A. A. P. v. Sierra Plumas Joint Unified Sch. Dist., 2:19-cv-00882-TLN-CKD
| Decision Date | 04 March 2021 |
| Docket Number | No. 2:19-cv-00882-TLN-CKD,2:19-cv-00882-TLN-CKD |
| Parties | A. A. P., et al., Plaintiffs, v. SIERRA PLUMAS JOINT UNIFIED SCHOOL DISTRICT, et al., Defendants. |
| Court | U.S. District Court — Eastern District of California |
This matter is before the Court on Defendants Sierra Plumas Joint Unified School District ("the District"), Dr. Merrill M. Grant ("Dr. Grant"), and Teresa Taylor's ("Taylor") (collectively, "Defendants") Motion to Dismiss. (ECF No. 31.) Plaintiffs A. A. P. ("A.A.P.") and K. N. P. ("K.N.P."), as minors by and through their guardian ad litem Caitlin Peters (collectively, "Plaintiffs"), opposed the motion. (ECF No. 33.) Defendants replied. (ECF No. 37.) For the reasons discussed herein, the Court GRANTS in part and DENIES in part Defendants' motion.
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This case arises from Defendants' alleged mistreatment of Plaintiffs and failure to provide special education and services to Plaintiffs, who are special needs students. (See ECF No. 1.) Plaintiffs initiated this action on February 9, 2019, asserting the following claims: (1) assault; (2) violations of the Unruh Civil Rights Act ("Unruh") and California Education Code ("Education Code") § 220; (3) negligence, including negligent hiring, discipline, and supervision of staff personnel by institutional Defendants; (4) breach of mandatory state statutory duty by all Defendants; (5) breach of mandatory federal statutory duty by all Defendants under Title VI of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 ("Title VI"); (6) breach of mandatory federal statutory and constitutional duty by all Defendants; (7) discrimination in violation of the Individuals with Disabilities Education Act ("IDEA"); (8) violations of the Americans with Disabilities Act ("ADA") or Section 504 of the Rehabilitation Act, 29 U.S.C. § 794 ("§ 504"); (9) intentional infliction of emotional distress; and (10) negligent infliction of emotional distress. (Id.) On July 30, 2019, Defendants moved to dismiss Claims One through Five and Claims Seven through Ten pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure ("Rule") 12(b)(6). (ECF No. 31.) Defendants also moved to strike Plaintiffs' claims for punitive damages under Title VI, IDEA, the ADA, and § 504, as well as monetary damages under IDEA, pursuant to Rule 12(f). (ECF No. 31-1 at 13.)
Rule 8(a) requires that a pleading contain "a short and plain statement of the claim showing that the pleader is entitled to relief." See Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678-79 (2009). Under notice pleading in federal court, the complaint must "give the defendant fair notice of what the claim . . . is and the grounds upon which it rests." Bell Atlantic v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555 (2007) (internal quotations omitted). "This simplified notice pleading standard relies on liberal discovery rules and summary judgment motions to define disputed facts and issues and to dispose of unmeritorious claims." Swierkiewicz v. Sorema N.A., 534 U.S. 506, 512 (2002).
On a motion to dismiss, the factual allegations of the complaint must be accepted as true. Cruz v. Beto, 405 U.S. 319, 322 (1972). A court must give the plaintiff the benefit of every reasonable inference to be drawn from the "well-pleaded" allegations of the complaint. Retail Clerks Int'l Ass'n v. Schermerhorn, 373 U.S. 746, 753 n.6 (1963). A plaintiff need not allege "'specific facts' beyond those necessary to state his claim and the grounds showing entitlement to relief." Twombly, 550 U.S. at 570. "A claim has facial plausibility when the plaintiff pleads factual content that allows the court to draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged." Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678 (citing Twombly, 550 U.S. at 556).
Nevertheless, a court "need not assume the truth of legal conclusions cast in the form of factual allegations." United States ex rel. Chunie v. Ringrose, 788 F.2d 638, 643 n.2 (9th Cir. 1986). While Rule 8(a) does not require detailed factual allegations, "it demands more than an unadorned, the defendant-unlawfully-harmed-me accusation." Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678. A pleading is insufficient if it offers mere "labels and conclusions" or "a formulaic recitation of the elements of a cause of action." Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555; see also Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678 (). Moreover, it is inappropriate to assume the plaintiff "can prove facts that it has not alleged or that the defendants have violated the . . . laws in ways that have not been alleged." Associated Gen. Contractors of Cal., Inc. v. Cal. State Council of Carpenters, 459 U.S. 519, 526 (1983).
Ultimately, a court may not dismiss a complaint in which the plaintiff has alleged "enough facts to state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face." Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 697 (quoting Twombly, 550 U.S. at 570). Only where a plaintiff fails to "nudge[ ] [his or her] claims . . . across the line from conceivable to plausible[,]" is the complaint properly dismissed. Id. at 680. While the plausibility requirement is not akin to a probability requirement, it demands more than "a sheer possibility that a defendant has acted unlawfully." Id. at 678. This plausibility inquiry is "a context-specific task that requires the reviewing court to draw on its judicial experience and common sense." Id. at 679.
If a complaint fails to state a plausible claim, "[a] district court should grant leave to amend even if no request to amend the pleading was made, unless it determines that the pleading could not possibly be cured by the allegation of other facts." Lopez v. Smith, 203 F.3d 1122, 1130 (9th Cir. 2000) (en banc) (quoting Doe v. United States, 58 F.3d 484, 497 (9th Cir. 1995)); see also Gardner v. Marino, 563 F.3d 981, 990 (9th Cir. 2009) (). Although a district court should freely give leave to amend when justice so requires under Rule 15(a)(2), "the court's discretion to deny such leave is 'particularly broad' where the plaintiff has previously amended its complaint[.]" Ecological Rights Found. v. Pac. Gas & Elec. Co., 713 F.3d 502, 520 (9th Cir. 2013) (quoting Miller v. Yokohama Tire Corp., 358 F.3d 616, 622 (9th Cir. 2004)).
Defendants move to dismiss Plaintiffs' state law claims pursuant to the Eleventh Amendment and Claims Seven and Eight on the basis that Plaintiffs have failed to exhaust administrative remedies under the IDEA. (ECF No. 31-1 at 2.) Defendants also move to dismiss all federal claims against the individual Defendants. (Id.) Finally, Defendants move to strike Plaintiffs' claims for punitive damages under Title VI, IDEA, ADA, and § 504, as well as monetary damages under IDEA. (Id.) The Court will address the Eleventh Amendment issue, exhaustion requirements under IDEA, the individual Defendants' liability under federal law, and punitive and monetary damage claims in turn.1
Defendants argue Plaintiffs' state law claims (Claims One through Four, Nine, and Ten) should be dismissed because the Eleventh Amendment provides them immunity in federal court.3 (See ECF No. 31-1 at 4-6.) "The ultimate guarantee of the Eleventh Amendment is that non-consenting States may not be sued by private individuals in federal court." Bd. of Trs. of the Univ. of Ala. v. Garrett, 531 U.S. 356, 363 (2001). This "sovereign immunity" also extends to state agencies. Durning v. Citibank, 950 F.2d 1419, 1423 (9th Cir. 1991). School districts in California are "state agencies" and protected by the Eleventh Amendment. Belanger v. Madera Unified School Dist., 963 F.2d 248, 251 (9th Cir. 1992). Officials of school districts, when sued in their official capacities, also receive Eleventh Amendment protection. Pennhurst State Sch. & Hosp. v. Halderman, 465 U.S. 89, 101-02 (1984). Further, immunity "extends to state law claims over which federal court could exercise supplemental jurisdiction." S.B. by & through Kristina B. v. Cal. Dep't of Educ., 327 F. Supp. 3d 1218, 1235 (E.D. Cal. 2018) (citing Raygor v. Regents of Univ. of Minn., 534 U.S. 533, 541 (2002)). For example, the Eleventh Amendment immunizes school districts in California from tort claims and claims brought under Unruh and the Education Code. See Stanley v. Trustees of Cal. State Univ. 433 F.3d 1129, 1133-34 (9th Cir. 2006).
Plaintiffs argue sovereign immunity does not apply to Defendants. However, most of Plaintiffs' arguments miss the mark. First, Plaintiffs argue various reasons why the Eleventh Amendment does not bar Plaintiffs' Claims Seven and Eight under federal law.4 (See ECF No. 33 at 7-11.) However, Defendants did not move to dismiss Claims Seven and Eight on sovereign immunity grounds. (See ECF No. 31-1 at 2.)
Second, Plaintiffs cite two cases to argue school districts are not immune from students' tort claims. (See ECF No. 33 at 10-11 () However, the two cited cases deal with tort claims in state court and neither addresses sovereign immunity for tort claims in federal court.
Third, Plaintiffs argue that Ex Parte Young, 209 U.S. 123 (1908), carves out an exception for their claims against Dr. Grant. (ECF No. 33 at 9.) Although Plaintiffs correctly note the court in Ex Parte Young permitted injunctive relief against state actors, Plaintiffs fail to specify how exactly the Ex Parte Young exception applies with respect to Dr. Grant and what relief they are seeking from him in this context. (See id.) As it does not appear Plaintiffs are seeking injunctive relief against Dr. Grant in his official capacity (see id.; see also ECF No 1. at 21-22), this Court cannot ascertain the relevance of Plaintiffs' Ex Parte Young exception argument.
Fourth, Plaintiffs argue that...
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