Pacars v. Pemiscot County

Decision Date30 June 2008
Docket NumberNo. SC 88956.,SC 88956.
Citation256 S.W.3d 98
PartiesMISSOURI PROSECUTING ATTORNEYS AND CIRCUIT ATTORNEYS RETIREMENT SYSTEM, an Agency of the State of Missouri, Respondent, v. PEMISCOT COUNTY, et al., Appellants.
CourtMissouri Supreme Court

Wendell L. Hoskins, II, Joshua D. Underwood, Caruthersville, for appellants.

Kristi Grobe Booker, James E. Spain, Poplar Bluff, for respondent.

STEPHEN N. LIMBAUGH, JR., Judge.

Pemiscot County and its county commissioners, Charles Moss, Wendell Hoskins, Sr., and David Wilkerson, appeal the entry of summary judgment in favor of the Missouri Prosecuting Attorneys and Circuit Attorneys Retirement System (PACARS), which petitioned for a writ of mandamus to compel the County to pay additional monies into the PACARS retirement fund. The trial court held that the statutory scheme set out in chapter 561 for the compensation of prosecuting attorneys violated the Equal Protection Clauses of the federal and state constitutions. Because this case presents a challenge to the constitutional validity of these statutes, this Court has exclusive appellate jurisdiction. Mo. Const. art. V, sec. 3. The judgment is reversed.

The material facts of this case are undisputed. Before August 1998, the position of prosecuting attorney for Pemiscot County, a third class county, was part-time. On August 4, 1998, the citizens of Pemiscot County voted to make the position full-time pursuant to section 56.363.1.2 However, the county commission has declined to "elect to have that position also qualify for the retirement benefit available for a full-time prosecutor of a county of the first classification," which is its option under section 56.363.3.3

Section 56.807 establishes the amount counties, depending on their classification were required to pay into the retirement fund for prosecuting attorneys from August 28, 1989, to August 27, 2003. That section states, in relevant part:

1. Beginning August 28, 1989, and continuing monthly thereafter until August 27, 2003, the funds for prosecuting attorneys ... shall be paid from county or city funds.

2. Beginning August 28, 1989, and continuing monthly thereafter until August, 27, 2003, each county treasurer shall pay to the system the following amounts to be drawn from the general revenues of the county:

(1) For counties of the third and fourth classification, except as provided in subdivision (3) of this subsection, three hundred and seventy-five dollars.

...

(3) For counties of the first classification, counties which pursuant to section 56.363 elect to make the position of prosecuting attorney a full-time position after August 28, 2001, or whose county commission has elected a full-time retirement benefit pursuant to subsection 3 of section 56.363, and the city of St. Louis, one thousand two hundred ninety-one dollars and sixty-seven cents.

Section 56.807.5 then details the amounts counties, depending on their classification, are to pay from August 28, 2003 to present:

5. Beginning August 28, 2003, each county treasurer shall pay to the system the following amounts to be drawn from the general revenues of the county:

(1) For counties of the third and fourth classification except as provided in subdivision (3) of this subsection, one hundred eighty-seven dollars;

...

(3) For counties of the first classification, counties which pursuant to section 56.363 elect to make the position of prosecuting attorney a full-time position after August 28, 2001, or whose county commission has elected a full-time retirement benefit pursuant to subsection 3 of section 56.363, and the city of St. Louis, six hundred forty-six dollars.

Under these provisions, Pemiscot County is statutorily required to pay into the retirement fund for its prosecuting attorney only $187.00 per month as of August 2003. However, the County did not alter its contribution in PACARS after voting to make the position of prosecuting attorney a full-time position in 1998, and it has since July 1993 in fact paid $375.00 into PACARS per month.

In 2005, based on the provisions of 56.807.5, PACARS petitioned for a writ of mandamus to compel Pemiscot County to pay an additional $4,336.00 into the retirement fund — the difference between the $375.00 paid per month and the $646.00 per month allegedly owed under section 56.807 once the prosecuting attorney position was made full-time. Thereafter, Pemiscot County filed a motion for summary judgment, which the trial court granted, and the PACARS appealed to the court of appeals. The court of appeals issued its decision upholding the trial court's construction of the relevant statutes, but reversed and remanded the case on the basis that the trial court did not rule on PACARS's claim that the statutory scheme for prosecutors' retirement compensation under chapter 56 violated the Equal Protection Clause of the federal and state constitutions. Mo. Prosecuting Atty's v Pemiscot County, 217 S.W.3d 393 (Mo. App.2007).

The basis for the equal protection claim is the disparity between the statutory contributions for prosecuting attorneys in third-class counties whose positions were made full-time before August 28, 2001, as is the case here, and the statutory compensation for prosecuting attorneys in third-class counties whose positions were made full-time after August 28, 2001. Since 2003, prosecuting attorneys in the former category are entitled only to $187.00 per month in retirement contributions, while prosecuting attorneys in the latter category are entitled to $646.00 per month.

On remand, the trial court entered a judgment and order reversing its initial judgment and granting PACARS's motion for summary judgment, ruling that the disparity in retirement compensation for prosecutors who became full-time before August 28, 2001, and those who became full-time after August 28, 2001, was not rationally related to any legitimate state purpose and was, therefore, an unconstitutional violation of the Equal Protection Clauses. In addition, the trial court specifically ordered that:

* Deemed unconstitutional, subsection 3 be stricken from section 56.363, RSMo.

* Deemed unconstitutional, "after August 28, 2001, or whose county commission has elected a full-time retirement benefit pursuant to subsection 3 of section 56.363," be stricken from subdivision 3 of subsection 2 of section 56.807, RSMo and subdivision 3 of subsection 5 of section 56.807, RSMo.

This appeal followed.

The standard of review on appeal of summary judgment is de novo, and summary judgment will be upheld on appeal if there is no genuine dispute of material fact and the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. ITT Commercial Fin. Corp. v. Mid-Am. Marine Supply Corp., 854 S.W.2d 371, 376 (Mo. banc 1993).

This Court's review begins with the recognition that all statutes are "presumed to be constitutional and will not be held unconstitutional unless [they] clearly and undoubtedly contravene[] the constitution." United C.O.D. v. State, 150 S.W.3d 311, 313 (Mo. banc 2004). A statute will be enforced "unless it plainly and palpably affronts fundamental law embodied in the constitution." Id. Doubts will be resolved in favor of the constitutionality of the statute. Id.

In terms of equal protection, a statute that neither operates to the disadvantage of a suspect class nor impinges on a fundamental right will withstand constitutional challenge if...

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