A.P. H. v. Brian Johnson & Sioux Rapids Cmty. Sch. Dist.
| Decision Date | 23 March 2015 |
| Docket Number | No. 14-CV-4022-DEO,14-CV-4022-DEO |
| Parties | A.P. as parent and natural guardian of L.H., a minor, Plaintiffs, v. BRIAN JOHNSON and SIOUX RAPIDS COMMUNITY SCHOOL DISTRICT, Defendants. |
| Court | U.S. District Court — Northern District of Iowa |
The above captioned case concerns a lawsuit brought by the Plaintiff, a parent, against a school, on behalf of a minor child. In the Complaint, Docket No. 1, the Plaintiff alleges a variety of causes of action against the Defendants related to alleged abuse suffered by L.H. For clarity's sake, the Court will refer to A.P. and L.H. jointly as the Plaintiff and will refer to each individually by their initials when necessary.
Currently before the Court is a Motion to Dismiss, Docket No. 8, filed by the Defendants. The parties appeared for a hearing on October 23, 2014. After listening to the parties'arguments, the Court took the matter under consideration and now enters the following.
Because the present motion is a pre-answer Motion to Dismiss, few facts are before the Court. However, a short overview of the allegations is necessary for context.
During the 2012-2013 school year, L.H. was a seventh grade student at the Sioux Rapids Community School. L.H. suffers from autism as well as other mental/emotional disorders, and can act out angrily, or even violently at times. To facilitate L.H.'s unique educational needs, the parties developed an Individualized Education Program [hereinafter IEP].1 As part of the IEP, L.H. was assigned an aide who was with L.H. throughout the school day. The IEP also provided that there should be a quiet place L.H. could go if he became overstimulated. Finally, the IEP included aBehavior Intervention Plan [hereinafter BIP], which set out how faculty should intervene if L.H. began to act out. The BIP included the clause, "if [L.H.] is unable to be escorted safely, faculty trained in appropriate restraint techniques may be contacted for assistance."
An incident occurred on April 5, 2013. L.H. was having problems and attempted to go his quiet room. On the way, he pushed another student. While in the quiet room, he was approached by Defendant (teacher) Brian Johnson and Principal Jeff Scharn. The situation deteriorated, L.H. attempted to run away, and in that attempt pushed another student. At that point, Defendant Johnson physically restrained L.H. and allegedly caused L.H. injury.
Another incident occurred the following school year on October 10, 2013. L.H. was in a class taught by Defendant Johnson. L.H. became upset and threw a chair. Defendant Johnson again tackled L.H.
Plaintiff contends that Defendant Johnson failed to follow the IEP and BIP both times he physically intervened with L.H. Plaintiff alleges that in both situations, L.H. wasacting out as a result of his disability and the Defendants' response to L.H.- physically restraining him- was abusive.
The notice pleading standard of Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 8(a)(2) requires a plaintiff to give "a short and plain statement showing that the pleader is entitled to relief." In order for the Court to dismiss a claim under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(1), the opposing party must successfully challenge the claim "on its face or the factual truthfulness of its averments." Titus v. Sullivan, 4 F.3d 590, 593 (8th Cir. 1993). Facial challenges are limited to analyzing the face of the complaint. Biscanin v. Merrill Lynch & Co., Inc., 407 F.3d 905, 907 (8th Cir. 2005).
In order to meet that standard and to survive a motion to dismiss, "a complaint must contain sufficient factual matter, accepted as true, to state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face." Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 663 (2009) (internal quotations and citation omitted). This requirement of facial plausibility means that the factual content of the plaintiff's allegations must "allow[ ] the court to draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for themisconduct alleged." Cole v. Homier Distrib. Co., Inc., 599 F.3d 856, 861 (8th Cir. 2010). Furthermore, courts must assess the plausibility of a given claim with reference to the plaintiff's allegations as a whole, not in terms of the plausibility of each individual allegation. Zoltek Corp. v. Structural Polymer Group, 592 F.3d 893, 896 n. 4 (8th Cir. 2010) (internal citation omitted). This inquiry is "a context-specific task that requires the reviewing court to draw on its judicial experience and common sense." Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 664.
"While a complaint attacked by a Rule 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss does not need detailed factual allegations, a plaintiff's obligation to provide the 'grounds' of his 'entitlement to relief' requires more than labels and conclusions, and a formulaic recitation of the elements of a cause of action will not do." Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555 (2007) (internal alterations and citations omitted). Nevertheless, although the "plausibility standard requires a plaintiff to show at the pleading stage that success on the merits is more than a sheer possibility," it is not a "probability requirement." Braden v. Wal-Mart Stores,Inc., 588 F.3d 585, 594 (8th Cir. 2009). As such, "a well-pleaded complaint may proceed even if it strikes a savvy judge that actual proof of the facts alleged is improbable, and that a recovery is very remote and unlikely," Id.
In assessing "plausibility," as required by the Supreme Court in Iqbal, the Eighth Circuit Court of Appeals has explained that courts should consider only the materials that are necessarily embraced by the pleadings and exhibits attached to the complaint. See Mattes v. ABC Plastics, Inc ., 323 F.3d 695, 697 n. 4 (8th Cir. 2003), stating that "in considering a motion to dismiss, the district court may sometimes consider materials outside the pleadings, such as materials that are necessarily embraced by the pleadings and exhibits attached to the complaint. Porous Media Corp. v. Pall Corp., 186 F.3d 1077, 1079 (8th Cir. 1999). The Court may also consider "materials that are part of the public record or do not contradict the complaint." Miller v. Redwood Toxicology Lab., Inc., 688 F.3d 928, 931 (8th Cir. 2012). "A more complete list of the matters outside of the pleadings that a court may consider, without converting a Rule 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss into a Rule 56 motion for summary judgment,pursuant to Rule 12(d), includes matters incorporated by reference or integral to the claim, items subject to judicial notice, matters of public record, orders, items appearing in the record of the case, and exhibits attached to the complaint whose authenticity is unquestioned." Van Stelton v. Van Stelton, 11-CV-4045-MWB, 2013 WL 3776813 (N.D. Iowa 2013) (internal citations omitted).
In their Motion to Dismiss, the Defendants raise one main issue. The Defendants argue that the Plaintiff has failed to exhaust the applicable administrative remedies.
The Defendants' argument is this Court lacks subject matter jurisdiction because the Plaintiff has failed to exhaust valid administrative remedies. As set out in Defendants' brief:
District Courts within the Eighth Circuit have held that a failure to exhaust administrative remedies is a jurisdictional requirement under the Individuals with Disabilities Education Act, 20 U.S.C. §1400 ("IDEA"). See C.S. v. Missouri State Board of Education, 656 F. Supp. 2d 1007 (E.D. Mo. 2009) (); M.P. ex rel. K. and D.P. v. Indep. Sch. Dist. No. 721, 439 F.3d 865, 867 (8th Cir. 2006) (); A.C. ex rel. M.C. v. Indep. Sch. Dist. No. 152, 2006 WL 3227768 (D. Minn. 2006) (). Because Plaintiff failed to exhaust his administrative remedies before filing the complaint, this Court does not have subject matter jurisdiction over Plaintiffs['] claims. Further, when a plaintiff brings a claim under another federal statute or the United States Constitution, the IDEA exhaustion requirement also applies to the extent that those claims seek relief that is also available under the IDEA. See 20 U.S.C. §1415(1) (); M.Y., ex rel., J.Y. v. Special Sch. Dist. No. 1, 544 F.3d 885, 888 (8th Cir. 2008) (). Claims which must be exhausted are those related "to the IEP process, which involves individual identification, evaluation, educational placement, and free, appropriate education (F APE) decisions." The exhaustion requirement remains the general rule, regardless of whether the administrative process offers the particular type of relief that is being sought. J.B. ex rel. Bailey v. Avilla R-XIII Sch. Dist., 721 F.3d 588, 595 (8th Cir. 2013) (citing M.P. ex rel. K. v. Indep. Sch. Dist. No. 721, 326 F.3d 975, 980 (8th Cir. 2003). Id. Only if therelief sought is "wholly unrelated" to the IDEA is exhaustion of administrative remedies not required. See M.P., 439 F.3d at 868 ().
Docket No.8, Att. 1, p. 2-3. The Defendants argue that each of the Plaintiff's claims are grounded in the IDEA and thus, they are all barred by the failure to exhaust doctrine.
It is clear that, generally, J.B. ex rel. Bailey, ...
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