P.A. Bergner & Co. of Illinois v. Lloyds Jewelers, Inc.
| Decision Date | 04 April 1986 |
| Docket Number | No. 61581,61581 |
| Citation | 492 N.E.2d 1288,112 Ill.2d 196,97 Ill.Dec. 415 |
| Parties | , 97 Ill.Dec. 415 P.A. BERGNER & COMPANY OF ILLINOIS, Appellant, v. LLOYDS JEWELERS, INC., et al., Appellees. |
| Court | Illinois Supreme Court |
Charles G. Roth, Richard D. Rinner, David J. Dubicki, Laurie M. Judd, Peoria (Kavanagh, Scully, Sudow, White & Frederick, P.C., of counsel), for appellant.
Lex Hawkins, Glenn L. Norris, George F. Davison, Jr., Hawkins & Norris, Des Moines, Ia., Glenn J. Church, Glenn J. Church, Ltd., Peoria, for appellees.
Plaintiff, P.A. Bergner & Company of Illinois, instituted this action against defendants, Lloyds Jewelers, Inc. (Lloyds), and J. Robert Congress (Congress), in the circuit court of Peoria County. Defendants counterclaimed against plaintiff and two affiliated corporations which, after leave given, they joined as counterdefendants, alleging that they conspired with plaintiff to wrongfully terminate a lease held by defendant Lloyds. The jury returned a verdict in favor of plaintiff and against both defendants in the amount of $36,688.33 on each of three counts in plaintiff's complaint. The jury returned a verdict in favor of Lloyds in the amount of $670,000 on count I of its counterclaim against plaintiff, and verdicts in favor of the two counterdefendants. Following a hearing on the post-trial motions, the circuit court directed a verdict in favor of plaintiff on count I of the counterclaim and allowed a new trial on plaintiff's action on the issue of damages only. Defendants appealed; the appellate court reversed the judgment entered on count I of the counterclaim, reinstated the verdict, and reversed the order granting a new trial. (130 Ill.App.3d 987, 86 Ill.Dec. 59, 474 N.E.2d 1256.) We allowed plaintiff's petition for leave to appeal (94 Ill.2d R. 315).
The record shows that plaintiff operated a chain of retail department stores and that Lloyds was in the retail jewelry business. In 1967, plaintiff and Lloyds entered into a "Departmental Lease" under the terms of which Lloyds would operate the jewelry department located in plaintiff's Peoria store. The agreement provided for a minimum guaranteed rental and for additional rental based on Lloyds' net sales in excess of $100,000 per lease year. The agreement provided that all cash receipts would be delivered to plaintiff's cashier not later than the close of business of each day and for charge accounts and installment payments to be processed through plaintiff's credit department. The agreement also provided:
On January 21, 1975, the parties executed a "Master Department Lease" which applied to lease departments operated by Lloyds in eight of plaintiff's stores. This agreement contains the foregoing provision.
For reasons not explained in the record, plaintiff, in accounting to Lloyds, did not consistently deduct fixture costs which the agreements provided Lloyds was to pay, and failed to deduct the excess rentals. Lloyds' financial statements for the fiscal year 1972 through 1976 (June 1 through May 31) showed liabilities for accrued rent, and the financial statement for 1976 showed a fixture liability to plaintiff in the amount of $125,361.
In late January 1977, Congress, who was president and sole shareholder of Lloyds, met with an officer of plaintiff to discuss payment of the amounts due from Lloyds to plaintiff. At that meeting the parties signed a letter agreement which agreed that Lloyds was indebted to plaintiff in the amount of $125,361.43 for fixtures, and $161,220.39 for excess rentals. It was agreed that the fixture indebtedness would be paid on or before February 28, 1977, through a loan Congress was negotiating with his bank. Payments of $10,000 per month on the excess rental indebtedness were to be deducted by plaintiff from Lloyds' statement, and on April 30, 1977, the matter was to be reviewed for the purpose of accelerating the principal payments. Congress executed two promissory notes payable to plaintiff, one in the amount of each indebtedness.
On July 31, 1977, because the fixture and rent charges remained unpaid, plaintiff withheld the entire sum due Lloyds under the monthly settlement statement. Lloyds was given written notice of the withholding and advised as to the balance remaining on each indebtedness, and was further notified that failure to pay the entire amount due within 30 days would result in the lease being terminated. Except for some money released by plaintiff to Lloyds in August for the purpose of making payments to some other creditors, plaintiff withheld Lloyds' sales proceeds for July and August 1977, and applied them to the amounts due. On October 14, 1977, Lloyds vacated all of the leased locations, and its attorney advised plaintiff that Lloyds considered the lease agreement "at an end, effective immediately."
Plaintiff's complaint contained three counts; count I, based on the letter agreement as an account stated, asked judgment against defendant Lloyds in the amount of $82,292.72; counts II and III sought judgments against Congress in the amount of the balances remaining due on the notes, $37,683.02 on the fixture note, and $44,608.70 on the rent note.
In Lloyds' counterclaim, as amended, count I...
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