P.L.S. v. Juvenile Officer
| Citation | 651 S.W.3d 885 |
| Decision Date | 06 September 2022 |
| Docket Number | WD 84977 |
| Parties | In the Interest of: P.L.S., Appellant, v. JUVENILE OFFICER, Respondent. |
| Court | Court of Appeal of Missouri (US) |
Jeffrey C. Esparza, Kansas City for appellant.
Troy L. Dietrich, Cameron, for respondent.
Before Division One: Janet Sutton, P.J., and Alok Ahuja and Karen King Mitchell, JJ.
P.L.S. is a juvenile born in 2005. P.L.S. appeals from a judgment of the Circuit Court of Livingston County which committed him to the custody of the Division of Youth Services, based on his admission that he had committed acts of delinquency. P.L.S. argues that the circuit court plainly erred when it failed to make an adequate record, and failed to make findings, that his admission of delinquency was knowing and voluntary, or that there was an adequate factual basis for his admissions. P.L.S. also argues that the circuit court could not have found a factual basis for his admission of one of the two offenses alleged by the Juvenile Officer, because it was impossible for him to commit that offense. Because we find that the circuit court plainly erred in accepting P.L.S.’s admission of an offense he could not have committed, we vacate the circuit court's judgment and remand for further proceedings.
On April 19, 2021, the Juvenile Officer for Livingston County filed a petition in the circuit court alleging that P.L.S. was absent from school repeatedly without justification and that P.L.S. disobeyed the reasonable and lawful directions of his parents or custodians, and was beyond their control.
P.L.S. admitted the allegations in the April 2021 petition. On May 5, 2021, at the conclusion of a dispositional hearing, the circuit court ordered that P.L.S. be committed to the custody of the Division of Youth Services. The court stayed its commitment order and placed P.L.S. on probation under the supervision of the Juvenile Office. The court ordered that P.L.S. attend school daily and complete assigned school work; perform 50 hours of community service; and attend counseling and therapy. The court memorialized its dispositional order in a judgment entered on May 20, 2021.
The amended motion also alleged that, between the same dates, P.L.S. committed acts which were injurious to his welfare, in violation of § 211.031.1(2)(d),1 by failing to attend the full school day at his high school, and by failing to complete assigned school work.
On November 5, 2021, the circuit court held a hearing on the amended motion to modify. At the outset of the hearing, the parties discussed whether P.L.S. was contesting the Juvenile Officer's allegations.
The court proceeded directly to a dispositional hearing. During the disposition hearing, four witnesses testified regarding P.L.S.’s absences from school; his failure to consistently pay attention in class and complete assigned school work; his diagnoses for Oppositional Defiance Disorder and Attention-Deficit/Hyperactivity Disorder; and the medications he had been prescribed to address those conditions. P.L.S. also made a statement to the court, in which he told the court that he was "taking [his] medication as needed" and had already "see[n] a difference in" himself; that he was working on improving his school attendance and performance; and that he had researched available community service and work opportunities.
At the conclusion of the disposition hearing, the circuit court entered its judgment ordering that P.L.S. be committed to the custody of the Division of Youth Services for placement in a Division facility for an indeterminate period of time. The judgment found, based on P.L.S.’s admissions, that he had "willfully violated, neglected, or refused to obey a lawful order of the court," in violation of § 211.431. The judgment also found that P.L.S. had violated § 211.031.1(2)(d), by engaging in behaviors which were "injurious to his welfare or to the welfare of others," by failing to attend school and complete assigned course work. The circuit court's judgment found that "the necessary care cannot be furnished by placing the juvenile in his own home, but requires the care, custody and discipline of a facility of the Division of Youth Services, because suitable community-based treatment services would not be appropriate in this matter."
P.L.S. appeals.
The parties agree that P.L.S. did not preserve his appellate arguments in the circuit court, and that we review solely for plain error. "Plain errors affecting substantial rights may be considered on appeal, in the discretion of the court, though not raised or preserved, when the court finds that manifest injustice or miscarriage of justice has resulted therefrom." Rule 84.13(c).
The first step in the plain error process is to determine whether the juvenile court committed a plain error that is evident, obvious and clear. If so, the second step is to determine whether the error resulted in manifest injustice or a miscarriage of justice.
In re J.L.T. , 441 S.W.3d 183, 186 (Mo. App. E.D. 2014) ; accord , In re Adoption of C.M.B.R. , 332 S.W.3d 793, 809 (Mo. 2011).2
P.L.S. argues that the circuit court committed error that was evident, obvious, and clear when it did not make an adequate record, or make adequate findings, that his admission of the Juvenile Officer's allegations was knowing and voluntary, and that there was a factual basis for P.L.S.’s admissions. P.L.S. also argues that the circuit court could not have found an adequate factual basis for one of the offenses he admitted committing, because he could not meet the age restriction contained in the statutory definition of the offense. Finally, P.L.S. argues that these errors resulted in manifest injustice or a miscarriage of justice because he could not have committed the age-restricted offense, and the circuit court considered the age-restricted offense in entering its dispositional order and depriving him of his liberty.
Based on P.L.S.’s admissions, the circuit court found that he was delinquent on two grounds: (1) that he had committed acts which were injurious to his welfare by failing to attend school and/or complete assigned schoolwork, in violation of § 211.031.1(2)(d); and (2) that he had violated § 211.431 by "willfully violat[ing], neglect[ing], or refus[ing] to obey a lawful order of the Court."
The circuit court committed evident, obvious, and clear error in accepting P.L.S.’s admission of a violation of § 211.431 because in order to find that P.L.S. violated the statute, the court had to conclude that there was a factual basis for the violation. See Rule 128.02(d)(3) (). P.L.S. could not have violated § 211.431, however, because he did not meet the age requirement explicitly included as an element of that misdemeanor offense. Section 211.431 provides that "[a]ny person eighteen years of age or over who willfully violates, neglects or refuses to obey or perform any lawful order of the court, or who violates any provision of this chapter is guilty of a class A misdemeanor." (Emphasis added.) P.L.S. was sixteen years old at the time of his alleged actions.
Chapter 211 gives juvenile courts exclusive authority over claims that juveniles have violated the criminal law. Section 211.031.1(3) provides:
(Emphasis added.)
The authority of the juvenile courts under Chapter 211 is limited to the circumstances described in § 211.031.
Clearly, the exclusive original jurisdiction given the juvenile court by § 211.031 is confined to specifically enumerated situations. "A juvenile court is a legal tribunal limited in its jurisdiction by the statute law which establishes it." While the juvenile code is to be liberally construed to promote the interests of infants, § 211.011, RSMo 1986, such liberal construction cannot be utilized to give the juvenile court jurisdiction and powers not conferred upon it by statute.
B.L.W. by Ellen K. v. Wollweber , 823 S.W.2d 119, 121-22 (Mo. App. S.D. 1992) (citations omitted); accord, State ex rel. Choctaw Nation of Okla. v. Sifferman , 633 S.W.3d 876, 880-81 (Mo. App. S.D. 2021).
As relevant here, § 211.031.1(3) gives the juvenile court authority in cases in which a juvenile "is alleged to have violated a state law or municipal ordinance." In this case, however, P.L.S. could not have violated § 211.431, because that statute only applies to violations of juvenile court orders by "[a]ny person eighteen years of age or over." Because of the age restriction in § 211.431, that statute cannot serve as the basis for a finding of...
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