A.P. v. Feaver, No. 04-15645 (11th Cir. 8/21/2008)
| Decision Date | 21 August 2008 |
| Docket Number | No. 04-15645.,04-15645. |
| Parties | A.P., by and through his next friend, David Bazerman, R.K., by and through next friend, David Bazerman, N.M., by and through next friend, David Bazerman, R.M., by and through next friend, David Bazerman, Plaintiffs-Appellants, v. EDWARD FEAVER, individually, JOHNNY BROWN, individually, JENNIFER CHANG, individually, SUSAN KANASKIE, individually, SHARON WOODROOF, individually, SUSAN WORSLEY, individually, KATHERINE KAUFMAN, individually, CORRINE MILLIKAN, individually, et al., Defendants-Appellees. |
| Court | U.S. Court of Appeals — Eleventh Circuit |
Appeal from the United States District Court for the Southern District of Florida; D. C. Docket No. 02-61534-CV-FAM.
Before TJOFLAT and BARKETT, Circuit Judges, and MILLS,* District Judge.
A.P., R.K., N.M., and R.M. appeal from an order of the district court dismissing their lawsuit against thirteen state officials1 employed by the Florida Department of Children and Family Services pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6). The plaintiffs brought suit against the state officials under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, alleging violations of their Fourteenth Amendment right to be safe from an unreasonable risk of physical harm while in state custody. After careful review of the allegations against each defendant, we affirm in part, and reverse in part.
As to defendants Feaver, Brown, Kanaskie, and Pollack, we find no error, and affirm the dismissal of A.P., N.M. and R.M.'s claims against them.
As to defendants Chang, Woodroof, Millikan, Worsley, Andrews, Kaufman, Desmangles, and Wilburn, we find that the district court erred in dismissing A.P., N.M. and R.M.'s claims against them and reverse the dismissal of these claims in the Second Amended Complaint.
Accordingly, the judgment of the district court is AFFIRMED in part; REVERSED in part; and REMANDED for proceedings consistent with this opinion.
Judges Barkett and Mills and I sharply disagree as to whether the factual allegations of plaintiffs' complaint are sufficient to state constitutional violations against the defendants in their provision of foster care and as to whether they are entitled to qualified immunity.1 For the reasons advanced in this opinion, I concur in the part of the court's judgment affirming the district court's dismissal of the claims against Feaver, Brown, Kanaskie, and Pollack, and I dissent from the part of the court's judgment reversing the district court's dismissal of the remaining defendants. I write separately to provide the factual context in which plaintiffs' claims are presented and the legal rationale for my view that plaintiffs' factual allegations failed to establish that defendants possessed the requisite subjective knowledge of a substantial risk of serious harm to plaintiffs that the Constitution requires as a basis for personal liability under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. I would therefore affirm the district court's judgment as to all defendants.
This appeal concerns the second phase of a controversy over the quality of foster care provided by the State of Florida's Department of Children and Family Services (the "Department" or "DCF") to dependent children in District 10, Broward County, in the late 1990s.2 The first phase involved a class action suit for injunctive relief brought on behalf of the foster children in District 10; the district court granted prospective relief in the form of a consent decree. In the second phase, four members of the plaintiff class who had allegedly suffered child-on-child sexual abuse while living in a foster home sought damages from thirteen Department officials in their individual capacities for violations of the Fourteenth Amendment. The district court denied relief, dismissing the claims under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6). This appeal challenges this ruling.
On October 20, 1998, a class action suit for injunctive relief was filed under 42 U.S.C. § 19833 in the United States District Court for the Southern District of Florida on behalf of the over 1,000 dependent children in District 10 against the Secretary of the Department and the Administrator of District 10 in their official capacities.4 The suit alleged that the Department and District 10 were denying the dependent children their constitutional right to safety and freedom from harm5 by failing to provide proper care that was consistent with both professional judgment and Florida's foster care statutory and regulatory regime6 — a failure so profound that it caused the children "to suffer harm which is often more severe than that which caused them to be removed from the custody of their parents" in the first place. The suit exposed the Florida foster care system as having reached a state of systemic crisis, and nowhere was this more evident than in District 10. A yearly staff turnover rate of 80% and a dearth of adequate placements spawned a rapidly increasing number of severely overcrowded homes with little supervision by the Department.7 Burdened by caseloads that were between two and eight times the recommended national standards, counselors were regularly unable to meet their monthly visitation requirements; in fact, a sampling of foster children in District 10 during this time revealed that nearly a quarter of the children surveyed had not been visited by their caseworker in over two months.8 Contributing further to the institutional malady was the overall lack of proper screening procedures, which resulted in emotionally disturbed and potentially dangerous children being improperly placed in homes that were unable to provide them with adequate care or monitoring.9 As a result, the complaint alleged that physical, sexual, and emotional abuse and neglect pervaded the District 10 foster care system.
After the defendants answered the complaint and following months of discovery and negotiations, the parties entered into a settlement agreement and, on January 26, 2000, presented it to the district court. The court approved the settlement agreement and, treating it as a proposed consent decree enforceable through the court's civil contempt power, entered the decree on May 31, 2000.10 The decree required the Secretary and the District 10 Administrator to develop and implement an adequate system of foster care for the dependent children of District 10. The decree also required the Secretary and the District 10 Administrator to adhere to the commands of the Florida statutes and regulations governing the care of dependent children11 and to meet numerous minimum standards regarding the placement and monitoring of children in foster homes.
On October 28, 2002, counsel for the plaintiff class in Ward brought the present lawsuit in the district court on behalf of A.P., a District 10 dependent child,12 against the Department's former Secretary, Edward Feaver, two former District 10 Administrators, including Johnny Brown, seventeen District 10 caseworkers charged with the day-to-day, on-the-ground monitoring of the children in the District's foster care system, and their supervisors between September 15 and November 23, 1998, alleging that A.P. suffered child-on-child sexual abuse while residing in the Calhoun foster home (the "Calhoun home").13 A.P. sought money damages against each of these defendants, in their individual capacities, under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, on the ground that the defendants effectively caused such sexual abuse and thereby deprived him of his substantive and procedural rights under the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.
A.P.'s case was assigned to the district judge who had entered the consent decree in Ward. Also assigned to that judge was a case brought by District 10 dependents shortly after A.P. filed suit. The plaintiffs were N.M. and R.M., two siblings who joined in one complaint.14 The complaint sought money damages against Feaver, Brown, another former District 10 administrator, and various District 10 caseworkers and supervisors under § 1983 the same legal theory A.P. was advancing as a basis for recovering damages for the sexual abuse he suffered while in the Calhoun home. Since the case was similar to A.P.'s case, the court dismissed it without prejudice with leave to replead the claims in a single complaint in the action filed by A.P.15
On April 3, 2003, the plaintiffs filed their first amended complaint. The complaint focused on the Calhoun home, alleging that it suffered from many of the ills the Ward complaint had listed as characteristic of District 10: the home was severely overcrowded and housed children with histories of violence and deviant behavior, many of whom had been perpetrators as well as victims of sexual abuse. The complaint alleged that the defendants failed to monitor properly the Calhouns and the children in their care, and that had they followed DCF's procedures and implemented corrective measures, the plaintiffs would not have been abused. The defendants had allegedly acted with deliberate indifference to the significant risk of harm the plaintiffs faced and thereby denied them due process of law.
The defendants severally moved to dismiss the first amended complaint for failure to state a claim upon which relief could be granted.16 The district court referred the motion to a magistrate judge who recommended that the motions be denied. The defendants objected to the recommendation, and on March 30, 2004, following oral argument on their objections, the district court, relying on Ray v. Foltz, 370 F.3d 1079 (11th Cir. 2004), concluded that the complaint should be amended.17 Like the plaintiffs in Foltz, the plaintiffs before the district court had not alleged that each defendant, individually, actually knew of the substantial risk of harm the plaintiffs faced in the Calhoun home and were deliberately indifferent to such harm. In directing the plaintiffs to amend their first...
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