Ozyagcilar v. Davis
| Decision Date | 01 March 1983 |
| Docket Number | No. 82-1472,82-1472 |
| Citation | 701 F.2d 306 |
| Parties | Mehmet N. OZYAGCILAR, Appellant, v. Milton DAVIS and J.D. Waugh, and University of South Carolina, Appellees, v. Kenneth SWAISLAND, Rafel Industrial Group, Ltd., Bryan E.W. Gransden, Norminco Developments, Ltd., B.J.R. Research Company, and Great Basins Petroleum Company, Third-Party Defendants. |
| Court | U.S. Court of Appeals — Fourth Circuit |
Herbert Rosenberg, New York City (Miller, Singer, Michaelson & Raives, Barry Evans, Curtis, Morris & Safford, P.C., New York City, on brief) for appellant.
Robert Neuner, New York City (John D. Murnane, Brumbaugh, Graves, Donohue & Raymond, New York City, Robert W. Dibble, Jr., Randall T. Bell, Robert E. Stepp McNair, Glenn, Konduros, Corley, Singletary, Porter & Dibble; C. Tolbert Goolsby, Jr., Deputy Atty. Gen., Columbia, S.C., on brief) for appellees.
Before WINTER, Chief Judge, WIDENER, Circuit Judge, and FIELD, Senior Circuit Judge.
Mehmet Ozyagcilar, a student at the University of South Carolina, sued the University and two of its professors regarding patent rights to two new chemical processes which plaintiff claimed to have invented. The parties purportedly reached a settlement just before trial. An outline of their agreement was made part of the record and the case was dismissed with prejudice. Later, during the drafting of the formal settlement agreement, a dispute arose over the meaning of a clause in the outline agreement, and the district court, purporting to act as a "final arbiter," issued an order interpreting the agreement. Concluding that the district court proceeded improperly, we reverse its order and remand for further proceedings consistent with this opinion.
One of the two chemical processes at issue in the original suit involved the synthesis of ammonia and the other the synthesis of hydrocarbons and alcohols. Ozyagcilar alleged in his complaint that the University and its professors had wrongfully appropriated his inventions and filed patent applications for them. Plaintiff also filed patent applications for both inventions concurrent with his filing suit.
Just before trial, lawyers for the parties reached an agreement in settlement of the litigation. An outline of the agreement was drafted by defendants' attorneys and signed by plaintiff and all of the attorneys for both sides. It was contemplated that the outline would be followed by the drafting and execution of more formal documents. In relevant part, the outline provided for
Ownership in the University of all United States and foreign patents and patent applications except for Turkey.... Mr. Ozyagcilar to receive a nonexclusive transferrable royalty-free irrevocable license under the patents and patent applications.
When the case was called for trial, the outline agreement was read into the record. The district court asked plaintiff's counsel whether he accepted the terms of the agreement and had authority to do so, and counsel responded that he did. The following colloquy then took place:
Plaintiff, himself, and counsel for all of the defendants also responded affirmatively when questioned whether they agreed that the court would resolve any disputes which might arise as to the interpretation of the agreement. However, the outline agreement contained no provision that the district court would be the interpreter of any of its terms; it was completely silent as to who was to resolve any disputes arising as to its meaning.
A dispute as to the meaning of "a nonexclusive transferrable royalty-free irrevocable license" arose in the course of drafting the formal settlement agreement. Plaintiff contended that his understanding was that he would have the right to sublicense the process to numerous companies. Defendants contended that they had understood--and that plaintiff had understood--that plaintiff would only get one indivisible license that he could transfer to one company.
The district court, after receiving affidavits and briefs from the parties, issued its "Order Interpreting Settlement Agreement." The district court did not conduct an evidentiary hearing; it made no findings of fact; and it did not address the argument raised by plaintiff, that there had never been a meeting of the minds between the parties as to the meaning of the phrase. Rather, the court, purporting to act as a "final arbitor [sic]," examined patent law principles and the effect on the parties of possible...
To continue reading
Request your trial
-
In re Baseline Sports, Inc.
...jurisdiction and equitable power to enforce agreements entered into in settlement of litigation before that court." Ozyagcilar v. Davis, 701 F.2d 306, 308 (4th Cir.1983). The retention of jurisdiction to interpret and enforce settlements and the accompanying orders approving settlements ext......
-
Samra v. Shaheen Business and Investment Group
...— that is, agreements about whose existence there is no genuine dispute. See Quijano, 952 F.Supp. at 4 (citing Ozyagcilar v. Davis, 701 F.2d 306, 308 (4th Cir.1983); Gardiner v. A.H. Robins Co., 747 F.2d 1180, 1189 (8th Cir.1984)). Where there is such a genuine dispute regarding the existen......
-
McCall-Bey v. Franzen
...should later be reduced to writing. The circuit has continued to cite the general principle of Aro approvingly. Ozyagcilar v. Davis, 701 F.2d 306, 308 (4th Cir.1983); Millner v. Norfolk & Western RR, 643 F.2d 1005, 1009 (4th Even if Fairfax were controlling, the district court here successf......
-
Silicon Image, Inc. v. Genesis Microchip, Inc.
...any partial performance of the settlement agreement must be rescinded and the case restored to the docket for trial. Ozyagcilar v. Davis, 701 F.2d 306, 308 (4th Cir.1983) (citations omitted). "Thus, to exercise its inherent power to enforce a settlement agreement, a district court (1) must ......