Pabon v. Nelson
| Decision Date | 21 June 2022 |
| Docket Number | 9:20-CV-1503 (DNH/TWD) |
| Parties | REYNALDO PABON, Plaintiff, v. NELSON, et al., Defendants. |
| Court | U.S. District Court — Northern District of New York |
APPEARANCES: REYNALDO PABON Plaintiff, pro se
HON LETITIA JAMES New York State Attorney General Attorney for Defendants The Capitol Albany, New York 12224
OF COUNSEL: BRENDA T. BADDAM Assistant Attorney General
ORDER AND REPORT-RECOMMENDATION
In this action brought pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983, pro se Plaintiff Reynaldo Pabon claims Raymond Nelson, John Doe, and Jane Doe (collectively, “Defendants”) were deliberately indifferent to prison conditions in violation of the Eighth Amendment. (Dkt. No. 1; see also Dkt. No. 7 at 5, 8-9.) Defendant Nelson now moves for summary judgment under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 56. (See Dkt. No. 21.) For the following reasons the undersigned recommends that the Court dismiss the Doe defendants and grant Nelson's motion. See id.
Pabon initiated this action pro se in late 2020. (See Dkt. No. 1.) He signed his Complaint on November 26, 2020, and it was postmarked for mailing on December 1, 2020. See Id. at 1, 6; see also Dkt. No. 1-4. On December 7, 2020, this Court received Pabon's Complaint, as well as his application to proceed in forma pauperis (“IFP Application”), and an Inmate Authorization Form. (Dkt. Nos. 1-3.) Pabon's IFP Application was incomplete, so Senior District Judge David N. Hurd ordered the case administratively closed until Pabon submitted the full filing fee or a complete IFP Application. (See Dkt. No. 4.) Pabon subsequently filed a complete IFP Application, and Judge Hurd ordered the case re-opened. (See Dkt. Nos. 5, 6.)
On February 12, 2021, Judge Hurd granted Pabon's IFP Application and conducted an initial review of the Complaint pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2) and 28 U.S.C. § 1915A. (Dkt. No. 7.) Judge Hurd accepted for filing Plaintiff's Eighth Amendment claim against defendants Nelson, John Doe, and Jane Doe, but dismissed all remaining claims and defendants. See Id. at 14-15. Judge Hurd ordered the Clerk to serve Nelson with Pabon's Complaint, and urged Pabon to “take reasonable steps through discovery to ascertain the identity of defendants John Doe and Jane Doe.” Id. However, Judge Hurd warned Pabon that his “failure to timely serve” the Doe defendants “will result in dismissal of the claims asserted against them and termination of those defendants from the action.” Id. at 15. Pabon never identified or served the Doe defendants.
On December 8, 2021, Nelson moved for summary judgment. (Dkt. No. 21.) Pabon filed his response after the undersigned granted several extensions. (Dkt. Nos. 24, 26, 28, 30, 32, 33.) Nelson did not file a reply.
Pabon claims the Defendants, corrections officers at Clinton Correctional Facility, violated the Eighth Amendment by being deliberately indifferent to unsafe prison conditions. (See Dkt. No. 1 at 5-6; see generally Dkt. No. 7 at 5.) Specifically, Pabon alleges Defendants were deliberately indifferent to the dangers of forcing him-an individual who experiences random fainting spells-to use stairs to access the law library. (Dkt. No. 1 at 5-6.) According to Pabon, his injuries resulted from Defendants' failure to comply with medical accommodations that involved avoiding the use of stairs. Id.; see generally Dkt. No. 1-1 at 21. Pabon asserts Defendants' “refus[al] to permit special accommodations for law library,” as well as their alleged “inactions” caused him to fall down the stairs while he was being escorted to the law library on December 1, 2017, resulting in several injuries. (Dkt. No. 1 at 5-6.)
Through his summary judgment motion, Nelson claims he is entitled to judgment as a matter of law because: (A) Pabon's claim is barred by the applicable statute of limitations, (B) Pabon produced no evidence that he was personally involved in the alleged Eighth Amendment violation, (C) Pabon failed to exhaust his administrative remedies, and (D) Pabon cannot satisfy the objective or subjective prongs of the deliberate indifference test. (Dkt. No. 21-1.)
Pabon failed to respond to Nelson's Statement of Material Facts. (Compare Dkt. No. 21-9, with Dkt. No. 33.) He also offered no response to Nelson's arguments that his claim is untimely and unsupported by any evidence of Nelson's personal involvement in the alleged Eighth Amendment violation. (See Dkt. No. 33.) Rather, Pabon argues he exhausted his remedies, and Nelson was deliberately indifferent. See Id. at 3, 5.
“A motion for summary judgment may not be granted unless the court determines that there is no genuine issue of material fact to be tried, and that the facts as to which there is no such issue warrant judgment for the moving party as a matter of law.” S. Katzman Produce Inc. v. Yadid, 999 F.3d 867, 877 (2d Cir. 2021).[1] “A material fact is one capable of influencing the case's outcome under governing substantive law, and a genuine dispute is one as to which the evidence would permit a reasonable juror to find for the party opposing the motion.” Figueroa v. Mazza, 825 F.3d 89, 98 (2d Cir. 2016) (citing Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 248 (1986)); see also Selevan v. New York Thruway Auth., 711 F.3d 253, 256 (2d Cir. 2013). “The moving party is entitled to a judgment as a matter of law [where] the nonmoving party has failed to make a sufficient showing on an essential element of her case with respect to which she has the burden of proof.” Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 323 (1986); El-Nahal v. Yassky, 835 F.3d 248, 252 (2d Cir. 2016).
The party moving for summary judgment bears the initial burden of identifying “pleadings, depositions, answers to interrogatories, and admissions on file, together with the affidavits, if any, which it believes demonstrate the absence of a genuine issue of material fact.” Celotex, 477 U.S. at 323; see generally Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(c)(1). “Where, as here, the burden of persuasion at trial would be on the non-moving party . . . the party moving for summary judgment may satisfy [its] burden of production under Rule 56 in either of two ways: (1) by submitting evidence that negates an essential element of the non-moving party's claim, or (2) by demonstrating that the non-moving party's evidence is insufficient to establish an essential element of the non-moving party's claim.” Nick's Garage, Inc. v. Progressive Cas. Ins. Co., 875 F.3d 107, 114 (2d Cir. 2017). “If the movant makes this showing in either manner, the burden shifts to the nonmovant to point to record evidence creating a genuine issue of material fact.” Salahuddin v. Goord, 467 F.3d 263, 272-73 (2d Cir. 2006).
On a motion for summary judgment, “the evidence of the non-movant is to be believed, all permissible inferences are to be drawn in [his] favor, and the court must disregard all evidence favorable to the moving party that the jury is not required to believe.” Redd v. New York Div. of Parole, 678 F.3d 166, 174 (2d Cir. 2012); see also S. Katzman Produce Inc., 999 F.3d at 877; see generally Reeves v. Sanderson Plumbing Prod., Inc., 530 U.S. 133, 151 (2000) ().[2]“[I]n reviewing the evidence and considering what inferences may reasonably be drawn, the court may not make credibility determinations or weigh the evidence.” S. Katzman Produce Inc., 999 F.3d at 877. Moreover, “[t]he evaluation of ambiguous acts is a task for the jury, not for the judge on summary judgment.” Redd, 678 F.3d at 174. “In sum, summary judgment is proper only when, with all permissible inferences and credibility questions resolved in favor of the party against whom judgment is sought, there can be but one reasonable conclusion as to the verdict . . . i.e., it is quite clear what the truth is.” Id.; Kaytor v. Elec. Boat Corp., 609 F.3d 537, 546 (2d Cir. 2010).
At the outset, the undersigned concludes the Doe defendants should be dismissed and Nelson's Statement of Material Facts is undisputed. First, the Doe defendants should be dismissed because Pabon failed to ascertain their identities and timely serve them. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 4(m); NDNY LR 4.1(b). Judge Hurd warned Pabon that if he “fails to ascertain the identity of the Doe defendants so as to permit timely services of process, all claims against those individuals will be dismissed.” (Dkt. No. 7. at 9; see also Id. at 15 ().) Because Pabon failed to serve the Doe defendants, the undersigned recommends dismissing those defendants from this action. Fed.R.Civ.P 4(m); see, e.g., Berman v. Durkin, No. 9:13-CV-0136 (LEK) (DJS), 2017 WL 1215814, at *4 (N.D.N.Y. Mar. 10, 2017), report and recommendation adopted, 2017 WL 1207834 (N.D.N.Y. Mar. 31, 2017); Cusamano v. Sobek, 604 F.Supp.2d 416, 440-41 (N.D.N.Y. 2009).
Second Nelson's Statement of Material Facts is undisputed. (Compare Dkt. No. 21-9, with Dkt. No. 33.) On initial review, Judge Hurd specifically warned the parties they must “comply with Local Rule 7.1 of the Northern District of New York in filing motions.” (Dkt. No. 7 at 15.) Among other requirements, that rule provides “[a]ny motion for summary judgment shall include a Statement of Material Facts, and any opposition shall contain a response to the Statement of Material Facts.” NDNY LR 7.1(b)(3). Pabon failed to file a response to Nelson's Statement of Material Facts, and did not controvert...
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