P. Lorillard Co. v. Federal Trade Commission, 6140.
Decision Date | 29 December 1950 |
Docket Number | No. 6140.,6140. |
Citation | 186 F.2d 52 |
Parties | P. LORILLARD CO. v. FEDERAL TRADE COMMISSION. |
Court | U.S. Court of Appeals — Fourth Circuit |
L. P. McLendon, Greensboro, N. C. (G. Neil Daniels, Greensboro, N. C., F. J. Daniels and T. L. Perkins, New York City, on brief), for petitioner.
Joseph S. Wright, Asst. General Counsel, Federal Trade Commission, Washington, D. C. (W. T. Kelley, General Counsel; James W. Cassedy, Asst. General Counsel; John W. Carter, Jr., John R. Phillips, Jr., and A. B. Hobbes, Attorneys, Federal Trade Commission, all of Washington, D. C., on brief), for respondent.
Before PARKER, Chief Judge, and SOPER and DOBIE, Circuit Judges.
This is a petition to set aside an order of the Federal Trade Commission which directed that the P. Lorillard Company cease and desist from making certain representations found to be false in the advertising of its tobacco products. The Commission has filed answer asking that its order be enforced. The company was ordered to cease and desist "from representing by any means directly or indirectly:
The company does not contend that the falsity of the representations referred to in paragraphs (1), (2) and (4) of the above order was not established by substantial evidence but does make that contention with respect to its advertising of Old Gold cigarettes referred to in paragraph (3). It contends, also, that the Commission was without power to make the order because of alleged procedural irregularities and that the order exceeds the authority and jurisdiction of the Commission and is fatally vague and ambiguous in its terms. Three questions are presented for our consideration: (1) whether the Commission was without power to enter the order complained of because of the alleged procedural irregularities; (2) whether paragraph three of the order relating to Old Gold cigarettes is supported by substantial evidence; and (3) whether the order exceeds the power of the Commission or is otherwise invalid.
The principal procedural question raised by the company is whether the Commission, after approving a fact stipulation, could rescind its order to that effect and direct the taking of testimony in the case. The facts are that after the proceeding was instituted, counsel for the company and the Commission agreed upon a stipulation as to the facts with respect to most of the questions presented but provided for the taking of testimony as to two of them. The Commission approved the stipulation and set the case down for hearing. It later discovered that facts in the case which it regarded as highly important had not been stipulated, viz., facts relating to the nicotine, tar and resin content of Old Gold cigarettes as compared with other leading brands of cigarettes. Upon the refusal of the company to agree to an amendment of the stipulation so as to cover this matter, counsel for the Commission moved that it withdraw its approval of the stipulation. This motion was allowed and the order of approval was rescinded and the case was reopened for the taking of additional testimony. The company made a motion to strike this order from the record which the Commission denied, setting forth at length its reasons for the action taken as follows:
Little need be added to what the Commission itself has said with respect to the reopening of the case. Fact stipulations approved by the Commission certainly have no greater sanctity than pretrial stipulations approved by a judge; and no one would contend that a judge could not relieve against fact stipulations upon such a finding as was made by the Commission here. Fed. Rules Civ. Proc. rule 16, 28 U. S.C.A. It must not be forgotton that the Commission is not a private party, but a body charged with the protection of the public interest; and it is unthinkable that the public interest should be allowed to suffer as a result of inadvertence or mistake on the part of the Commission or its counsel where this can be avoided. As said by this court in National Labor Relations Board v. Baltimore Transit Co., 4 Cir., 140 F.2d 51, 55:
See also McComb v. Homeworkers'...
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