P & E Boat Rentals, Inc., Matter of

• Decision Date: 10 May 1989
• Docket Number: No. 87-3372,87-3372
• Citation: 872 F.2d 642
• Parties: , 57 USLW 2685 In the Matter of P & E BOAT RENTALS, INC., Plaintiff. Cheryl Daphne FUSSELMAN, etc., Plaintiff-Appellee-Cross-Appellant, and Insurance Company of North America, Intervenor-Appellee, v. ENNIA GENERAL INSURANCE COMPANY, INCORPORATED, et al., Defendants-Third Party Defendants-Plaintiffs-Cross-Appellants, and Brigette Stockstill, etc., Defendant-Third Party Plaintiff-Appellee Cross-Appellant. Karen Walker BOULAS, et al, Defendants and Third Party Plaintiffs-Appellees-Cross-Appellants, v. David STOUFFLET and Prentiss G. Stockstill, Plaintiffs and Third Party Defendants-Appellees-Cross-Appellants, v. CHEVRON, USA, INCORPORATED, Third Party Defendant-Appellant-Cross-Appellee.
• Court: U.S. Court of Appeals — Fifth Circuit

Page 642

872 F.2d 642

1989 A.M.C. 2447, 57 USLW 2685

In the Matter of P & E BOAT RENTALS, INC., Plaintiff.

Cheryl Daphne FUSSELMAN, etc., Plaintiff-Appellee-Cross-Appellant, and Insurance Company of North America, Intervenor-Appellee, v. ENNIA GENERAL INSURANCE COMPANY, INCORPORATED, et al.,

Defendants-Third Party

Defendants-Plaintiffs-Cross-Appellants,

and

Brigette Stockstill, etc., Defendant-Third Party

Plaintiff-Appellee Cross-Appellant.

Karen Walker BOULAS, et al, Defendants and Third Party Plaintiffs-Appellees-Cross-Appellants, v. David STOUFFLET and Prentiss G. Stockstill, Plaintiffs and Third Party Defendants-Appellees-Cross-Appellants, v. CHEVRON, USA, INCORPORATED, Third Party

Defendant-Appellant-Cross-Appellee.

No. 87-3372.

United States Court of Appeals,

Fifth Circuit.

May 10, 1989.

Rehearing and Rehearing En Banc Denied June 22, 1989.

Neal D. Hobson, Bruce R. Hoefer, Jr., Stephen C. Carleton, Milling, Benson, Woodward, Hillyer, Pierson & Miller, New Orleans, La., for Chevron.

John R. Martzell, Scott R. Bickford, Martzell, Lamothe & Gay, New Orleans, La., for Fusselman.

Wood Brown, III, Montgomery, Barnett, Brown, New Orleans, La., for Ins. Co. of North America.

Rufus C. Harris, III, Bernard P. McSherry, Jr., Jacob Shisha, Terriberry, Carroll & Yancey, New Orleans, La., for Ennia.

Stewart E. Niles, Jr., Glen Goodier, Gino J. Rendeiro, John R. Peters, Jones, Walker, Waechter, Poitevent, New Orleans, La., for Stockstill.

Paul R. Miller, Robert A. Chaffin, G. Robert Friedman, Houston, Tex., Stephen B. Murray, New Orleans, La., for Boulas, et al.

John M. Robin, Covington, La., Darryl J. Tschirn, Metairie, La., for Stoufflet.

Appeals from the United States District Court for the Eastern District of Louisiana.

Before JOHNSON, DAVIS and JONES, Circuit Judges.

W. EUGENE DAVIS, Circuit Judge:

The litigation that spawned this appeal arose from a collision between two crewboats, the MARIE ELISE and the MISS BRIDGET. The owners of the two vessels filed limitation of liability proceedings in which the injury and death claimants filed counter claims. Those claimants also cross-claimed against Chevron, the time-charterer of the MARIE ELISE, and filed separate suits against Chevron and others. Judgment was rendered against a number of defendants; of those defendants, Chevron alone appeals. The plaintiffs cross-appeal but limit their complaint to the court's refusal to award prejudgment interest. With one exception, we affirm the award of compensatory damages and denial of prejudgment interest, but we vacate the award of punitive damages.

I. STATEMENT OF FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY

A.

This case arises out of a tragic collision in heavy fog between two vessels, the MISS BRIDGET and the MARIE ELISE on January 31, 1983 at 2:00 p.m. The collision occurred on the Mississippi River near its intersection with the Jump, a local name The MARIE ELISE was a forty-six foot crewboat owned and operated by P & E Boat Rentals, Inc. (P & E). Her skipper, Louis Barrios, was employed by P & E. The MISS BRIDGET was a thirty-three foot crewboat owned by Stoufflet, Inc., with its president, David Stoufflet, serving as captain on the day of the accident. The MARIE ELISE was under time-charter to Chevron, Inc. and the MISS BRIDGET was orally time-chartered to Coastline Construction Company, Inc.

for Grand Pass, which empties into the river through its west bank, south of Venice, Louisiana.

Earlier in the day--at approximately 6:00 a.m.--Captain Barrios and the MARIE ELISE departed from Chevron's Venice base, located on the Jump, near its juncture with the Mississippi River, to deliver a work crew to the Chevron work facility in the Southwest Pass in the lower Mississippi River. Around noon, Wilton Moses, a Chevron construction foreman, learned that a platform had been completed near Southwest Pass and that Chevron needed to install a navigation aid on that structure. Moses dispatched the MARIE ELISE to the Venice base to pick up the navigation aid and bring it back to the W-2 work area for ultimate transportation downstream to the new platform.

Barrios followed these instructions, departed Southwest Pass and arrived at the Jump at approximately 1:00 p.m. Barrios encountered considerable fog in the Mississippi River during this trip, some of which was heavy. Barrios had the navigation aid loaded aboard the MARIE ELISE and departed the Venice base at approximately 2:00 p.m. Although the evidence was conflicting, the district court found that Barrios made this trip under protest because of heavy fog. The court also found that Moses pressured Barrios to return from Venice quickly so that the MARIE ELISE would be available to make her regular run to transport the work crews.

At the same time that Barrios departed the Venice base at the Jump, Captain Stoufflet was piloting the MISS BRIDGET northbound, favoring the west bank of the Mississippi River, and approaching the Jump. Due to unusually low tides, the MISS BRIDGET's time-charterer had halted its offshore operation for the day and the MISS BRIDGET was transporting an eight member work crew back to shore. The MISS BRIDGET was proceeding dead slow in the fog, but without a functioning radio.

When Barrios, piloting the MARIE ELISE, reached the point where the Jump intersected the Mississippi River, he announced his intention on his radio to "shoot across" to the east bank of the river. When he received no protest to his plan from vessels in the area, Barrios put his engine at 3/4 speed and proceeded rapidly across the river. Unfortunately, the northbound MISS BRIDGET was in the MARIE ELISE's path. The MARIE ELISE collided with the port side of the MISS BRIDGET, a few feet aft of her bow, and went partially over the top, coming to rest on top of the MISS BRIDGET. Four passengers on the MISS BRIDGET were killed, and five others aboard that vessel, including its skipper, were seriously injured. The MISS BRIDGET was rendered a total loss. Barrios, the only person aboard the MARIE ELISE, was uninjured.

B.

Within a month of the collision, P & E Boat Rentals, Inc., owner of the MARIE ELISE, and Stoufflet, Inc., owner of the MISS BRIDGET, petitioned the district court for exoneration from or limitation of liability pursuant to 46 U.S.C.App. Sec. 183, et seq. The personal injury and death claimants asserted claims in those proceedings and cross-claimed against Chevron and others. These claimants also filed separate actions against their employers under the Jones Act, and against Chevron and others under the general maritime law.

The district court empaneled a jury to hear the actions triable by jury. At trial, the court heard the same evidence that was presented to the jury to resolve the non-jury claims. In a trifurcated proceeding, the jury found that David Stoufflet and the MISS BRIDGET were not responsible for The district court ruled that all the personal injury and death claimants, except Fusselman, were entitled to a jury trial on the claims they asserted in their independent actions. Fusselman, who sued only Chevron, acknowledged that she was not entitled to a jury trial. The district court was the trier of fact as to liability and damages in her general maritime law claim, but the court nonetheless permitted the jury, in an advisory capacity, to hear this same claim. The district court also made independent findings on all issues presented to the jury. Although Chevron challenged in the district court the right of the claimants to a jury trial, Chevron does not contest that ruling on appeal. ¹ Thus, whether the claimants were entitled to a jury trial on the maritime actions against Chevron is not before this court.

the collision and assigned 45% of the fault to Chevron; 35% to Louis Barrios, captain of the MARIE ELISE, and 20% to Paul Gibson, the owner of that vessel. In the second phase of the proceeding, the jury found Chevron's acts grossly negligent and reckless, and returned a verdict for $16,000,000 in punitive damages against Chevron. In the final stage of the trial, the jury returned a verdict in favor of the claimants in various amounts for compensatory damages. The district court entered findings of fact and conclusions of law that mirrored the jury's verdict.

On review, we will uphold a trial judge's factual determinations unless they are clearly erroneous. Marathon Pipeline Co. v. M/V SEA LEVEL II, 806 F.2d 585, 589 (5th Cir.1986). We will uphold a jury's factual findings unless "the facts and inferences point so strongly in favor of one party that the Court believes that reasonable men could not arrive at a contrary verdict ..." Boeing Co. v. Shipman, 411 F.2d 365, 374 (5th Cir.1969) (en banc).

Following the trial, the jury and the district court found that Barrios, as captain of the MARIE ELISE, was negligent in several respects: operating the vessel without a Coast Guard license; operating a vessel at an excessive rate of speed under operating conditions of restricted visibility; failing to sound proper fog signals; and failing to properly monitor the vessel's radar. With respect to Chevron, the court and jury found Chevron at fault for negligently allowing unlicensed captains to operate vessels in the Venice field and because Wilton Moses, a Chevron field foreman, directed Barrios to make the trip in question: 1) with knowledge that dense fog was present; and 2) knowing that it would be necessary for Barrios to operate the vessel at high speed in order to return to the Chevron base in time to make the regular crew run. The court and jury also found that such orders by Chevron foremen were common in the Venice field. Although the district court characterized the above practices as part of the Chevron corporate policy, it did not identify anyone other than foremen assigned to the Venice area who had knowledge of this conduct.

The district judge and the jury found that Chevron's conduct was willful and wanton and imposed punitive damages against...