Pa. State Police v. Drake
| Docket Number | 235 C.D. 2022 |
| Decision Date | 30 October 2023 |
| Parties | Pennsylvania State Police, Petitioner v. Michael Drake, Respondent |
| Court | Commonwealth Court of Pennsylvania |
1
Pennsylvania State Police, Petitioner
v.
Michael Drake, Respondent
No. 235 C.D. 2022
Commonwealth Court of Pennsylvania
October 30, 2023
Submitted: September 13, 2023
BEFORE: HONORABLE RENÉE COHN JUBELIRER, President Judge HONORABLE PATRICIA A. McCULLOUGH, Judge HONORABLE ANNE E. COVEY, Judge HONORABLE MICHAEL H. WOJCIK, Judge HONORABLE CHRISTINE FIZZANO CANNON, Judge HONORABLE ELLEN CEISLER, Judge HONORABLE LORI A. DUMAS, Judge
OPINION
ELLEN CEISLER, JUDGE
Petitioner Pennsylvania State Police (PSP) appeals from the Office of the Attorney General's (OAG) February 17, 2022 order, through which an OAG administrative law judge (ALJ) reversed the PSP's denial of Respondent Michael Drake's (Drake) application for a license to carry a concealed firearm. After thorough review, we reverse in part, vacate in part, and remand this matter to the OAG for proceedings consistent with this opinion.
I. Background
On May 30, 2015, Drake was arrested in Folsom, California, and was charged with multiple crimes relating to violent acts he had perpetrated against the mother of his young son. Reproduced Record (R.R.) at 91a-92a, 96a-101a. Drake subsequently pled nolo contendere in the Superior Court of California, County of Sacramento
(California Superior Court), to 1 misdemeanor count each of false imprisonment[1] and unlawfully carrying a concealed firearm,[2] and was sentenced on October 9, 2015, to 45 days in county jail, along with 258 hours of community service. Id. at 84a, 90a.
At some point thereafter, Drake moved to Pennsylvania. He then sought post-conviction relief by filing a petition for dismissal with the California Superior Court, which was granted on April 4, 2019, pursuant to California Penal Code Section 1203.4.[3] Id. at 104a-05a. In doing so, the California Superior Court set aside Drake's
nolo contendere plea, entered a not guilty plea on his behalf, and dismissed the criminal complaint that had been filed against him in 2015. R.R. at 104a. Additionally, the California Superior Court stated in its order memorializing this dismissal that:
[Drake] is released from all penalties and disabilities resulting from the offense except as provided in [California] Penal Code sections 29800 and 29900 . . . and [California] Vehicle Code section 13555. In any subsequent prosecution of [Drake] for any other offense, the prior conviction may be pleaded and proved and shall have the same effect as if probation had not been granted or the accusation or [criminal] information dismissed. The dismissal does not permit a person to own, possess, or have in his . . . control a firearm if prevented by [California] Penal Code sections 29800 or 29900[.]
Id. at 105a.
On May 6, 2019, Drake applied for a license to carry a concealed firearm at the York County Sheriff's Office, which was denied when the Pennsylvania Instant
Check System (PICS)[4] indicated that Drake was legally prohibited from obtaining such a license. Id. at 2a, 70a. Drake then filed a PICS challenge with the PSP on May 14, 2019, which the PSP denied on June 26, 2019. Id. at 70a-77a. In doing so, the PSP explained that Drake's application had been denied because of his aforementioned false imprisonment conviction. Id. at 74a, 77a.
Shortly thereafter, Drake appealed the PSP's denial to the OAG, whereupon an OAG ALJ held an evidentiary hearing on July 12, 2021. The ALJ then took the matter under advisement and, on February 17, 2022, issued an order granting Drake's appeal. Id. at 1a. In the written adjudication that accompanied this order, the ALJ explained that he had made this ruling for two reasons. First, the California Superior Court's April 4, 2019 order, which set aside Drake's 2015 nolo contendere plea, meant that his false imprisonment conviction could not be considered a "conviction" for purposes of federal or Pennsylvania gun control law and, thus, could not impede Drake's ability to secure a license to carry a concealed firearm. Id. at 15a-18a. Second, the PSP had not established that Drake's situation involved a firearm that had moved in or affected interstate commerce, as the ALJ believed the PSP was required to do under both federal and state law. Id. at 18a. Accordingly, the ALJ concluded that the PSP lacked a legally valid basis for denying Drake's application. Id. at 18a-19a. In response, the PSP appealed the OAG's order to our Court on March 17, 2022.
II. Discussion
The PSP offers three arguments for our consideration, which we summarize as follows.[5] First, the California Superior Court's set aside order did not expunge Drake's false imprisonment conviction. Therefore, despite being "set aside," the existence of that conviction still necessitated the denial of Drake's application for a license to carry a concealed firearm. PSP's Br. at 9-13. Second, Drake failed to make any interstate commerce-related arguments during the course of his administrative appeal to the OAG. Consequently, the ALJ erred by sua sponte raising and ruling upon such an argument, i.e., whether the PSP had shown that the matter involved a firearm that had moved in or affected interstate commerce. Id. at 15-16. Finally, even if Drake had properly preserved that claim, the ALJ's ruling regarding this issue was wrong on the merits, as it disregarded unambiguous statutory language, was absurd and unreasonable, and wrongly relied upon an interstate commerce-related requirement that was present in federal law, but not in state law. Id. at 16-18.[6]
The PSP's first argument hinges upon the interplay between California law, federal law, and Pennsylvania law. Per Section 6109(e) of the Uniform Firearms Act of 1995 (UFA), "[a]n individual who is . . . prohibited from possessing, using, manufacturing, controlling, purchasing, selling or transferring a firearm as provided
by [S]ection 6105 [of the UFA,]" or "who is prohibited from possessing or acquiring a firearm under the statutes of the United States[,]" is barred from obtaining a license to carry a firearm in Pennsylvania. 18 Pa. C.S. § 6109(e)(1)(xiii)-(xiv). Pursuant to Section 6105 of the UFA, "[a] person who is prohibited from possessing or acquiring a firearm under [Section 922(g)(9) of the Federal Gun Control Act (FGCA),] 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(9)[,]" is also prohibited from securing such a license in this Commonwealth. Id. § 6105(a)(1), (c)(9), (h). In turn, Section 922(g) of the FGCA provides, in relevant part:
It shall be unlawful for any person--
. . . .
(9) who has been convicted in any court of a misdemeanor crime of domestic violence,
to ship or transport in interstate or foreign commerce, or possess in or affecting commerce, any firearm or ammunition; or to receive any firearm or ammunition which has been shipped or transported in interstate or foreign commerce.
18 U.S.C. § 922(g). Generally speaking, Section 922(g)
makes possession of a firearm unlawful when the following elements are satisfied: (1) a status element (here "[convicted in any court of a misdemeanor crime of domestic violence]"); (2) a possession element (to "possess"); (3) a jurisdictional element ("in or affecting commerce"); and (4) a firearm element (a "firearm or ammunition").
Rehaif v. United States, 139 S.Ct. 2191, 2195-96 (2019). The FGCA also includes an exception to this rule, however, in that
[a] person shall not be considered to have been convicted of [a misdemeanor crime of domestic violence] for purposes of this chapter if the conviction has been expunged or set aside, or is an offense for which the person has been pardoned or has had civil rights restored (if the law of the applicable jurisdiction provides for the loss of
civil rights under such an offense) unless the pardon, expungement, or restoration of civil rights expressly provides that the person may not ship, transport, possess, or receive firearms.
18 U.S.C. § 921(a)(33)(B)(ii).
Upon reviewing this statutory language, as well as the factual record, the ALJ determined that Drake's false imprisonment conviction constituted a misdemeanor crime of domestic violence, but reasoned that the California Superior Court's set aside order had rendered that conviction a nullity. See R.R. at 16a-17a. Because of this, as well as the absence in the set aside order of any language that imposed firearms-related restrictions upon Drake, the ALJ concluded that Section 922(g)(9) of the FGCA did not bar Drake from possessing or acquiring a firearm and, consequently, that Drake was not prohibited by either Section 6105 or 6109 of the UFA from obtaining a permit...
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