Pace v. Edel-Harrelson, Docket No. 151374.

• Decision Date: 01 February 2016
• Docket Number: Docket No. 151374.
• Citation: 499 Mich. 1,878 N.W.2d 784
• Parties: PACE v. EDEL–HARRELSON.
• Court: Michigan Supreme Court

499 Mich. 1

878 N.W.2d 784

PACE

v.EDEL–HARRELSON.

Docket No. 151374.

Supreme Court of Michigan.

Feb. 1, 2016.

Law Offices of Lisa C. Ward, PLLC (by Lisa C. Ward, Okemos and Nicole J. Schmidtke ), for plaintiff.

Foley & Mansfield, PLLP (by Greg Meihn and Melinda A. Balian, Ferndale), for defendants.

PER CURIAM.

This case requires the Court to consider the application of Michigan's Whistleblowers' Protection Act (WPA) to an employee who alleges that she was terminated because she reported a coworker's plan to violate the law. Pursuant to MCL 15.362

, the WPA provides protection to an employee who reports "a violation or a suspected violation of a law" to a public body. Because "a violation or a suspected violation" refers to an existing violation of a law, the plain language of MCL 15.362 envisions an act or conduct that has actually occurred or is ongoing. MCL 15.362 contains no language encompassing future, planned, or anticipated acts amounting to a violation or a suspected violation of a law. Because plaintiff in the instant case merely reported another's intent to violate a law in the future, plaintiff has no recourse under the WPA. Accordingly, we reverse the Court of Appeals' contrary decision and remand this case to that court for further consideration.

I. BASIC FACTS AND PROCEEDINGS

Plaintiff, Barbara Pace, brought suit against her former employer, SIREN Eaton Shelter, Inc., (SIREN),¹ SIREN executive director, Jessica Edel–Harrelson, and SIREN operations manager, Christy Long, claiming that she was wrongfully terminated on January 18, 2012 in violation of the WPA.

Plaintiff claims Long stated that she intended to use SIREN grant money to purchase a stove for her daughter. According to plaintiff, Long implied that plaintiff should document the transaction in the name of a specific client to cover up the unauthorized purchase. Long denies ever using grant funds for this purpose, or ever discussing such a purchase with plaintiff.

Plaintiff testified that she contacted two of her supervisors to inform them of Long's plans. When plaintiff's supervisors did not act upon her warning, plaintiff reported her incident with Long directly to Edel–Harrelson in December 2011 or early January 2012. Plaintiff stated in her deposition that, at that time, she believed that Long had already purchased the stove with grant funds. Plaintiff alleges that Edel–Harrelson told plaintiff that she would look into the matter, but Edel–Harrelson claimed in a later deposition that she had no recollection of this discussion with plaintiff.²

SIREN terminated plaintiff's employment on January 18, 2012. Plaintiff alleges that she was terminated for reporting her conversation with Long to Edel–Harrelson. SIREN's stated reason for terminating plaintiff's employment was plaintiff's allegedly harassing and intimidating behavior toward a fellow employee in violation of defendants' employment policies in a January 2012 incident.³ The termination letter stated that plaintiff was terminated because she "engaged in behavior that resulted in fear and intimidation in coworkers, and which was witnessed by three employees."

On April 10, 2012, plaintiff brought the instant action alleging that her termination was in violation of the WPA. On August 21, 2013, defendants moved for summary disposition under MCR 2.116(C)(10)

, arguing that plaintiff could not establish a prima facie case under the WPA because (1) no conduct had occurred that could be considered a violation or suspected violation of a law, and therefore, plaintiff did not engage in "protected activity" under the WPA and (2) plaintiff could not demonstrate a causal connection between her alleged report of a suspected violation of a law and her termination.

On November 6, 2013, the circuit court granted summary disposition in favor of defendants, ruling that plaintiff failed to establish that a violation or suspected violation of a law occurred. On February 24, 2015, the Court of Appeals reversed the circuit court's ruling with respect to plaintiff's WPA claim.⁴ According to the panel, plaintiff presented sufficient evidence to establish a genuine issue of material fact that she had engaged in "protected activity," and that the alleged protected activity was causally connected to her subsequent termination, rendering summary disposition improper. The panel remanded for proceedings consistent with its opinion. Defendants filed an application for leave to appeal in this Court, arguing that plaintiff failed to establish a prima facie claim under the WPA because there was no evidence that any conduct or actions were taken that constituted a violation or a suspected violation of a law. After review of the briefs filed on the application for leave to appeal, in lieu of granting leave to appeal, we summarily reverse the Court of Appeals and remand this case to that court for further consideration.

II. STANDARD OF REVIEW

The interpretation of the WPA presents a statutory question that this Court reviews de novo.⁵ This Court also reviews de novo decisions on motions for summary disposition brought under MCR 2.116(C)(10)

.⁶

III. ANALYSIS

The pertinent issue before this Court is whether plaintiff has stated a viable claim under the WPA. The applicable provision of the WPA, MCL 15.362

, states the following:

An employer shall not discharge, threaten, or otherwise discriminate against an employee regarding the employee's compensation, terms, conditions, location, or privileges of employment because the employee, or a person acting on behalf of the employee, reports or is about to report, verbally or in writing, a violation or a suspected violation of a law or regulation or rule promulgated pursuant to law of this state, a political subdivision of this state, or the United States to a public body, unless the employee knows that the report is false, or because an employee is requested by a public body to participate in an investigation, hearing, or inquiry held by that public body, or a court action.

This provision protects an employee who has reported, or is about to report, a violation or suspected violation of a law to a public body. To establish a prima facie case under MCL 15.362

, a plaintiff must show that "(1) the plaintiff was engaged in protected activity as defined by the act, (2) the plaintiff was discharged or discriminated against, and (3) a causal connection exists between the protected activity and the discharge or adverse employment action."⁷

Our initial, and ultimately dispositive, inquiry is whether plaintiff engaged in "protected activity" as articulated in MCL 15.362

when she reported Long's alleged plan to purchase a stove with SIREN grant money to Edel–Harrelson. When interpreting a statute, the primary goal is to give effect to the intent of the Legislature by construing the language of the statute.⁸ When the plain and ordinary meaning of statutory language is clear, judicial construction is neither necessary nor permitted.⁹ When a statute does not expressly define a term, courts may consult dictionary definitions to ascertain its ordinary and generally accepted meaning.¹⁰

MCL 15.362

states that the WPA applies to employees who report "a violation or a suspected violation of a law" to a public body.¹¹ We agree with the Court of Appeals that a plaintiff need not necessarily report an actual violation of a law to receive protection under this provision, as MCL 15.362

explicitly provides protection for "a suspected violation of a law."¹² Nonetheless, we disagree with the Court of Appeals to the extent it held "that, where an employee has a good faith and reasonable belief that a violation of the law ... is being actively planned, the report of that belief is [ ]sufficient to trigger the protections of the WPA."¹³

The reference in MCL 15.362

to "a violation or a suspected violation of a law" plainly envisions an act or conduct that has actually occurred or is ongoing. A common dictionary defines "violation" in part as "the act of violating: the state of being violated[.]"¹⁴ This definition contemplates an existing act that has occurred or is ongoing. That is, "a violation or a suspected violation" refers to an existing violation. The provision must therefore be read in the context of some conduct or act that has already occurred or is occurring, and not some conduct or act that may or may not occur. MCL 15.362

contains no language indicating that future, planned, or anticipated acts amounting to a violation or a suspected violation of a law are included within the scope of the WPA. Consequently, a stated intention to commit an act amounting to a violation of a law in the future does not constitute "a violation or a suspected violation of a law" for purposes of MCL 15.362 as a matter of law.¹⁵

Plaintiff reported to Edel–Harrelson Long's stated plans to commit a future act in violation of the law. Plaintiff claimed in her deposition that Long said she was "going to use the money" to buy the stove and agreed that Long "was simply telling [plaintiff] what her intention was." Plaintiff therefore did not engage in "protected activity" for purposes of the WPA, as plaintiff's report of a suspected planned or future violation of a law is not encompassed within the protections provided by MCL 15.362

.

In holding to the contrary, the Court of Appeals relied in part on plaintiff's statement in her deposition that at the time of her report to Edel–Harrelson, she "believed" Long had already purchased the stove. Based on this statement, the Court of Appeals concluded that plaintiff reported a "suspected violation of an actual law," and that defendants' argument that plaintiff only suspected that Long might purchase the stove in the future is inconsistent with the record.

However, the WPA provides protection to an employee only where that employee "reports or is about to report" a violation or a suspected violation of a law.¹⁶ Thus, an employee's unexpressed personal belief when making a report is not relevant for...