P.L.K. v. D.R.K., No. 61844
Court | Court of Appeal of Missouri (US) |
Writing for the Court | CRIST; AHRENS, P.J., and REINHARD |
Citation | 852 S.W.2d 366 |
Parties | P.L.K., Appellant, v. D.R.K., Respondent, L.T. and N.W.K., Defendants. |
Docket Number | No. 61844 |
Decision Date | 30 March 1993 |
Page 366
v.
D.R.K., Respondent,
L.T. and N.W.K., Defendants.
Eastern District,
Division One.
Motion for Rehearing and/or Transfer to
Supreme Court Denied May 12, 1993.
Page 367
Melody E. Noel, Daniel R. Sokol, St. Louis, for appellant.
Charles W. Niedner, St. Charles, Andrew Howard Koor, Guardian Ad Litem, O'Fallon, for respondent.
CRIST, Judge.
N.W.K. (Child), through his guardian ad litem, filed a petition for declaration of a father and child relationship between him and his putative father and declaration of the nonexistence of a father and child relationship between him and his presumed father. Mother appeals the trial court's granting of Child's petition. We reverse.
On November 5, 1986, the Circuit Court of St. Charles County entered a decree of dissolution between P.L.K. (Mother) and D.R.K. (Presumed Father). Child was born during the marriage on April 5, 1985. On August 1, 1990, Presumed Father filed a two-count petition with the Circuit Court of St. Charles County with a motion to modify the dissolution decree and a petition for declaratory judgment and fraud. He alleged Mother told him he was not the biological father of Child. His petition for declaratory judgment and fraud asked, inter alia, the court to determine the paternity of Child. He asserted L.T. (Putative Father) could be the biological father of Child and added him as a defendant in the case. On January 1, 1991, the trial court granted Presumed Father leave to add Child as a third-party defendant and appointed a guardian ad litem for Child. Upon Mother's motion, the two causes of action were severed. The trial court ordered blood tests for Child, Mother, Presumed Father, and Putative Father. These blood tests show there is a 99.93% chance that Putative Father is the biological father of Child and that Presumed Father is excluded as the biological father of Child. However, following the blood tests, the trial court granted Mother's motion to dismiss because paternity had already been adjudicated in the prior dissolution decree and Presumed Father was precluded from raising the issue again by collateral estoppel. Following this dismissal, Child was granted leave to file additional pleadings in the case.
On June 3, 1991, Child, through his guardian ad litem, filed an action asking the trial court to find the nonexistence of a father and child relationship between him and Presumed Father and to declare a father and child relationship between him and Putative Father. Child also requested child support from Putative Father. Presumed Father then requested the same relief as Child. Mother then filed a motion to dismiss asserting Child's petition was barred by the statute of limitations in *368s 210.826.1(2), RSMo Supp.1992. The trial court denied Mother's motion to dismiss. Child's petition was heard on January 14, 1992. The trial court issued its judgment finding Putative Father to be the biological father of Child and ordered him to pay $386 per month in child support. The guardian ad litem, Andrew H. Koor, was awarded attorney's fees in the sum of $2,538: Presumed Father to pay $900, Mother to pay $450, and Mother and Putative Father to split the remaining $1,188. Mother appeals the judgment. Presumed Father responds with Child adopting his brief.
Mother's first point on appeal is the trial court erred in overruling her motion to dismiss Child's petition because Child's paternity action was untimely under the statute of limitations in § 210.826. We agree with Mother.
The Uniform Parentage Act (UPA), enacted July 15, 1987, provides the exclusive means through which paternity may be determined. Poole Truck Lines, Inc. v. Coates, 833 S.W.2d 876, 878 (Mo.App.1992); and Snead by Snead v. Cordes by Golding, 811 S.W.2d 391, 395 (Mo.App.1991). Section 210.826, RSMo Supp.1992, provides the guidelines for when and by whom an action for paternity may be brought. Under this statute, Child could only bring such an action in four different scenarios. First, he could bring an action to declare the existence of a presumed father and child relationship under § 210.822.1(1), (2) or (3) at any time. § 210.826.1(1) (emphasis added). Second, Child could bring an action to declare the nonexistence of a presumed father and child relationship, but only "within a reasonable time after obtaining knowledge of relevant facts, but in no event later than five years after the child's birth." § 210.826.1(2) (emphasis added). Third, he could bring an action to declare the existence or nonexistence of a father and child relationship presumed under § 210.822.1(4) at any time. § 210.826.2. Fourth, if he...
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Nocita, Matter of, No. 77828
...Snead v. Cordes, 811 S.W.2d 391, 395-396 (Mo.App.1991); Poole Truck Lines v. Coates, 833 S.W.2d 876, 878 (Mo.App.1992); P.L.K. v. D.R.K., 852 S.W.2d 366, 368 (Mo.App.1993). These cases are distinguishable: none deal with establishing paternity during probate, or reconciling two uniform stat......
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State ex rel. Div. of Family Services v. Brown, No. 19749
...child was born. No statute of limitations defense has been raised, hence we need not consider whether one existed. See: P.L.K. v. D.R.K., 852 S.W.2d 366...
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Michigan Dept. of Social Services ex rel. D.H. v. K.S., No. 64249
...941, 944 (Mont.1979). It is well established that the UPA is the exclusive means for determining paternity in Missouri. P.L.K. v. D.R.K., 852 S.W.2d 366, 368 (Mo.App.1993). The UPA was adopted with the general purpose of making uniform the law in respect to paternity. Poole Truck Lines, Inc......
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Standard Ins. Co. v. Wandrey, No. 2:04 CV 86 DDN.
...832 S.W.2d 4, 6 (Mo.App.1992) (internal citations omitted). In support of their argument, A.W.(I) and A.W.(II) cite P.L.K. v. D.R.K., 852 S.W.2d 366 (Mo.App.1993). In P.L.K., a dissolution decree noted that the child was born during the marriage. Id. at 367. Four years later, the presumed f......
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Nocita, Matter of, No. 77828
...Snead v. Cordes, 811 S.W.2d 391, 395-396 (Mo.App.1991); Poole Truck Lines v. Coates, 833 S.W.2d 876, 878 (Mo.App.1992); P.L.K. v. D.R.K., 852 S.W.2d 366, 368 (Mo.App.1993). These cases are distinguishable: none deal with establishing paternity during probate, or reconciling two uniform stat......
-
State ex rel. Div. of Family Services v. Brown, No. 19749
...child was born. No statute of limitations defense has been raised, hence we need not consider whether one existed. See: P.L.K. v. D.R.K., 852 S.W.2d 366...
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Michigan Dept. of Social Services ex rel. D.H. v. K.S., No. 64249
...941, 944 (Mont.1979). It is well established that the UPA is the exclusive means for determining paternity in Missouri. P.L.K. v. D.R.K., 852 S.W.2d 366, 368 (Mo.App.1993). The UPA was adopted with the general purpose of making uniform the law in respect to paternity. Poole Truck Lines, Inc......
-
Standard Ins. Co. v. Wandrey, No. 2:04 CV 86 DDN.
...832 S.W.2d 4, 6 (Mo.App.1992) (internal citations omitted). In support of their argument, A.W.(I) and A.W.(II) cite P.L.K. v. D.R.K., 852 S.W.2d 366 (Mo.App.1993). In P.L.K., a dissolution decree noted that the child was born during the marriage. Id. at 367. Four years later, the presumed f......