Paavola v. United States
| Decision Date | 29 April 2020 |
| Docket Number | Civil Action No. 19-1608 (JDB) |
| Parties | Lana M. PAAVOLA, Individually and as Administrator of the Estate of Joel D. Paavola, Plaintiff, v. UNITED STATES of America, et al., Defendants. |
| Court | U.S. District Court — District of Columbia |
Gideon, C.J., Jr., J. Blake Carter, Gideon, Cooper & Essary, PLC, Nashville, TN, for Plaintiff.
Robert Aaron Caplen, William Mark Nebeker, United States Attorney's Office, Washington, DC, for Defendant United States of America.
Emma Lee Lomax, Kerslyn D. Featherstone, Office of Attorney General, Washington, DC, for Defendant District of Columbia.
Jeanett P. Henry, Law Office of Jeanett P. Henry, Silver Spring, MD, for Defendant Hope Village, Inc.
JOHN D. BATES, United States District Judge Plaintiff Lana Paavola, individually and on behalf of the estate of her late husband Joel D. Paavola and his beneficiaries, sued the United States, the District of Columbia, and Hope Village, Inc., for their alleged roles in the tragic death of her husband. Defendants have each moved to dismiss plaintiff's complaint. For the reasons explained below, the Court concludes that plaintiff has failed to state a claim against either the United States or the District of Columbia. The Court also concludes that some of plaintiff's claims against Hope Village must be dismissed. The Court will therefore grant in full the motions filed by the United States and the District of Columbia and will grant in part and deny in part the motion filed by Hope Village.
At the pleading stage, district courts accept as true a plaintiff's factual allegations, see Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678, 129 S.Ct. 1937, 173 L.Ed.2d 868 (2009), and thus the Court rehearses here the facts as presented in plaintiff's complaint. On April 27, 2018, Domenic Micheli was arrested for trespassing on the White House lawn in Washington, D.C. Compl. [ECF No. 1] ¶ 19. On May 1, Mr. Micheli appeared at his arraignment, where he claimed to be the President of the United States and stated that he had come to Washington to lead the nation. Id. ¶ 20. He also disclosed that he had previously been treated for mental health issues in Nashville, Tennessee. Id. He was held in D.C. jail until his detention hearing on May 2, when the magistrate judge determined that he was to be released to the D.C. Department of Corrections for placement in a halfway house. Id. ¶¶ 20–22. As part of his release order, the Magistrate Judge instructed that "[t]he D.C. Department of Corrections is Directed to Notify the Court Immediately by FAX of Defendant's Escape or Remand to the D.C. Jail." Id. ¶ 21. During this period, Mr. Micheli underwent at least two mental competency evaluations, which returned "concerning" and "equivocal" results. Id. ¶¶ 24, 26. At a hearing before the U.S. District Court on May 18, a member of the Pretrial Services Agency ("PSA") stated that a third such evaluation was set for May 21. Id. ¶ 26.
On May 15, 2018, Mr. Micheli checked into the Hope Village halfway house. Id. ¶ 25. "After May 18," according to plaintiff, "Mr. Micheli failed to comply with the terms of his confinement at Hope Village." Id. ¶ 27. At some point, he absconded from the facility and made his way to Tennessee, where he murdered his former employer, Joel Paavola, on June 4. Id. ¶¶ 31–34. Mr. Micheli had worked for Mr. Paavola at a fitness facility in Tennessee until 2017, when Mr. Paavola fired him. Id. ¶ 19.
Plaintiff alleges that "[p]rior to Mr. Micheli's escape from Hope Village, Mr. Micheli's family and friends warned the Defendants that Mr. Micheli was an escape risk and was dangerous" and that he "might injure someone if not detained." Id. ¶ 28. Plaintiff also asserts that, after absconding from Hope Village, but before murdering Mr. Paavola, "Mr. Micheli posted a series of bizarre and deeply concerning messages on Facebook," wherein he declared himself a deity, threatened to dole out justice, and "boasted he could ‘kill nine tenths’ " of the global population and "be within justice." Id. ¶ 29. Plaintiff alleges that, "[u]sing these posts, law enforcement could have located and apprehended Mr. Micheli before he murdered Joel Paavola." Id.
Plaintiff filed this lawsuit against the United States, the District of Columbia, and Hope Village on June 3, 2019, bringing nine counts that include claims of wrongful death, negligent supervision, state endangerment and deliberate indifference, intentional infliction of emotional distress, and breach of contract. Id. ¶¶ 36–106. Each defendant has separately moved to dismiss plaintiff's claims, and all three motions are now ripe for consideration.
When considering a motion to dismiss under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6), a court presumes the truth of a complaint's factual allegations; it is, however, "not bound to accept as true a legal conclusion couched as a factual allegation." Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555, 127 S.Ct. 1955, 167 L.Ed.2d 929 (2007) (internal quotation omitted). The key question is whether the complaint "state[s] a claim to relief that is plausible on its face." Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678, 129 S.Ct. 1937 (internal quotation omitted). When "a complaint pleads fact that are merely consistent with a defendant's liability," but goes no further, that complaint "stops short of the line between possibility and plausibility of entitlement to relief." Id. (internal quotation marks omitted). The court considers the "facts alleged in the complaint, any documents either attached to or incorporated in the complaint and matters of which [the Court] may take judicial notice." Mpoy v. Rhee, 758 F.3d 285, 291 n.1 (D.C. Cir. 2014) (internal quotation omitted).
Plaintiff brings a variety of claims against the United States, the District of Columbia, and Hope Village. Because many of the claims and corresponding defenses overlap, the Court examines each type of claim in turn, addressing the defendants’ specific arguments as needed.
Plaintiff first sues all three defendants for wrongful death; relatedly but in the alternative, she brings claims under D.C.’s wrongful death statute, D.C. Code § 16-2701 ; D.C.’s survival action statute, D.C. Code § 12-101 ; and Tennessee's wrongful death statute, Tenn. Code § 20-5-101. Compl. ¶¶ 37–47, 67–77, 79–88. At root, each of these claims turns on whether defendants were negligent. To succeed, therefore, plaintiff must demonstrate (1) the existence of a duty owed by a defendant to the plaintiff, (2) a breach of that duty by the defendant, and (3) damage, proximately caused by the breach, to the interests of the plaintiff. See District of Columbia v. Cooper, 483 A.2d 317, 321 (D.C. 1984) ; Bradshaw v. Daniel, 854 S.W.2d 865, 869 (Tenn. 1993) ().
To start, the District argues that plaintiff's negligence claim is barred by the public duty doctrine and that even if this doctrine does not apply, plaintiff has failed to "plead facts showing that [Mr. Micheli's] crime ... was reasonably foreseeable" or that the District's actions "proximately caused Mr. Paavola's death." Def. District of Columbia's Mem. of P. & A. in Supp. of its Mot. to Dismiss Pls.’ Compl. ("District Mot.") [ECF No. 10] at 16–17. Because the Court concludes that the public duty doctrine applies, it will refrain from addressing the District's secondary arguments.
"The public duty doctrine originated at common-law and shields a public employee from suits for injuries that are caused by the public employee's breach of a duty owed to the public at large."
Ezell v. Cockrell, 902 S.W.2d 394, 397 (Tenn. 1995) ; see also Klahr v. District of Columbia, 576 A.2d 718, 719–20 (D.C. 1990) . There are exceptions to this general principle, however, when the government owes a special duty to the plaintiff. See Klahr, 576 A.2d at 719. These exceptions vary by state. Under Tennessee law, immunity is eliminated when:
Chase v. City of Memphis, 971 S.W.2d 380, 385 (Tenn. 1998) (quoting Ezell, 902 S.W.2d at 402 ). But D.C. law, by contrast, recognizes only the first two exceptions. See Klahr, 576 A.2d at 720 ; see also Turner v. District of Columbia, 532 A.2d 662, 667 (D.C. 1987) .
Plaintiff focuses on the third exception under Tennessee law, contending that the District acted "with reckless misconduct" by "permitt[ing] and maintain[ing] a culture of lax detention and supervision of pretrial detainees." Pls.’ Resp. in Opp'n to Def. District of Columbia's Mot. to Dismiss ("Pl.’s District Opp'n") [ECF No. 18] at 10–11. By plaintiff's telling, "the District knew Mr. Micheli was mentally ill" and dangerous, "knew arrestees in its custody placed with Hope Village routinely escaped," and yet did "nothing to ensure [he] did not...
To continue reading
Request your trial
-
E.M. v. Shady Grove Reprod. Sci. Ctr. P.C.
...and apply the law of the jurisdiction with the more substantial interest in the resolution of the issue.’ " Paavola v. United States , 459 F. Supp. 3d 21, 30 (D.D.C. 2020) (quoting Lamphier v. Wash. Hosp. Ctr. , 524 A.2d 729, 731 (D.C. 1987) ). Courts look to "the governmental policies unde......