Pa. Dental Ass'n v. MED. SER. ASS'N OF PA.

• Decision Date: 28 October 1983
• Docket Number: Civ. A. No. 81-1187.
• Citation: 574 F. Supp. 457
• Parties: PENNSYLVANIA DENTAL ASSOCIATION; Delaware County Dental Society; Erie County Dental Association, Inc.; Harrisburg Area Dental Society; Luzerne County Dental Society; Montgomery-Bucks Dental Society; Odontological Society of Western Pennsylvania; Scranton Dental Society; and York County Dental Society; Third-Party Plaintiffs, v. MEDICAL SERVICE ASSOCIATION OF PENNSYLVANIA, d/b/a Pennsylvania Blue Shield; and Donald S. Mayes, D.D.S., in his Individual Capacity; Third-Party Defendants.
• Court: U.S. District Court — Middle District of Pennsylvania

574 F. Supp. 457

PENNSYLVANIA DENTAL ASSOCIATION; Delaware County Dental Society; Erie County Dental Association, Inc.; Harrisburg Area Dental Society; Luzerne County Dental Society; Montgomery-Bucks Dental Society; Odontological Society of Western Pennsylvania; Scranton Dental Society; and York County Dental Society; Third-Party Plaintiffs, v. MEDICAL SERVICE ASSOCIATION OF PENNSYLVANIA, d/b/a Pennsylvania Blue Shield; and Donald S. Mayes, D.D.S., in his Individual Capacity; Third-Party Defendants.

Civ. A. No. 81-1187.

United States District Court, M.D. Pennsylvania.

October 28, 1983.

COPYRIGHT MATERIAL OMITTED

Thomas A. Beckley, John G. Milakovic, Beckley & Madden, Harrisburg, Pa., Charles F. Scarlata, Scarlata & DeRiso, Pittsburgh, Pa., for third-party plaintiffs; Barry E. Carter, Washington, D.C., of counsel.

William H. Wood, William E. Miller, Jr., Thomas E. Wood, Keefer, Wood, Allen & Rahal, Harrisburg, Pa., Joseph Friedman, Stephen F. Ban, Michael J. Hennessy, Springer & Perry, Pittsburgh, Pa., for third-party defendants.

MEMORANDUM

CALDWELL, District Judge.

The third-party defendants, Medical Service Association of Pennsylvania d/b/a Pennsylvania Blue Shield (hereinafter Blue Shield) and Donald S. Mayes, D.D.S., have filed a motion for summary judgment as to the claims asserted in the third amended third-party complaint (TATPC) of the third-party plaintiffs,¹ filed on November 30, 1982. This opinion addresses that motion.

The Commonwealth of Pennsylvania initiated this civil action on October 20, 1981, by filing a complaint against the Pennsylvania Dental Association (PDA) and a number of other dental associations, contending that these associations were violating antitrust laws, principally by encouraging dentists to terminate Blue Shield participating dentist agreements. The Associations filed answers to the complaint on or about November 9, 1981.

On November 17, 1981, the Associations filed the third-party complaint at issue here naming, inter alia, Pennsylvania Blue Shield and Donald S. Mayes, D.D.S. as third-party defendants. Blue Shield moved to dismiss the third-party complaint on December 7, 1981. On March 1, 1982, Blue Shield's motion was denied except with respect to paragraph 12 of the third-party complaint. This third-party complaint, like other pleadings in this case, has been amended a number of times.

On March 11, 1982, Blue Shield filed its answer and counterclaim to the third-party complaint naming the defendant Dental Associations and an additional Dental Association (Fifth District Dental Society) as counterclaim defendants and naming several individuals as additional defendants on the counterclaim.² Counterclaim defendants moved to dismiss Blue Shield's counterclaim, which motion was denied by order of July 30, 1982. On September 20, 1982, the counterclaim defendants filed a responsive pleading to Blue Shield's counterclaim, which included a class action counterclaim against Blue Shield and Dr. Mayes brought by PDA and three other Dental Associations.

On September 15, 1982, Blue Shield filed a motion for a preliminary injunction. On November 17, 1982, PDA filed a motion for a preliminary injunction. On December 30, 1982, both the motions of Blue Shield and of PDA for preliminary injunctions were denied.

On November 22, 1982, the Court granted a joint motion of the Commonwealth and the Dental Associations dismissing the initial complaint on the basis of a settlement agreement.

On January 25, 1983, the class plaintiffs filed a motion for class certification. On April 6, 1983, that motion was denied in part and granted in part, the Court denying class certification completely to one subclass and certifying another subclass for injunctive relief only. That order was appealed to the Third Circuit Court of Appeals on April 13, 1983. On April 26, 1983, Blue Shield and Dr. Mayes filed a motion to dismiss the appeal and on May 24, 1983, the appeal was dismissed.

PDA is a non-profit corporation under Pennsylvania law and is an association of dentists, most of whom are licensed to practice in Pennsylvania. TATPC, 3(A), page 3. The other third-party plaintiffs (hereinafter referred to as plaintiffs) similarly are non-profit corporations composed of dentists. TATPC, 3(B-I), pages 3-5. Blue Shield is a health service corporation formed and operating under the laws of Pennsylvania. 40 Pa.C.S. § 6301 et seq. Dr. Mayes is a vice president in charge of dental affairs of Blue Shield.

In the third-party complaint (hereinafter referred to as the complaint), the plaintiffs allege in Count I that "since at least 1974 and continuing to the present, Blue Shield, certain Pennsylvania dentists, and other coconspirators have been and are involved in practices which vertically fix the price of prepaid dental care in the Commonwealth of Pennsylvania, in violation of Section 1 of the Sherman Act, 15 U.S.C. § 1." Blue Shield is alleged to fix the price of prepaid dental care vertically by use of "usual, customary and reasonable" (UCR) method of payment for services rendered by dentists to patients covered by a Blue Shield plan, and by coercing dentists who have not entered into a provider agreement with Blue Shield (pursuant to which dentists agree to accept Blue Shield's UCR-based reimbursement figure as payment in full for a given service to a patient) to charge no more than the UCR rate. TATPC, 9(A, B), pages 8-9. The plaintiffs allege that the defendants seek to coerce dentists who are not contractually obligated to charge no more than the UCR rate by having these dentists boycotted by their patients and their potential patients. TATPC, 10, pages 9-10. They allege that a Blue Shield plan known as Dental PLUS, which provides for a covered patient in the plan to receive insurance coverage for dental services only if the patient utilizes participating dentists, constitutes a boycott in violation of 15 U.S.C. § 1.

Count II of the complaint is based upon 15 U.S.C. § 2 and alleges that Blue Shield is engaged in an attempt to monopolize the "statewide (i.e., Pennsylvania) market for the provision of dental care through third-party payers" and that there is a dangerous probability that Blue Shield will succeed in its attempt. In Count II, plaintiffs aver that 1,210,000 of the 3,280,000 citizens of Pennsylvania who are covered by prepaid dental care programs are covered by Blue Shield, and that almost all dentists provide services to Blue Shield covered patients. They further aver that most dentists have signed provider agreements with Blue Shield, and that other than Blue Shield's 1,210,000 insureds there are only 90,000 insureds in Pennsylvania who are covered by prepaid dental care programs through health service corporations. They contend that Blue Shield's practices and policies described in the first count of their complaint are prescribed or followed by Blue Shield in its effort to monopolize the statewide market for the provision of dental care through third-party payers and that this is in violation of Section 2 of the Sherman Act, 15 U.S.C. § 2.

In Count III of their complaint, plaintiffs contend that Blue Shield has established an actual monopoly of a market in violation of 15 U.S.C. § 2. The relevant market, for purposes of Count III of plaintiffs' complaint, is described as, "... among others, the provision of prepaid dental care through health service corporations in Pennsylvania." TATPC, 33, page 18.

Count IV of the complaint charges the defendants with the state law torts of malicious abuse of civil process (for instigating the present litigation) and interference with business and contractual relationships between dentists and their patients.

Under Rule 56 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, summary judgment is to be granted if the pleadings, depositions, answers to interrogatories, and admissions on file, together with the affidavits, if any, show that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and that the moving party is entitled to a judgment as a matter of law. Rule 56(e) provides that when a motion for summary judgment is made and supported as provided in this rule, an adverse party may not rest upon the mere allegations or denials of his pleadings, but his response, by affidavits or as otherwise provided by Rule 56, must set forth specific facts showing that there is a genuine issue for trial.

Rule 401.4 of the Rules of Court for the Middle District of Pennsylvania provides:

401.4 Motions for Summary Judgment. Upon any motion for summary judgment pursuant to Fed.R.Civ.P. 56, there shall be annexed to the motion a separate, short and concise statement of the material facts, in numbered paragraphs, as to which the moving party contends there is no genuine issue to be tried.

The papers opposing a motion for summary judgment shall include a separate, short and concise statement of the material facts, responding to the numbered paragraphs set forth in the statement required in the foregoing paragraph, as to which it is contended that there exists a genuine issue to be tried.

All material facts set forth in the statement required to be served by the moving party will be deemed to be admitted unless controverted by the statement required to be served by the opposing party.³

In analyzing the defendants' motion herein, the Court will rely upon those facts set forth in defendants' Rule 401.4 statement of facts and will also accept as true those specific facts asserted by plaintiffs to be material and in dispute if the plaintiffs have pointed with clarity to evidence acceptable under Rule 56 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure to establish such facts. The Court will not accept plaintiffs' conclusions as to those issues which are either ultimate issues of fact or legal issues in the absence of supporting specific facts, nor will the Court accept plaintiffs' general references to entire depositions or groups of depositions as establishing specific factual points.

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