"(1) The plaintiff prays the court to instruct the jury that if they find from the evidence that on or about the 16th day of December, 1908, the plaintiff was employed by the defendant, and was then engaged in the work of placing the iron and steel superstructure on the bridge which was then being constructed across the Potomac river at
Williamsport, as testified to by the witnesses, if the jury so find, then it was the duty of the defendant to exercise reasonable care to provide a reasonably safe place in which the plaintiff might perform the services for which he had been employed; and if the jury find that the defendant's 'traveler' and the superstructure was placed upon pier No. 10 in the manner as testified to by the witnesses, and that the plaintiff, under his said employment by the defendant, in order to perform the said services, was required to go upon the 'traveler' and superstructure as testified to in this case, and further find that said pier No. 10 was constructed of concrete, as testified to in this case, and that the construction of said concrete pier had been finished on or about December 9, 1909, and further find that at the time the injuries complained of in this action were sustained, if the jury so find, the said concrete pier was green and had not become sufficiently hardened to support the weight of said 'traveler' and superstructure which was then and there being placed upon it, as testified to in this case, and further find that, whilst the plaintiff was using due care and caution on his part, if the jury so find, and whilst he was in the exercise of the duties required of him under his said employment, if the jury so find, the said pier No. 10 collapsed and gave way under the weight of said 'traveler' and superstructure, and thereby hurled and threw the plaintiff into the Potomac river below, whereby the plaintiff was injured, if the jury so find, and further find that the collapsing and giving way of said pier No. 10, and the hurling and throwing of the plaintiff as aforesaid, was caused by reason of the fact that said pier was then and there green and had not become sufficiently hardened, if the jury so find, then the plaintiff is entitled to recover in this action, provided the defendant knew, or by the exercise of reasonable care could have known, that said pier No. 10 was then and there green and had not sufficiently hardened, and that said condition rendered it unsafe for the weight the defendant placed upon it. And provided they further find that the plaintiff by the exercise of reasonable care on his part could not have known the said condition of said pier, if the jury so find, and the danger of using said pier in said condition. And the jury is further instructed that both as to the plaintiff and defendant no greater knowledge of the use of concrete in the character of work in which they were engaged is required than is ordinarily possessed by well-informed persons in their respective occupations.
"(2) If the jury find for the plaintiff in this case, then, in estimating the damages, they are entitled to take into consideration the plaintiff's state of health and physical condition prior to the accident, his capacity for doing work and earning wages prior thereto, as compared with his, condition and capacity since the accident in consequence thereof; and they may also consider the question as to whether the injuries will be permanent in their effect, and they may also consider the physical and mental anguish which the plaintiff has suffered in the past, or is likely to continue to suffer in the future, and award him such sum as in their judgment will be an adequate compensation for the injuries which he has sustained."
"(1) The defendant prays the court to instruct the jury that there is no legally sufficient evidence in this case to entitle the plaintiff to recover, and their verdict must be for the defendant.
"(2) The defendant prays the court to instruct the jury that under the pleadings there is no legally sufficient evidence to entitle the plaintiff to recover, and their verdict must be for the defendant.
"(3) The jury is instructed that there is no legally sufficient evidence in this case to entitle the jury to find the defendant liable for any negligence the jury may find on the part of Mason D. Pratt.
"(4) The jury is instructed that under the uncontradicted evidence William H. Bickel was a fellow servant of the plaintiff, and the plaintiff is not entitled to recover for any negligence they may find on the part of the said William H. Bickel.
"(5) The jury is instructed that there is no legally sufficient evidence in this case to enable them to find that, prior to the happening of the injury complained of, the defendant knew or was negligently ignorant that it would be unsafe to place the steel or iron structure on pier 10, at the time it was placed thereon, if the jury find that it was unsafe to place the steel or iron structure thereon at that time.
"(6) The jury is instructed that if the find that it was the custom among corporations and persons engaged in the same kind of business as the defendant to rely upon the engineer in charge of the work, to see that work and materials furnished by different parties, upon which said corporations or persons were to place materials or structures, were properly built and sufficient and ready to receive the materials or structures to be placed thereon by said corporations or persons, that then the defendant was not negligent in relying upon the engineer in charge of the erection of the bridge mentioned in the evidence, to see that pier 10 was safe, and in proper condition to receive the steel or iron structure to be placed thereon, if the jury find that the defendant did so rely on the engineer in charge.
"(7) The jury is instructed that if they find from the evidence that pier 10 was completed on the 9th day of December, 1908, and that the wooden forms were removed therefrom on the eleventh day of December, 1908
and further find that Mason D. Pratt, the engineer in charge of the bridge employed by the Washington & Berkeley Bridge Company, if the jury find that the said Mason D. Pratt was such engineer, and was so employed, at or about the time the said pier was completed, told William H. Bickel, the foreman, employed by the defendant in charge of the erection of the steel or iron structure, if the jury so find the said Bickel was such foreman, that the steel or iron structure could be placed on the piers within 48 hours after the forms were taken off, and further find that the said steel or iron structure was not placed on said pier before the 15th day of December, 1908, then the plaintiff is not entitled to recover, even though they should find that the injury complained of was caused by attempting to place the said steel or iron structure on said pier before it had sufficient time to properly set and dry out to sustain the weight being placed thereon.
"(8) The jury is instructed that as the undisputed evidence shows that the plaintiff began to work on the erection of the iron or steel structure on the abutment and piers from the Maryland side of the Potomac river on December 1 or 2, 1908, and continued in said work until the day of the accident, and knew or had opportunity to know of the method of erecting said structure on said piers, and continued in said work without objection, and knew or had opportunity to know that the defendant was not providing an expert to inspect the condition of the piers before placing the steel work thereon, he cannot recover in this action for the failure of the defendant to provide an expert to inspect the condition of pier No. 10 to ascertain if it was in a condition to place the steel structure placed thereon, even if the jury should find such failure, there being no evidence that the defendant, before the accident, knew or was negligently ignorant that said pier was not in a safe condition.
"(9) If the jury find that from the commencement of the work on the bridge until the time of the accident the defendant had followed the orders and instructions of Mason D. Pratt, the engineer in charge, if the jury so find, as to the time when the superstructures were to be placed on the piers, and that the superstructures had been placed on nine piers without any accident, and that the work so done had been wholly satisfactory, and that nothing had occurred up to the time of the accident to lead the defendant to believe, in the exercise of ordinary and reasonable care, that any accident would result from continuing to follow the instructions of said Pratt, and shall further find that in accordance with the instructions of said Pratt the defendant had placed on pier No. 10 a large part of the weight intended to be placed on said pier without any accident and without any occurrence that would lead the defendant to believe, in the exercise of ordinary and reasonable care, that there was any danger to be incurred in following the directions of said Pratt, then the jury are instructed that the defendant was not negligent in continuing to follow the direction of said Pratt or in sending him men, including the plaintiff, to work at the place and time of the accident, if the jury find the defendant did so, and the jury is further instructed that the defendant was not required to employ some expert or engineer to supervise and inspect the work of said Pratt.
"(10) The jury is instructed that if they find from the evidence that Mason...
