Pa. R. Co. v. Nat'l Docks & N. J. J. C. Ry. Co.

• Decision Date: 16 September 1896
• Citation: 54 N.J.E. 647,35 A. 433
• Parties: PENNSYLVANIA R. CO. v. NATIONAL DOCKS & N. J. J. C. RY. CO.
• Court: New Jersey Supreme Court

35 A. 433

54 N.J.E. 647

PENNSYLVANIA R. CO.

v. NATIONAL DOCKS & N. J. J. C. RY. CO.

Court of Errors and Appeals of New Jersey.

Sept. 16, 1896.

(Syllabus by the Court.)

Appeal from court of chancery.

On a bill by the National Docks & New Jersey Junction Connecting Railway Company against the Pennsylvania Railroad Company, an injunction issued, and from a decree adjudging respondent in contempt for a violation thereof (33 Atl. 936) respondent appeals. Reversed.

The respondent, by condemnation, acquired the right to cross the car yard of the appellant by means of a subterranean passageway. The respondent contended that, in the proper construction of the passageway in question, it was necessary that the surface of the car yard should be raised, and that, in making said subterranean roadway, the tracks of the appellant, crossing such proposed excavation, would have to be cut and kept open during the progress of the work. The execution of this project being resisted by the appellant, a bill was filed to quell such opposition, the result being a decree (33 Atl. 860), which was thus expressed, viz.: "That the defendants be, and they hereby are, enjoined and restrained from obstructing the complainant in the construction of its railroad and arch upon the route of the complainant according to the plan and in the manner set forth in the order of amendment of the Hudson circuit court dated September 30, 1893, and in the statement filed July 11, 1895, in the office of the clerk of said court," etc., "and from placing or maintaining any cars within the route of complainant upon defendants' yard tracks 1, 2, and 3, being the most southerly of the yard tracks in the yard of defendants covered by complainant's route, until the complainant shall have completed its arch across said tracks," etc. From this decree the appellant duly appealed within 10 days from its date. In this situation the respondent endeavored to proceed with its work, but such attempt was actively repulsed by the appellant, which, in despite of the decree, maintained in its yard passenger cars on its tracks 2 and 3 at the place of respondent's crossing. As this conduct was in plain violation of the decree appealed from, on motion the appellant was adjudged to be in contempt (33 Atl. 936), and it is this latter decree that was brought before this court by this appeal.

Vredenburgh & Garretson (R. V. Lindabury, of counsel), for appellant.

Dickinson, Thompson & McMaster (C. L. Corbin, of counsel), for respondent.

BEASLEY, C. J. (after stating the facts). From the statement preceding this opinion, it appears that the appellant was enjoined from opposing the making of a certain subterranean causeway through its car yard by the respondent, and that, notwithstanding such inhibition, the prohibited resistance was made. For that disobedience the appellant has been adjudged to be in contempt, and from this latter judgment the present appeal has been taken. The appellant does not deny that it disobeyed the decree in question, both with respect to its mandatory and its prohibitive command, for it is admitted that it did not remove its trains as directed, and that it did obstruct the respondent in the construction of the archway in the manner that had been approved of by the chancellor. In this respect its contention was and is that by its appeal these mandates of the inferior court had been absolutely suspended, and that the appellant had the right to wholly disregard them. It will be observed, therefore, that the single inquiry on this occasion is with respect to the effect of an appeal to this court from a decree rendered in the court of chancery. The chancellor adopted the theory, insisted on by the respondent, that an appeal has no suspensive effect on the operative force of a decision in his court, and in this respect he has the support of sundry dicta in our own state and elsewhere. But such expressions of opinion were not called for in any of the cases cited, and must be regarded, consequently, as entirely obiter, while at the same time it must be conceded that a notion has long prevailed in the court of chancery that to a large extent it is one of its prerogatives to establish for this court the boundaries of its jurisdiction, and this assumption has exhibited itself, not only in the dicta referred to, but also in the more imposing form of stated rules of court. When it is provided that an appeal shall not, per se, stay an interlocutory decree, and that, when an appeal from a final decree has been put in within 10 days after the filing of such final decree, the same shall be suspended unless otherwise ordered, no room is left for doubt that the conviction exists that it is a function of the inferior court to regulate and define the force of the appellate process of this tribunal. It is difficult to understand how in right reason such a view should have obtained. The only reason that appears to have been assigned is that it is, and for a long time has been, the practice of the court. But when we ask where such a practice has prevailed, the reply must be that it has prevailed only in the court of chancery, for it does not seem that it can be claimed that, in any respect, such a course of law has received the sanction of this court. It is not perceived that this court has ever permitted anything to be done in the lower court that in any degree has established or curtailed the power of this court to control, preserve, and adjudicate the entire appellate controversy. All the cases referred to in the opinion of the learned chancellor are to this effect, for every one of them exhibits a refusal of this court to give such an effect to an appeal as will have even a tendency to interfere with the exercise of its appellate faculty. It has at all times manifested in this matter a purpose to conserve its authority, its decisions in every instance tending in that direction. An example in this line is afforded by the case of Doughty v. Railroad Co., 7 N. J. Eq. 633, which is a leading authority relied upon in the court below. There an injunction had been dissolved, and a stay ordered by the chancellor until the sitting of this court, and the question was whether this court could extend such stay until the hearing of the appeal. The argument against such extension was that an order for the continuance of the stay was an injunction, which mode of proceeding could be taken only by a tribunal exercising original judicature, and not by force merely of...