materials had been furnished by plaintiffs to the defendants or to someone on their behalf, that payment therefor had been neglected or refused, and that liens had been filed on the property. Jensen answerred, raising defenses of no claim, no knowledge of the truth of the allegations, and late filing of the liens. Oxley appeared 'for the purpose of asserting his defenses as to the property proceeded against in this action, and not submitting himself personally to the jurisdiction of the court,' and pleaded lack of jurisdiction of his person and the subject matter, late filing of the action, insufficient claim for relief, failure to join an indispensable party, insufficiency of process and improper service of procees; alleged no knowledge of certain allegations and generally denied the others; but admitted he had an interest in certain improvements on some of the mining claims. He also filed a motion to dismiss on various grounds, one of the bases of which was that 'the court lacks jurisdiction because all necessary parties are not joined in said action and cannot be so joined because this action is to foreclose materialmen's liens against certain mining claims owned by the Wyoming Industrial Company which is not a party to this action and cannot be made a party within the time set by law for foreclosing liens on mining claims.' The motion to dismiss was denied.

The pretrial order indicates that Oxley admitted plaintiffs delivered to the property involved the material and supplies stated in their liens, that these were duly and timely recorded, and that suit for foreclosure was timely instituted except as to defendant Jensen. The order further shows defendants Oxley and Jensen to have denied that the material and supplies furnished were lienable items or that either of them was liable or responsible for the items involved.

A trial of the cause resulted in a foreclosure of lien judgment from which defendants Oxley and Jensen appeal, asserting three grounds of error, that (1) the court's refusal to dismiss the foreclosure actions because the Wyoming Industrial Company, an indispensable party, had not been joined was fatal, (2) the lien statements were invalid, (3) the service upon Oxley was invalid.

The argument advanced by defendants to substantiate their charge of the trial court's error in denying their motion to dismiss because of failure to join the Wyoming Industrial Company is unpersuasive. The record ownership of the mining claims by that corporation, established by the stipulation of counsel, was not, ipso facto, sufficient to demonstrate its indispensability as a party. We had occasion to discuss the general subject recently in American Beryllium & Oil Corporation v. Chase, Wyo., 425 P.2d 66, 68, where we approved the well established rule that an indispensable party is one without whose presence before the court a final decree could not be made without either affecting his interest or leaving the controversy in such a condition that its final determination might be wholly inconsistent with equity and good conscience. The opinion went on to say that whether or not a person is an indispensable party cannot be determined by prescribed formula because the facts peculiar to each case are determinative of that question. At that time we indicated the questions which a trial court ought to consider after determination that a party is interested in the controversy. These were:

1. Is the interest of the absent party distinct and separable?

2. In his absence can the court render judgment between the parties before it?

3. Will the decree made in his absence have no injurious effect on his interests?

4. Will the final determination in his absence be consistent with equity and good conscience?

Only if the court should determine any of these questions in the negative, is the absent party indispensable. Applying this formula to the instant case we have before us no information which would show that any of those questions should have been answered in the negative.

By the 'Mining Development and Operating Agreement,' an exhibit in the case, the Wyoming Industrial Company gave Oxley all its rights to explore, drill, test, mine, extract, remove, produce, and process all minerals found upon or under the lands embraced within the boundaries of the unpatented placer mining claims located in Teton County, described as Crystal Nos. 1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6, 8, 12, 13, and 14 (recorded 9-11-59, Book 9, pp. 390-396). Admissions in the record seem to show that Oxley thus held an interest legal or equitable in the property and as such was an owner within the provisions of § 29-27, W.S. 1957, C.1967. Three of the four cases cited by defendants to support their contention that there was error in denying the motion did not relate to liens and we consider the opinions to be inapplicable and unworthy of discussion. The fourth, Fein v. Davis, 2 Wyo. 118, 123, discloses the reason for the court's declining to approve a lien in that case, namely, that the petition there did not attribute any ownership to the plaintiff.

The pronouncement of the United States Supreme Court many years ago is pertinent in the instant situation: 'Persons who not only have an interest in the controversy, but an interest of such a nature that a final decree cannot be made without either affecting that interest, or leaving the controversy in such a condition that its final termination may be wholly inconsistent with equity and good conscience (are indispensable parties).' Shields v. Barrow, 58 U.S. (17 How.) 130, 15 L.Ed. 158, 160. Here no judgment was sought or rendered against the Wyoming Industrial Company, which incidentally has not registered any objection to the...