Pacas v. State

Decision Date22 September 2020
Docket Number01-18-01018-CR,NOS. 01-18-01016-CR,01-18-01017-CR,S. 01-18-01016-CR
Citation612 S.W.3d 588
Parties Roberto Amaya PACAS, Appellant v. The STATE of Texas, Appellee
CourtTexas Court of Appeals

Peter Kelly, Justice

Roberto Amaya Pacas pleaded guilty to three indictments charging him with aggravated assault, a second-degree felony. The trial court found him guilty and assessed punishment at 16 years' imprisonment for each charge, with the sentences running concurrently. On appeal, Pacas contends that the trial court erred in accepting his guilty plea because the Texas Constitution requires a jury trial in all criminal prosecutions. He also alleges that he was assessed duplicative court costs. We modify the trial court's judgments in case numbers 1561965 and 1561966 to delete duplicative court costs and affirm the judgments as modified. We affirm the trial court's judgment in case number 1561964.

Background

In October 2017, a grand jury returned three indictments against Pacas relating to the same incident in which he shot his girlfriend and her two sons. The first accused him of aggravated assault with a deadly weapon against a family member for shooting his girlfriend with a firearm. The second and third indictments charged Pacas with aggravated assault with a deadly weapon for shooting his girlfriend's two sons.

Pacas signed and filed a "Waiver of Constitutional Rights, Agreement to Stipulate, and Judicial Confession" in each case, in which he pleaded guilty and admitted that he committed the acts as alleged in each indictment. Pacas's trial counsel also signed the "Waiver of Constitutional Rights, Agreement to Stipulate, and Judicial Confession" in each case, affirming that he believed that Pacas had entered his guilty plea knowingly, voluntarily, and after a full discussion of the consequences of the plea. Counsel also affirmed that he believed his client was competent to stand trial.

Pacas signed written admonishments that informed him he had been indicted for second-degree felonies and of the punishment range for each offense. See TEX. CODE CRIM. PROC. art. 26.13. He also signed a "Defendant's Waivers and Statements" in each case, affirming that he was mentally competent; understood the nature of the charge against him, the trial court's admonishments, and the consequences of his plea; and freely and voluntarily pleaded guilty. See id. He affirmed that he was satisfied with his representation and that he received effective and competent representation. He gave up his right to a jury and his right to require the appearance, confrontation, and cross-examination of witnesses; and he consented to the oral and written stipulations of evidence in the case. He also signed a non-citizen immigration admonishment acknowledging that he was freely and voluntarily pleading guilty and that he was aware of the immigration consequences of his decision.

The trial court found sufficient evidence of Pacas's guilt and found that he had entered his guilty plea in each case freely, knowingly, and voluntarily. The court accepted his guilty pleas and found him guilty of two counts of aggravated assault with a deadly weapon and one count of aggravated assault with a deadly weapon against a family member. TEX. PENAL CODE § 22.02(a). Each of the three offenses is a second-degree felony. Id. § 22.02(b). At the conclusion of a sentencing hearing, at which the State and appellant both presented evidence, the trial court sentenced him to 16 years' imprisonment in each case and ordered the sentences to run concurrently.

Pacas was ordered to pay court costs in each of the three cases. The bill of costs in the first case lists $334 in court costs. The bill of costs in the second and third cases listed $309 in costs each. The $309 costs in the second and third cases consisted of exactly the same court costs as the first, except that a $25 court cost for "Summoning Witness/Mileage" was not assessed. Pacas appeals.

Right to a Jury Trial

In his first issue, Pacas contends that his convictions should be vacated because he did not receive a jury trial. Article I, section 10 of the Texas Constitution states, "In all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall have a speedy public trial by an impartial jury." TEX. CONST. art. I, § 10. He argues that this creates an absolute requirement of jury trials in every criminal prosecution. He relies solely on the language contained in this clause to assert that he could not waive a constitutional mandate to a jury trial. We disagree.

A. Applicable Law and Standard of Review

Two provisions of the Texas Constitution address the concept of trial by jury in a criminal case. Article I, section 10 of the Texas Constitution, titled "Rights of accused in criminal prosecutions," states: "In all criminal prosecutions the accused shall have a speedy public trial by an impartial jury." TEX. CONST. art. I, § 10. Article I, section 15, titled "Right of trial by jury," states: "The right of trial by jury shall remain inviolate" and authorizes the Legislature to "pass such laws as may be needed to regulate the same, and to maintain its purity and efficiency." TEX. CONST. art. I, § 15 ; see also TEX. CODE CRIM. PROC. art. 1.13 ("Waiver of trial by jury"). The Sixth Amendment to the United States Constitution addresses the concept of trial by jury.

It provides: "In all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy the right to a speedy and public trial by an impartial jury of the State and district wherein the crime shall have been committed...." U.S. CONST. amend. VI.

When interpreting our state constitution, we rely heavily on its literal text and give effect to its plain language. Republican Party of Tex. v. Dietz , 940 S.W.2d 86, 89 (Tex. 1997). We may consider "such things as the purpose of the constitutional provision, the historical context in which it was written, the collective intent, if it can be ascertained, of the framers and the people who adopted it, our prior judicial decisions, the interpretations of analogous constitutional provisions by other jurisdictions, and constitutional theory." Id. "It is well established that a reasonable construction should be given to constitutional provisions and that a provision will not be construed so as to lead to absurd conclusions, great public inconvenience, or unjust discrimination, if any other interpretation can be reasonably indulged." In re Keller , 357 S.W.3d 413, 421 (Tex. Spec. Ct. Rev. 2010).

B. Analysis

The trial court did not err by allowing Pacas to waive his right to a jury and accepting his guilty pleas. The Texas Constitution does not mandate that a defendant may not waive a jury trial in felony cases. Our analysis of article I, sections 10 and 15, our review of the history and context of the adoption of the Texas Constitution, and precedent from the Court of Criminal Appeals supports this conclusion.

1. Interpretation of the Texas Constitution

Pacas admits that article I, section 15 of the Texas Constitution articulates a waivable right to a trial by jury, while article I, section 10 provides a mandate to a trial by jury in felony prosecutions. But it is illogical to read the state constitution to simultaneously allow for the waiver of trial by jury in one provision while also mandating a trial by jury in another provision. See Keller , 357 S.W.3d at 421 (constitutional provisions should not be interpreted to lead to absurd conclusions if any other interpretation can be reasonably indulged). We construe constitutional provisions and amendments that relate to the same subject matter together and consider those amendments and provisions in light of each other. Doody v. Ameriquest Mortg. Co. , 49 S.W.3d 342, 344 (Tex. 2001).

Article I, sections 10 and 15 are in pari materia because they both articulate the right to the trial by jury. The Texas Court of Criminal Appeals has explained:

It is a settled rule of statutory interpretation that statutes that deal with the same general subject, have the same general purpose, or relate to the same person or thing or class of persons or things, are considered as being in pari materia though they contain no reference to one another, and though they were passed at different times or at different sessions of the legislature.

State v. Vasilas , 253 S.W.3d 268, 271–72 (Tex. Crim. App. 2008), (internal citations and quotations omitted). The Vasilas court explained that in para materia applies only if two statutes "have the same purpose or object, provides that where one statute deals with a subject in general terms, and another deals with a part of the same subject in a more detailed way, the two should be harmonized if possible; but if there is any conflict, the latter will prevail." Id. at 273, quoting 67 Tex. Jur. 3d Statutes § 133 (Supp. 2008). The guidelines applicable to the construction of statutes are equally applicable to the construction of the Texas Constitution.

Tex. Bankers Ass'n v. Ass'n of Cmty. Orgs. for Reform Now (ACORN) , 303 S.W.3d 404, 408 (Tex. App.—Austin 2010), aff'd in part, rev'd in part on other grounds sub. nom. Fin. Comm'n of Tex. v. Norwood , 418 S.W.3d 566 (Tex. 2013).

Because article I, sections 10 and 15 are in pari materia , we read them in harmony, and when there is a conflict, the specific provision controls over the general provision. See Vasilas , 253 S.W.3d at 273. Article I, section 15 dictates that the right to a jury trial "shall remain inviolate," mandates that the Legislature pass laws to regulate the right of trial by jury and to "maintain its purity and efficiency," and permits the Legislature to provide for temporary commitment of mentally ill people not charged with an offense for a period of time. TEX. CONST. art. I, § 15. Section 10 of the same article lists the rights of an accused, including that he shall have "a speedy public trial by an impartial jury," the right to know the...

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