Pace v. Pace

• Citation: 24 So.3d 325
• Decision Date: 24 November 2009
• Docket Number: No. 2008-CA-00380-COA.,2008-CA-00380-COA.
• Parties: Sidney Kelton PACE, Appellant v. Melanie Jean PACE, Appellee.
• Court: Court of Appeals of Mississippi

24 So.3d 325

Sidney Kelton PACE, Appellant v. Melanie Jean PACE, Appellee.

No. 2008-CA-00380-COA.

Court of Appeals of Mississippi.

November 24, 2009.

David A. Roberts, attorney for appellant.

Mark H. Watts, Pascagoula, Ray T. Price, Hattiesburg, attorneys for appellee.

Before MYERS, P.J., ISHEE and MAXWELL, JJ.

ISHEE, J., for the Court.

¶ 1. Sidney Pace and Melanie Pace were granted a divorce on the ground of irreconcilable differences on December 4, 2002; the judgment of divorce incorporated a written agreement concerning custody and property settlement. Thereafter, on July 7, 2005, Melanie filed a complaint for contempt in the Chancery Court of Jackson County, alleging that Sidney was in arrears on his agreed payments. Sidney responded and asked the chancery court to find the agreement unconscionable and, therefore, unenforceable. The chancery court held a hearing on the matter and refused to find Sidney in contempt. In the judgment, the chancery court modified some provisions of the agreement but, for the most part, left it intact. Aggrieved, Sidney appeals and presents the following issues for consideration:

I. Whether it was error to refuse to find the property settlement agreement to be unenforceable based on its unconscionability and ambiguity.

II. Whether it was error to order payment of the arrearage on the mortgage, property taxes, and property insurance.

III. Whether it was error to refuse to modify the property settlement agreement to clarify the ambiguous terms.

IV. Whether the chancery court's ruling was ambiguous and unenforceable.

Finding no error, we affirm.

FACTS

¶ 2. Melanie and Sidney were married on June 7, 1986, and they had three children during their marriage, all of whom were minors at the time of the proceeding in chancery court. Melanie and Sidney separated on or about May 29, 2002, and on December 4, 2002, they were granted a divorce on the ground of irreconcilable differences.¹ The parties had previously signed an agreement for custody and property settlement (the Agreement), which was signed by Sidney on September 17, 2002, and by Melanie on September 24, 2002. The Agreement was incorporated into the final judgment of divorce.

¶ 3. Sidney did not consult an attorney before signing the Agreement, despite the fact that he was a doctor and had the financial means to do so. The Agreement provided that the parties would share joint legal custody of the three minor children, with Melanie receiving primary physical custody and Sidney receiving visitation. In pertinent part, the Agreement included the following provisions: (1) Sidney shall pay $1,500 or twenty-two percent of his income per month in child support; (2) Sidney shall maintain medical, health, dental, and optical insurance through his employer for Melanie and the three children, and Sidney shall be responsible for any costs not covered by that insurance; (3) Sidney shall be responsible for the payment to obtain school uniforms; (4) Sidney shall be responsible for the payment of the daycare expenses; (5) Sidney shall be responsible for the payment of the children's college expenses and extracurricular activities (6) Sidney shall maintain $500,000 worth of life insurance for the benefit of Melanie and the children; (7) Sidney shall be allowed to claim the children for tax purposes; (8) Melanie shall be awarded all assets and interest that Sidney has or may acquire in his professional associations or corporations; (9) Melanie shall be awarded the marital home in Ocean Springs, Mississippi, with Sidney to be responsible for the remaining indebtedness, taxes, and insurance on the home; (10) Melanie shall be awarded the 1999 GMC Suburban, and Sidney shall purchase Melanie a new vehicle every four years and be responsible for payments of said vehicles; (11) Sidney shall be awarded the home in Pascagoula, Mississippi, and the 1999 Jeep Wrangler; (12) Melanie shall waive any interest in Sidney's medical practice; (13) Sidney shall pay Melanie $1,500 per month in alimony, to increase to $4,500 per month if Melanie "is fired, quits, laid off, or her position of employment with [Sidney's] office and/or company is terminated for any reason ...," with alimony to survive Sidney's death or Melanie's remarriage; and (14) each party shall waive any right to the other party's retirement.

¶ 4. Following the parties' divorce, Sidney made payments of $6,000 per month to Melanie. According to Sidney, this represented $1,500 in alimony, $1,500 in child support, and $3,000 for Melanie's household expenses—items such as the mortgage and car payment that he had agreed to pay. Sidney contended that he paid more than he was required to pay under the Agreement. However, Melanie claimed that he was in arrears in his payments for the mortgage, taxes, and insurance because she thought the $6,000 per month represented $4,500 in alimony and $1,500 in child support. Sidney did not make any payments for the school uniforms or for daycare, but Melanie admitted that she never sent him a bill for those expenses. Also, Sidney never added Melanie as a beneficiary to the $500,000 life insurance policy that he maintained for the children, and Melanie never executed a release of her claims to Sidney's retirement.

¶ 5. After hearing from the parties, the chancellor, for the most part, upheld the terms of the Agreement. However, the chancellor did find that: (1) Melanie waived the provision granting her an interest in Sidney's business; (2) Melanie waived the provision ordering Sidney purchase her a new car every four years; and (3) Sidney's obligation to pay alimony would cease upon his death or Melanie's remarriage. The chancellor found that there had not been a material change in circumstances that would warrant a reduction in alimony payments because Sidney's income had increased since the divorce; the chancellor also ordered Sidney to pay the arrearage on the marital home expenses: the mortgage, insurance, and taxes. The chancellor found that Sidney was not in willful contumacious contempt of court but did order him to pay $2,500 in attorney's fees to compensate Melanie for having to file the contempt action.

STANDARD OF REVIEW

¶ 6. This Court's standard of review in a domestic relations matter provides that a chancellor is "vested with broad discretion, and this Court will not disturb the chancellor's findings unless the court was manifestly wrong, the court abused its discretion, or the court applied an erroneous legal standard." Pulliam v. Smith, 872 So.2d 790, 793(¶ 5) (Miss.Ct.App.2004) (citing Andrews v. Williams, 723 So.2d 1175, 1177(¶ 7) (Miss.Ct.App.1998)).

DISCUSSION

I. Property Settlement Agreement

¶ 7. Sidney first argues that the Agreement that he and Melanie signed was unenforceable because it was unconscionable and ambiguous. He describes the Agreement as "one such as no man in his senses and not under a delusion would make on the one hand, and as no honest and fair man would accept on the other. ..." Warren v. Warren, 815 So.2d 457, 461(¶ 14) (Miss.Ct.App.2002) (quoting In re Will of Johnson v. Robinson, 351 So.2d 1339, 1341 (Miss.1977)). Sidney claims that he had no choice but to sign the Agreement, which had been drafted by Melanie's attorney, and Sidney had little time to study it or read it carefully. Furthermore, Sidney notes that he "was in the unfortunate position of having a pregnant girlfriend and a hostile wife."

¶ 8. Generally, a chancery court may modify an award of periodic alimony if there has been a material change of circumstances that "occurred as a result of after-arising circumstances not reasonably anticipated at the time of agreement." Dix v. Dix, 941 So.2d 913, 916(¶ 15) (Miss. Ct.App.2006) (citing Varner v. Varner, 666 So.2d 493, 497 (Miss.1995)). However, the supreme court has also stated that "[p]roperty settlement agreements are fixed and final, and may not be modified absent fraud or contractual provision allowing modification." Weathersby v. Weathersby, 693 So.2d 1348, 1352 (Miss.1997) (citing Mount v. Mount, 624 So.2d 1001, 1005 (Miss.1993); Brown v. Brown, 566 So.2d 718, 721 (Miss.1990); East v. East, 493 So.2d 927, 931-32 (Miss.1986)). In Weathersby, the supreme court stated that:

In property and financial matters between the divorcing spouses themselves, there is no question that, absent fraud or overreaching, the parties should be allowed broad latitude. When the parties have reached agreement and the chancery court has approved it, we ought to enforce it and take as dim a view of efforts to modify it, as we ordinarily do when persons seek relief from their improvident contracts.

Weathersby, 693 So.2d at 1351 (quoting Bell v. Bell, 572 So.2d 841, 844 (Miss. 1990)); see also Kelley v. Kelley, 953 So.2d 1139, 1143(¶ 9) (Miss.Ct.App.2007) (noting that a property settlement agreement incorporated into the divorce decree is not subject to modification except in limited situations).

¶ 9. Sidney first notes that "[w]here a property settlement agreement is entered into in contemplation of a divorce on the ground[s] of irreconcilable differences, there is more at work than general contract law." Warren, 815 So.2d at 461(¶ 13) (quoting Grier v. Grier, 616 So.2d 337, 340 (Miss.1993)). He also bases his argument on the fact that a chancellor has discretion to modify a property settlement agreement "where he finds it is necessary to protect the parties because the courts are not used as tools `for implementing unconscionable contracts which are not fair to either party.'" Id.

¶ 10. Sidney would further have this Court find overreaching based on this Court's citation to the Florida District Court of Appeals' definition of the concept, which we stated as follows:

"[T]hat which results from an inequality of bargaining power or other circumstances in which there is an absence of meaningful choice on the part of one of the parties." Schreiber also stated that "overreaching involves the situation where one party...