P.A. v. Fayette Cnty. Bd. of Educ.
| Decision Date | 14 August 2020 |
| Docket Number | CIVIL ACTION NO. 2:19-cv-00705 |
| Court | U.S. District Court — Southern District of West Virginia |
| Parties | P.A., et al., Plaintiffs, v. FAYETTE COUNTY BOARD OF EDUCATION, et al., Defendants. |
Pending before the Court is Defendants Fayette County Board of Education and Donna Evans' Motion to Dismiss. (ECF No. 11.) For the reasons set forth below, Defendants' Motion is DENIED in part, and GRANTED in part.
This action arises out of alleged injuries sustained by a developmentally disabled minor at a Pre-K school program on September 11, 2018 in Fayette County, West Virginia. (ECF No. 1.) This action was brought on behalf of P.A., by and through his parent and next friend, H.K., and by H.K. individually.1 (Id.) Plaintiffs filed this action against the Fayette County Board of Education ("FCBOE") and Donna Evans ("Evans") (collectively, "Defendants"), an occupational therapist, on September 27, 2019. (Id.)
The following alleged facts are taken from the Plaintiffs' Complaint. At the time of the events giving rise to this action, P.A. was a four-year-old minor with developmental disabilities, including a diagnosis of Autism Spectrum Disorder. (Id. at ¶¶ 11-12.) P.A. is nonverbal and has deficits in pre-writing, fine motor, self-care, and sensory modulation skills, and he requires assistance with self-care activities, including hygiene and eating. (Id. at ¶¶ 12-13.)
P.A. was enrolled as a special needs student at Gatewood Elementary School in the Pre-K school program at the beginning of the 2018-19 school year. (Id. at ¶ 16.) Because of his disabilities, P.A. required special education services at Gatewood Elementary, including an adaptive swing and weighted vest; a helmet; occupational therapy; and speech-language therapy. (Id. at ¶ 17.) P.A. was also provided specialized transportation to Gatewood Elementary on account of his lack of communication. (Id. at ¶ 19.) During this time, Evans provided P.A.'s occupational therapy. (Id. at ¶ 18.)
Plaintiffs allege that, on September 11, 2018, P.A. left for Gatewood Elementary and did not have any bruises or other injuries when he departed. (Id. at ¶¶ 20-21.) During the lunch period, Plaintiffs allege that Evans "physically and forcefully slammed P.A. into a cube chair" and further physically abused and restrained him. (Id. at ¶ 22.) Evans' alleged slamming and restraining of P.A. resulted in "severe physical and emotional damages," including bruising and abrasions on P.A.'s arms and back, edema to P.A.'s lower spine, an "extreme" fear of therapists, and "significant developmental regression." (Id.) Plaintiffs allege that P.A.'s teacher witnessed this incident and later called H.K. to apologize for Evans' misconduct and stated that the incident "shouldn't have happened." (Id. at ¶ 24.)
Plaintiffs also allege that FCBOE failed to timely and appropriately discipline Evans for the incident. (Id. at ¶ 33.) Further, Plaintiffs assert that H.K. requested at an IndividualizedEducation Program meeting that cameras or other monitoring equipment be used in classrooms prior to P.A. returning to school and that other parents of students made similar requests, but that FCBOE refused to implement any of the requested changes. (Id. at ¶¶ 34-36.) Plaintiffs allege that as a result of the misconduct and refusal to implement the requests, P.A. did not return to Gatewood Elementary until December 2018. (Id. at 42.)
Plaintiffs have asserted the following claims against only Defendant Evans: Count I, violation of the Fourth Amendment under 42 U.S.C. § 1983; Count II, violation of substantive due process under 42 U.S.C. § 1983; Count III, violation of procedural due process under 42 U.S.C. § 1983; and Count XII, common-law battery. (See generally id.)
Plaintiffs have asserted the following claims against only Defendant FCBOE: Count IV, municipal liability under 42 U.S.C. § 1983; Count V, violation of Section 504 of the Federal Rehabilitation Act, 29 U.S.C. § 794(a); Count VI, violation of the Americans with Disabilities Act ("ADA"), 42 U.S.C. § 12132; Count XI, negligent hiring, supervision, and retention. (See generally id.)
Finally, Plaintiffs have asserted the following claims against both Defendants FCBOE and Evans: Count VII, state constitutional tort under Article III, Sections 1, 5, 6 and 10, and Article XII of the West Virginia Constitution; Count VIII, violation of the West Virginia Human Rights Act, W. Va. Code § 5-11-1, et seq.; Count IX, intentional infliction of emotional distress; Count X, negligence; and Count XIII, individual damages sustained by Plaintiff H.K. (See generally id.)
On December 11, 2019, Defendants moved this Court to dismiss the Complaint in its entirety. (ECF No. 11.) Plaintiffs responded on December 26, 2019. (ECF No. 15.) Defendants did not file a reply. As such, this motion is fully briefed and ripe for adjudication.
A pleading must include "a short and plain statement of the claim showing that the pleader is entitled to relief." Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a)(2); see McCleary-Evans v. Md. Dep't of Transp., State Highway Admin., 780 F.3d 582, 585 (4th Cir. 2015) () (quoting Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555 (2007)). To withstand a motion to dismiss made pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6), a complaint must plead enough facts "to state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face." Wikimedia Found. v. Nat'l Sec. Agency, 857 F.3d 193, 208 (4th Cir. 2017) (quoting Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009)). "A claim has facial plausibility when the plaintiff pleads factual content that allows the court to draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged." Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678. Stated another way, the factual allegations in the complaint "must be sufficient 'to raise a right to relief above the speculative level.'" Woods v. City of Greensboro, 855 F.3d 639, 647 (4th Cir. 2017) (quoting Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555). Well-pleaded factual allegations are required; labels, conclusions, and a "formulaic recitation of the elements of a cause of action will not do." Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555; see also King v. Rubenstein, 825 F.3d 206, 214 (4th Cir. 2016) .
In evaluating the sufficiency of a complaint, this Court first "identif[ies] pleadings that, because they are no more than conclusions, are not entitled to the assumption of truth." Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 679. This Court then "assume[s] the[ ] veracity" of the complaint's "well-pleaded factual allegations" and "determine[s] whether they plausibly give rise to an entitlement to relief." Id. Review of the complaint is "a context-specific task that requires [this Court] to draw on its judicialexperience and common sense." Id. "[T]o satisfy the plausibility standard, a plaintiff is not required to plead factual allegations in great detail, but the allegations must contain sufficient factual heft to allow a court, drawing on judicial experience and common sense, to infer more than the mere possibility of that which is alleged." Nanni v. Aberdeen Marketplace, Inc., 878 F.3d 447, 452 (4th Cir. 2017) (internal quotation marks omitted).
Defendants begin by arguing that because FCBOE and Evans are entitled to qualified immunity on all claims Plaintiffs have asserted, all claims therefore fail as a matter of law and should result in the dismissal of the Complaint in its entirety. (ECF No. 12 at 4.) Defendants then argue that Plaintiffs have sued Evans both in her official capacity and her personal capacity, and that such "official capacity" claims are redundant of the claims asserted against FCBOE. (Id. at 7-8.) Next, Defendants argue that Plaintiffs' claim of intentional infliction of emotional distress against Evans is duplicitous of the claim for battery and should be dismissed. (Id. at 8.) Then, Defendants assert that the claims of intentional infliction of emotional distress and the claim asserting a violation of the West Virginia Human Rights Act must be dismissed against FCBOE because a political subdivision cannot be held responsible for the intentional conduct of its employees. (Id. at 8-9.) Next, Defendants argue that the claims alleging violations of the Rehabilitation Act and ADA must be dismissed because the Complaint fails to assert allegations that would show any alleged discrimination was intentional. (Id. at 9-11.) Further, Defendants argue that FCBOE cannot be held liable for any claim under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 asserted by the Plaintiffs because the Complaint has failed to meet the pleading standards of Twombly and Iqbal. (Id. at 11.) Then, Defendants assert that Plaintiffs' claim brought pursuant to the West Virginia Human Rights Act fails because it also has failed to meet the pleading standards of Twombly andIqbal. (Id. at 12-13.) Finally, Defendants argue that Plaintiffs' claim for punitive damages against the Defendants are barred by the provisions of West Virginia Code § 29-12A-7. (Id. at 13.) The Court will first address the issue of qualified immunity before turning to the remaining arguments.
Defendants have moved for the dismissal of "all claims" based on an assertion of qualified immunity afforded to Evans.2 (Id. at 4.) The purpose of qualified immunity is to ensure that government officials performing discretionary functions can perform their duties "free from the specter of endless and debilitating lawsuits." Torchinsky v. Siwinski, 942 F.2d 257, 260 (4th Cir. 1991) (citing Anderson v. Creighton, 483 U.S. 635, 638 (1987)). When performing discretionary functions, government officials are "entitled to qualified immunity from liability for civil...
To continue reading
Request your trial