PA SC. BOARDS ASS'N v. Ass'n of Sc. Adm'rs

Decision Date16 July 2002
Citation805 A.2d 476,569 Pa. 436
PartiesThe PENNSYLVANIA SCHOOL BOARDS ASSOCIATION, INC., the Philadelphia School District, and David Hornbeck, Superintendent of the Philadelphia School District, Appellees v. COMMONWEALTH ASSOCIATION OF SCHOOL ADMINISTRATORS, Teamsters Local 502, Appellant. Matthew J. Ryan, Speaker of the Pennsylvania House of Representatives and Robert C. Jubelirer, President Pro Tempore of the Pennsylvania Senate, Intervenors.
CourtPennsylvania Supreme Court

Charles J. Cunningham, Philadelphia, for appellant, Commonwealth Ass'n of School Adm'rs.

John G. Knorr, Harrisburg, for appellant amicus curiae, Office of Atty. Gen.

Barbara Ann McNeil, Philadelphia, for appellee, Philadelphia School Dist.

Michael Ira Levin, Huntingdon Valley, for appellee, Pennsylvania School Boards Ass'n.

Linda J. Shorey, John P. Krill, Harrisburg, for Robert C. Jubelirer and Matthew J. Ryan.

Before: FLAHERTY, C.J., and ZAPPALA, CAPPY, CASTILLE, NIGRO, NEWMAN and SAYLOR, JJ.

OPINION

Chief Justice ZAPPALA.

This is a direct appeal from an order of the Philadelphia County Common Pleas Court declaring Section 4 of Act 105-1996, 71 P.S. § 371 (Act 105), unconstitutional.1 Act 105 confers on certain school administrators the right to bargain collectively concerning terms and conditions of employment, as well as binding arbitration for resolution of impasses in the collective bargaining process. For the reasons that follow, we reverse the order of the common pleas court, finding no constitutional impediments in the law.

The Philadelphia School District and its superintendent, David Hornbeck, joined by the Pennsylvania School Boards Association (collectively referred to as "School District"), initiated this challenge to Act 105 in the Commonwealth Court. That court determined that neither the Commonwealth, the Secretary of Education, nor the Governor, who were originally named as defendants, was an indispensable party, and thus the court did not have original jurisdiction over four of the five counts presented.2 Accordingly, the matter was transferred to the common pleas court, where it proceeded solely against the Commonwealth Association of School Administrators, Teamsters Local 502 (Association).

The common pleas court granted the declaratory relief requested by the School District, ruling that Act 105 violated three separate state constitutional provisions. First, it determined that Act 105 violated the non-delegation provision of Article III, Section 31 of the Pennsylvania Constitution because it improperly delegated legislative power to a board of arbitration. The court based this conclusion on several factors. It held that Act 105 provided for both mandatory and binding arbitration without limitation, as opposed to binding arbitration undertaken pursuant to an agreement between the parties. The court ruled that the power delegated by Act 105 is legislative in character, not only because it may require legislation or taxes to effectuate the arbitrator's decision, but also because it infringes upon the ability of local and state legislative bodies to make decisions regarding the organization of the school district and the implementation of its policies.3 It further held that the legal characterization of the entity affected by the arbitration, i.e., the School District, constituted a municipal entity, to which the constitutional prohibition was intended to apply. The court found that there is no provision in Act 105 that distinguishes arbitration decisions requiring legislative acts from other types of decisions.

The court also held that Act 105 violated Article III, Section 4 of the Pennsylvania Constitution because the Legislature materially altered or amended the original version of the bill before enactment without consideration on three separate dates. Finally, the court ruled that Act 105 violated Article III, Section 14 of the Pennsylvania Constitution by impeding Philadelphia County's ability to maintain a "thorough and efficient" system of education. It based this conclusion on the Act's broad mandate that enabled the Association to submit to collective bargaining and binding arbitration various policy disputes of a supervisory nature that extended beyond the issues of wages and benefits.

The Association filed a notice of appeal, vesting jurisdiction in this Court pursuant to 42 Pa.C.S. § 722(7). Thereafter, we granted a petition to intervene filed by the Speaker of the Pennsylvania House of Representatives and the President Pro Tempore of the Pennsylvania Senate.

We must now determine whether Act 105 passes constitutional muster. As with all questions of law our review is plenary. Phillips v. A-Best Products Co., 542 Pa. 124, 665 A.2d 1167 (1995). It is well established that a statute is presumed to be constitutional and will not be declared unconstitutional unless it clearly, palpably and plainly violates the Constitution. Commonwealth v. Cotto, 562 Pa. 32, 753 A.2d 217, 219 (2000). Therefore, the party challenging the constitutionality of a statute has a heavy burden of persuasion. Id. Our analysis begins with an examination of the challenged portions of Act 105, codified at 71 P.S. § 371. Subsection (a) of Section 371 grants school administrators employed by a city of the first class "the right to bargain collectively with their public employers regarding the terms and conditions of their employment, including compensation, hours, working conditions and other benefits." 71 P.S. § 371(a). It further grants school administrators "the right to an adjustment or settlement of their grievances or disputes in accordance with the terms of [Section 371]."4,5

Subsection (h) of Section 371 provides that the determination of the board of arbitration shall be final on the issue in dispute and binding upon the public employer and school administrators involved, without appeal to any court. It further states that:

The determination shall constitute a mandate to the superintendent of schools in cities of the first class, with respect to matters which can be remedied by administrative action, to take the action necessary to carry out the determination of the board of arbitration.

71 P.S. § 371(h).6 Subsection (l) defines "school administrator" as "all supervisory and administrative employes of a school district below the rank of superintendent, district superintendent, executive director, associate superintendent, assistant superintendent or assistant executive director, but including those persons having the rank of first level supervisor." Id. at § 371 (l).

Our first issue for review is whether this legislative pronouncement violates Article III, Section 31, of the Pennsylvania Constitution, which prohibits the delegation of certain legislative powers. This section provides, in pertinent part, as follows:

The General Assembly shall not delegate to any special commission, private corporation or association, any power to make, supervise or interfere with any municipal improvement, money, property or effects, whether held in trust or otherwise, or to levy taxes or perform any municipal function whatever.7

Pa. Const. art. 3, § 31.

In drafting the former non-delegation provision, Article III, Section 20,8 the framers of the Constitution intended to prevent independent commissions from exercising municipal powers that may result in the expenditure of tax dollars. In Tranter v. Allegheny County Authority, et al., 316 Pa. 65, 173 A. 289 (1934), our Court recognized that:

By 1873, when the convention was engaging in preparing the constitution, public opinion had recognized the economic mistake of taking from municipalities certain powers and conferring them on independent commissions, while, at the same time, requiring the municipality to pay the bills incurred by the commission without any restraining voice in the expenditure. The separation of power to incur debts from the duty of providing for their payment by taxation, produced the principal mischief complained of and which it was sought to prevent.

Id. at 295.

The statute challenged in Tranter created the Allegheny County Authority, a public corporation empowered, inter alia, to construct, maintain and operate bridges, streets and highways. The statute did not afford the Authority the power to pledge the credit of the Commonwealth or any local governmental entity. The Court upheld the statute, finding no violation of the non-delegation clause. It based its decision on the fact that the Authority did not constitute a special commission or a private corporation or association. It further concluded that the statute authorized no supervision or interference with municipal improvements, money, property or effects in the sense contemplated by the constitution. Id. at 295. Thus, the power granted the Authority was delegable.

In Wilson v. Philadelphia School District, 328 Pa. 225, 195 A. 90 (1937), the issue was whether a statute that granted the Philadelphia School District the power to levy taxes constituted an improper delegation of legislative power. We held that there is an unconstitutional delegation of taxing power where the legislature confers unrestrained authority upon an appointed school board to fix the salaries for teachers. In reaching this conclusion, we recognized that the Philadelphia School District constituted a school district of the first class and had been governed by appointive officers rather than elected ones since its creation. The Court emphasized the difference between an elected school board, which is accountable for its actions at the polls, and an appointed school board, which is not. The Court concluded that the "effect of the delegation by the General Assembly is to vest in the school board the unlimited power of increasing expenses, plus the right to levy a tax in an amount sufficient to cover the expenditures to be incurred. The Constitution prohibits this, and this court must give effect...

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