Pace v. Hadley, 87-130

Decision Date22 September 1987
Docket NumberNo. 87-130,87-130
Citation742 P.2d 1283
PartiesLeslie Jan PACE and Wanda Mae Pace, Appellants (Plaintiffs), v. Les HADLEY, Barry Rochford, Mike Cheney, Mahlon Grubb, Berl Trafton, John W. Coykendall, Julius Jones, Dave Thomas, Chuck Maggio, Chuck Wilkinson, and Ken Bigler, Appellees (Defendants).
CourtWyoming Supreme Court

W. Keith Goody of King & Goody, Jackson, for appellants.

Patrick R. Day, Cheyenne, and Hugh Q. Gottschalk and Harry Shulman, Denver, Colo., for appellees.

Before BROWN, C.J., and THOMAS, CARDINE, URBIGKIT and MACY, JJ.

MACY, Justice.

Plaintiffs Leslie Jan Pace and Wanda Mae Pace (appellants herein) filed suit alleging negligence and culpable negligence on the part of defendants (appellees herein), who were co-employees of Mr. Pace at FMC Wyoming Corporation. The district court entered an order granting summary judgment in favor of defendants.

We reverse and remand.

Mr. Pace was employed as a class A mechanic for FMC Wyoming Corporation at its trona mine located in Sweetwater County, Wyoming. On August 15, 1986, in the course of his employment while working with a drill press, Mr. Pace severed his left arm just below the elbow. He was attempting to enlarge the center hole in a cone nut. He had been holding a bolt with his left hand in order to keep the cone nut straight and manually was feeding the drill press with his right hand. During the drilling process, the bolt slipped out of his hand causing his left forearm to be pushed against the drill bit.

On November 13, 1986, plaintiffs filed a personal injury action against defendants, who had supervisory responsibilities concerning the safety of working conditions in the mine. Generally, this complaint alleged that defendants were responsible for the locking of a tool room holding necessary tools which, if used, would have prevented Mr. Pace's injuries. Also, on the same day the suit was filed, plaintiffs served defendants with interrogatories and requests for production.

On December 23, 1986, defendant Barry Rochford filed a motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim upon which relief could be granted pursuant to Rule 12(b)(6), W.R.C.P., or, in the alternative, a motion for summary judgment. Likewise, the remaining defendants filed a motion to dismiss pursuant to Rule 12(b)(6). Both of these motions were accompanied by memoranda and affidavits. In response to these motions, plaintiffs filed a memorandum in opposition generally stating that inadequate discovery had occurred; therefore, argument at that time was impossible.

On February 9, 1987, the district court issued a decision letter announcing that it would convert the motions to dismiss filed by defendants into motions for summary judgment and allowed the parties until March 2, 1987, to file any additional affidavits or material in support of, or in opposition to, the motions. The next day, defendants filed a reply memorandum to plaintiffs' opposition to an order of dismissal and answered plaintiffs' first interrogatories and request for the production of documents. On February 26, 1987, plaintiffs filed a motion for continuance and opposition to the motion for summary judgment. Again, plaintiffs asked for additional time in which to make discovery and take depositions, and they alleged that it was absurd to require them to respond until such time as discovery had been completed.

On March 3, 1987, the district court converted both of defendants' motions to dismiss to motions for summary judgment and issued another decision letter stating that there were no "genuine issues of material fact." (Emphasis in original.) On March 17, 1987, an order was filed by the district court in favor of defendants granting them summary judgment. This appeal followed.

Plaintiffs raise the following issues:

"1) Did the District Court err in allowing the Rule 12(b)(6) motion to be converted to a Motion for Summary Judgment?

"2) Was the summary judgment improper because:

"a) there was a lack of a sufficient factual basis,

"b) genuine issues of material fact existed in the case, and

"c) [defendants] were not entitled to judgment as a matter of law?"

We need not specifically address these issues as we hold that plaintiffs were not allowed a reasonable time for discovery.

Defendants filed their respective motions to dismiss and, in one case, in the alternative, motion for summary judgment only 40 days after the initial complaint in this case was filed. These motions were filed before defendants had replied to plaintiffs' interrogatories and request for production of relevant documents. Despite being apprised by plaintiffs that there had been inadequate time for making discovery and gathering important facts in the case, the district court issued a decision letter allowing plaintiffs only 21 additional days in which to gather information and oppose such motions. While we recognize that defendants made affidavits, answers to interrogatories, and production of documents prior to the deadline set by the district court, this information provided plaintiffs with only the first stepping stones in fully developing their case or, more importantly, in opposing defendants' motions.

Mr. Pace was covered under the Wyoming Worker's Compensation Act and may recover from his co-employees only if he shows that they were culpably negligent. Section 27-12-103, W.S.1977. 1 "This court has said that culpable negligence is 'willful and serious misconduct.' " Stundon v. Sterling, Wyo., 736 P.2d 317, 318 (1987). In order to prove that an actor has engaged in willful misconduct, it must be demonstrated that the actions were taken with a state of mind which approached intent to do harm. Id.; Bettencourt v. Pride Well Service, Inc., Wyo., 735 P.2d 722 (1987). Also, it has long been recognized by this Court that:

"The initial burden is on the movant to show that there is no genuine issue of material fact. Once that showing is...

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9 cases
  • Mills v. Reynolds
    • United States
    • Wyoming Supreme Court
    • March 11, 1991
    ...recover damages from a culpably negligent co-employee; see Case v. Goss, 776 P.2d 188 (Wyo.1989); Wessel, 752 P.2d 1363; and Pace v. Hadley, 742 P.2d 1283 (Wyo.1987)), we imposed a heavy burden on plaintiffs to demonstrate a co-employee's culpable negligence. 8 The line between culpable neg......
  • Continental Ins. v. Page Engineering Co.
    • United States
    • Wyoming Supreme Court
    • December 5, 1989
    ...granting a summary judgment prematurely and denying reasonable time for the parties to conduct their desired discovery. Pace v. Hadley, 742 P.2d 1283 (Wyo.1987). It was clear in Pace that the decision of the trial court to convert the defendant's motion to dismiss into a motion for a summar......
  • Sare v. Sheridan County Bd. of County Com'rs
    • United States
    • Wyoming Supreme Court
    • December 19, 1989
    ...presented by the movant. General allegations and conclusory statements are not sufficient. (Citation omitted.) See also Pace v. Hadley, 742 P.2d 1283 (Wyo.1987). The parties do not dispute that Smith dedicated the street for public use when she filed a plat for a subdivision. 1 A dedication......
  • Baros v. Wells
    • United States
    • Wyoming Supreme Court
    • October 5, 1989
    ...must come forward with specific facts to show that there is a genuine issue. Conclusory statements are insufficient. Pace v. Hadley, 742 P.2d 1283 (Wyo.1987); Stundon v. Sterling, 736 P.2d 317 (Wyo.1987). Even if we were to agree that this activity was extremely dangerous, that does not equ......
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