Se. Pa. Transp. Auth. v. City of Phila.
Decision Date | 07 August 2015 |
Docket Number | No. 2445 C.D. 2009,2445 C.D. 2009 |
Citation | 122 A.3d 1163 |
Parties | SOUTHEASTERN PENNSYLVANIA TRANSPORTATION AUTHORITY, Appellant v. CITY OF PHILADELPHIA and Philadelphia Commission on Human Relations. |
Court | Pennsylvania Commonwealth Court |
Patrick M. Northen, Philadelphia, for appellant.
Eleanor N. Ewing, Senior Attorney, Philadelphia, for appellees.
BEFORE: DAN PELLEGRINI, President Judge, and BONNIE BRIGANCE LEADBETTER, Judge, and RENÉE COHN JUBELIRER, Judge, and ROBERT SIMPSON, Judge, and MARY HANNAH LEAVITT, Judge, and P. KEVIN BROBSON, Judge, and ANNE E. COVEY, Judge.
The Southeastern Pennsylvania Transportation Authority (SEPTA) seeks a declaratory judgment that as a Commonwealth agency it is not subject to the City of Philadelphia's anti-discrimination ordinance, but only to the provisions of the Pennsylvania Human Relations Act.1 The defendants, the City and the Philadelphia Commission on Human Relations (Philadelphia Commission), demurred to the complaint, and the Court of Common Pleas of Philadelphia County (trial court) sustained their preliminary objections. This Court reversed. The Supreme Court vacated our order and remanded the matter to this Court to do additional analysis. Concluding that the legislature did not intend SEPTA to be subject to a local anti-discrimination ordinance, we reverse.
In 1963, the General Assembly established SEPTA pursuant to the Metropolitan Transportation Authorities Act, 74 Pa.C.S. §§ 1701 –1785.2 That Act provides:
74 Pa.C.S. § 1711(a) (emphasis added).
Philadelphia is a first class city that is governed under authority of the First Class City Home Rule Act.3 Consistent with that authority, the City has established the Philadelphia Commission to administer and enforce the Philadelphia Fair Practices Ordinance,4 which prohibits discrimination in the areas of employment, housing and public accommodations. The Fair Practices Ordinance forbids discrimination on the basis of race, ethnicity, color, sex, sexual orientation, gender identity, religion, national origin, ancestry, age, disability, marital status, familial status, genetic information, or domestic or sexual violence victim status. Phila. Code §§ 9–1103, 9–1106.5
In 1955, the General Assembly enacted the Pennsylvania Human Relations Act, which forbids discrimination in the areas of employment, housing and public accommodations on the basis of “race, color, familial status, religious creed, ancestry, age, sex, national origin, handicap or disability, [or] use of guide or support animals because of the blindness, deafness or physical handicap of the user....” Section 2 of the Human Relations Act, 43 P.S. § 952. Its reach is statewide.
Both the Human Relations Act and the Fair Practices Ordinance forbid invidious discrimination. The protected classes in each legislation are nearly identical, but there are differences. The Fair Practices Ordinance forbids discrimination on the basis of a person's sexual orientation and gender identity, genetic information or domestic violence status, and the Human Relations Act does not. On the other hand, the Human Relations Act protects those who use support animals by reason of their deafness and blindness; the Fair Practices Ordinance does not.
Between July 2007 and April 2009, the Philadelphia Commission initiated seven separate complaints and investigations against SEPTA for alleged discrimination against its employees or customers in violation of the Fair Practices Ordinance. Complaint, ¶ 14; Reproduced Record at 95a–96a (R.R. ____).6 Two of the complaints involved alleged discrimination on the basis of gender identity and sexual orientation.7 Id.; R.R. 95a. SEPTA responded that as a Commonwealth agency, the Philadelphia Commission lacked jurisdiction over it. SEPTA requested the Philadelphia Commission dismiss each of the administrative complaints or certify them for an interlocutory appeal to address the jurisdiction issue. The Philadelphia Commission denied SEPTA's requests.
On July 23, 2009, while the administrative complaints were pending, SEPTA filed the instant complaint against the City and the Philadelphia Commission (collectively, City).8 SEPTA sought a declaration that the Fair Practices Ordinance does not apply to SEPTA because it is a Commonwealth agency. SEPTA also sought an injunction against the Philadelphia Commission's exercise of jurisdiction over SEPTA.9
The City filed preliminary objections demurring to SEPTA's complaint. On November 9, 2009, after briefing and argument, the trial court sustained the City's preliminary objections and dismissed SEPTA's complaint for the stated reason that SEPTA had failed to exhaust its administrative remedies and, further, was not exempt from the Fair Practices Ordinance. SEPTA appealed.
This Court, sitting en banc, reversed the trial court.10 See Southeastern Pennsylvania Transportation Authority v. City of Philadelphia and Philadelphia Commission on Human Relations,
20 A.3d 558 (Pa.Cmwlth.2011). This Court concluded that SEPTA is a Commonwealth agency for purposes of discrimination claims and, as such, subject only to the Pennsylvania Human Relations Act. We stated:
The Pennsylvania Supreme Court vacated this Court's order and remanded for further proceedings. See Southeastern Pennsylvania Transportation Authority v. City of Philadelphia and Philadelphia Commission on Human Relations, –––Pa. ––––, 101 A.3d 79 (2014) (SEPTA v. Philadelphia II ). The Supreme Court agreed that SEPTA was not required to exhaust its administrative remedies before commencing its action, which presented a purely legal challenge. The Supreme Court also agreed that SEPTA is a Commonwealth agency.11 However, it concluded that this Court failed to do the legislative intent analysis announced in Department of General Services v. Ogontz Area Neighbors Association, 505 Pa. 614, 483 A.2d 448 (1984), and used to determine when a state agency may be regulated by a local agency.12 The Supreme Court stated as follows:
At issue in Ogontz was the Commonwealth's proposed construction of a mental health facility in a Philadelphia neighborhood that was zoned residential. The Philadelphia Zoning Board of Adjustment denied the Department of General Services' permit application because the proposed use was not permitted in a residential district. The Department appealed, arguing that the Zoning Board could not impose any restrictions on the construction of a building authorized by a state statute. In considering that legal question, the Pennsylvania Supreme Court established the analysis to be used “[w]hen there is an apparent conflict in the use of ... powers” by two different governmental entities or agencies. Ogontz, 483 A.2d at 453–54 (quoting City of Pittsburgh v. Commonwealth, 468 Pa. 174, 360 A.2d 607, 612 (1976) ).
Noting that both government agencies were creatures of statute, the Supreme Court identified the Department's preemption claim as one of statutory construction:
To continue reading
Request your trial