Oyster v. Oyster
| Citation | 100 Pa. 538 |
| Parties | Oyster <I>versus</I> Oyster. |
| Decision Date | 02 October 1882 |
| Court | Pennsylvania Supreme Court |
Before SHARSWOOD, C. J., MERCUR, GORDON, PAXSON, TRUNKEY, STERRETT and GREEN JJ.
ERROR to the Court of Common Pleas of Cumberland county: Of July Term 1882, No. 58.
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S. Hepburn, Jr., for the plantiff in error.
John Hays, for the defendant in error.
The single question in this case is whether the word "children" in the third clause of Simon Oyster's will is a word of limitation or of purchase. The learned judge below held that under the said clause the testator's son, Simon Washington Oyster, took an estate tail, which under our statute of 27th April 1855 is enlarged into a fee simple. The operative words of the clause are as follows: "I give and bequeath to my son, Simon Washington Oyster, my farm, in East Pennsboro', county of Cumberland, . . . for his support and estate, to be and remain bequeathed to his children during their natural life."
Without reviewing the learning upon this subject, it is sufficient to say that the authorities are uniform that "children" is as certainly a word of purchase as "heirs of the body" are words of limitation: Guthrie's Appeal, 1 Wright 9; Taylor v. Taylor, 13 P. F. S. 481. This is the general rule, and the exceptions which from time to time have been recognized do not impair the rule itself. There are many instances in our state where "children" has been held to be a word of limitation, but in all of them such construction was clearly in accord with the intent of the testators as gathered from the four corners of the will, as when "children" has been used with "heirs of the body" or "issue" as its synonyms.
The ruling of the court below was based mainly upon the supposed intent of the testator; the learned judge being of opinion that he employed the word "children," not in its usual sense as a word of purchase, but in the more comprehensive sense of a word of limitation, pointing out the course of descent through the entire line of lineal heirs; and that, as there was no limitation over, the presumption is that he intended to dispose of his whole estate.
This course of reasoning is not without force, but we think it insufficient to overturn the legal and technical meaning of the testator's language. The intent of a testator is always important in the construction of a will, where such intent can be gathered from the face of the will with reasonable certainty. But too much care cannot be exercised to avoid setting aside the expressed intention for a supposed intention. In the former instance we have a rule which may be followed with mathematical precision, which lawyers and conveyancers understand, and in regard to which they can safely advise their clients; while in the latter case we are involved in speculation and uncertainty, and the result at last is but a guess, and not always a correct one. Mr. Jarman says in his work on Wills, vol. 3, p. 708: "Words and limitations may be transposed, supplied or rejected, where warranted by the immediate context or...
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McCormick v. Sypher
...be to assume that there are some in the profession who are still ignorant of it. It is sufficient to repeat what was said in Oyster v. Oyster, 100 Pa. 538: authorities are uniform that 'children' is as certainly a word of purchase as 'heirs of the body' are words of limitation: Guthrie's Ap......
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Xander v. Easton Trust Co
...Atl. 32); that this testamentary purpose is apparent from the will itself beyond all doubt (Guthrie's Appeal, 37 Pa. 9; Oyster v. Oyster, 100 Pa. 538, 45 Am. Rep. 388); that the provision for division over distributively as tenants in common, but without superadded words of limitation, does......
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Xander v. Easton Trust Co.
... ... 611); that this testamentary ... purpose is apparent from the will itself beyond all doubt ... (Guthrie's Appeal, 37 Pa. 9; Oyster v. Oyster, ... 100 Pa. 538); that the provision for division over ... distributively as tenants in common, but without superadded ... words of ... ...
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Shields v. Aitken
...a word of limitation, contrary to its natural import, must be rendered clear by the words of the grantor or testator himself." In Oyster v. Oyster, 100 Pa. 538, Justice PAXSON said (p. 540): "Without reviewing the learning upon this subject, it is sufficient to say that the authorities are ......