Pacheco v. Aguilar
| Decision Date | 21 November 2019 |
| Docket Number | No. A-1-CA-36297,A-1-CA-36297 |
| Parties | JOHN PACHECO, Plaintiff/Counterdefendant-Appellant, and TWIN PINES, LLC, Plaintiff/Counterdefendant, v. RICHARD AGUILAR, Defendant/Counterclaimant-Appellee. |
| Court | Court of Appeals of New Mexico |
This decision of the New Mexico Court of Appeals was not selected for publication in the New Mexico Appellate Reports. Refer to Rule 12-405 NMRA for restrictions on the citation of unpublished decisions. Electronic decisions may contain computer-generated errors or other deviations from the official version filed by the Court of Appeals.
APPEAL FROM THE DISTRICT COURT OF LINCOLN COUNTY
Fuqua Law & Policy, P.C.
Scott Fuqua
Santa Fe, NM
for Appellant
William N. Griffin
Ruidoso, NM
for Appellee
{1} Plaintiff/Counterdefendant John Pacheco appeals the district court's judgment concluding he defrauded Defendant/Counterclaimant Richard Aguilar by misrepresenting the value of a concession trailer exchanged for Aguilar's release of a debt Pacheco owed on a modular coffee kiosk. Pacheco makes numerous arguments on appeal—(1) as a threshold matter, Pacheco contends that we should consider his notice of appeal timely filed; on the merits, Pacheco contends Aguilar's fraud claim fails because (2) Pacheco never took anything of value from Aguilar, (3) Pacheco's representations regarding the trailer's purchase price did not establish evidence of its market value, (4) Aguilar was required to further investigate Pacheco's representations, (5) Aguilar did not establish Pacheco misrepresented the value of the trailer, and (6) Aguilar was required to unwind the agreement once he discovered the misrepresentation. Pacheco makes a final argument on behalf of Plaintiff/Counterdefendant Twin Pines, LLC, arguing the judgment should not have been entered against Twin Pines.1 Although we conclude the notice of appeal was timely under the circumstances and thus review the merits of this appeal, we find no error and affirm.
{2} Aguilar owned and operated a small, modular coffee kiosk in Ruidoso for several years. In February 2012, Aguilar agreed to sell the kiosk to Pacheco. Pacheco agreed to pay a total of $43,000, in the form of an initial down payment, twenty-four monthly payments, and two additional large payments. Pacheco made the down payment and the first three monthly payments. By May 2012, however, he was experiencing financial troubles, which he communicated to Aguilar. In early June 2012 Pacheco sought from Aguilar a reduction of his monthly payment obligation and indicated he might breach their agreement in the absence of a reduction. As an alternative, Pacheco proposed that Aguilar accept a concession trailer in exchange for a release of Pacheco's remaining debt of $36,200.
{3} In support, Pacheco sent Aguilar various images of the trailer, along with an "invoice" appearing to indicate that Pacheco had purchased the trailer in December 2010 for $32,821. Pacheco also provided Aguilar another "invoice" appearing to indicate he paid $10,275 for after-market additions to the trailer. Taken together, the documents indicated that Pacheco had invested a total of $43,096 in the trailer. Based on the documentation provided, Aguilar agreed to excuse Pacheco's remaining payments due on the kiosk in exchange for the trailer, and the parties signed a release agreement in July 2012 ("the release agreement").
{4} Aguilar took possession of the trailer, drove it to Oklahoma City, and attempted to sell it. He advertised the trailer on Craigslist for $39,900, but he received no offers. He ran a three-day advertisement in Oklahoma City's principal newspaper but again he received no offers. He then took the trailer to a large auctioneer, which had previously sold concession trailers and equipment. The auctioneer sold the trailer quickly, and after paying the auctioneer's costs and commission, Aguilar netted $8,726.46 on the sale. About two weeks later, Aguilar filed a UCC-1 financing statement, aiming to preserve an interest in the kiosk given the substantial difference between the sum he received for the trailer and the sum owed by Pacheco at the time of the release agreement.
{5} Aguilar communicated with the companies named on the invoices Pacheco had provided and discovered the invoices had been altered. The original documents, which Aguilar eventually obtained, reflected a total price for the trailer and after-market additions of approximately $14,933—at least $28,000 less than what Pacheco had originally represented.
{6} The district court found Pacheco committed fraud by altering the invoices and using them to induce Aguilar to enter the release agreement. The court added that Aguilar had justifiably relied on the invoices and Pacheco's related representations to his detriment, incurring damages of $27,437.54. The parties' remaining claims were dismissed.
{7} Pacheco filed a complaint, alleging breach of contract and various additional causes of action based in part on Aguilar's filing of the UCC-1 financing statement. Aguilar brought a counterclaim of fraud, based on the alterations made to the invoices, along with several other claims. The parties tried the case to the court in January 2016. The district court convened the parties on November 17, 2016, to orally announce its judgment. The court then invited the parties to submit proposed findings of fact and conclusions of law, on a mutually agreeable date. On December 30, 2016, the parties had not yet submitted proposals, and the court entered a judgment including various findings and conclusions and memorializing the decision announced at the November hearing.
{8} On January 23, 2017, Pacheco submitted proposed findings and conclusions, without any accompanying motion to amend or modify the judgment. Aguilar submittedhis own proposed findings and conclusions around the same time. On January 30, 2017, Pacheco moved to extend his deadline for filing a notice of appeal, apparently under the impression that filing a notice of appeal would deprive the district court of jurisdiction to consider the parties' submissions. Aguilar responded to Pacheco's motion, explaining an extension was unnecessary because Pacheco's submission acted as a motion to amend the district court's findings and conclusions under Rule 1-052(D) NMRA, and tolled the deadline to file a notice of appeal. The court nevertheless granted an extension, giving Pacheco an additional thirty days from the original deadline of January 30—through March 2—to file his notice of appeal. By March 2, 2017, the court had not yet acted on the parties' proposed findings and conclusions, and the court granted Pacheco an additional extension, until March 6, to file his notice of appeal. On March 6, 2017, the court entered new findings of fact and conclusions of law. Pacheco filed his notice of appeal the same day.
{9} We initially proposed to dismiss Pacheco's appeal on the ground that his notice of appeal was untimely because the district court lacked authority to extend the notice deadline to March 6 in light of Rule 12-201(E)(5) NMRA, which provides that any such extension "shall not exceed thirty (30) days after the date that the notice of appeal would have been due if the extension had not been granted." Pacheco nevertheless asks us to conclude his notice of appeal was timely because his submission of proposed findings and conclusions tolled his deadline until the district court acted on the submission. Alternatively, he contends he was entitled to rely on the district court's extensions of his deadline. Aguilar argues to the contrary but acknowledges Pacheco put the parties and the district court on notice of his intent to appeal and Pacheco's minimal delay in filing a formal notice caused no prejudice. Aguilar offers that Pacheco's notice of appeal "should be allowed in order to best serve justice." We conclude, under the particular circumstances here, Pacheco's submission of proposed findings and conclusions acted as a motion to amend and tolled the deadline to file a notice of appeal.
{10} Determination of whether Pacheco's appeal was timely turns on the interpretation of our court rules, which we review de novo. Grygorwicz v. Trujillo, 2009-NMSC-009, ¶ 7, 145 N.M. 650, 203 P.3d 865. We construe our appellate rules liberally so as to address appeals on their merits. L.D. Miller Constr., Inc. v. Kirschenbaum, 2017-NMCA-030, ¶ 15, 392 P.3d 194. Rule 12-201(A) NMRA directs that a notice of appeal be filed within thirty days of the filing of a judgment—or, in this case by January 30, 2017, the day Pacheco requested an extension. When a party timely files a motion that has the potential to affect the finality of the judgment, however, Rule 12-201(D)(1) directs that the thirty-day period for filing a notice of appeal shall not begin to run until the court disposes of the motion. A motion to amend made under Rule 1-052(D), which permits a party in a nonjury trial to move for amendment of the district court's findings and conclusions, is within the class of motions under Rule 12-201(D)(1) that tolls the deadline.
{11} Pacheco, the parties agree, filed no document captioned as a "motion" and no document asking explicitly for the district court's amendment of facts or conclusions made in its December 30 judgment. Our review of the record, however, reveals that Pacheco's January 23, 2017, submission was in substance, and the parties and the court understood Pacheco's submission as, a motion to amend under Rule 1-052(D), affecting the finality of the judgment. See, e.g., Phelps Dodge Corp. v. Guerra, 1978-NMSC-053, ¶ 18, 92 N.M. 47, 582 P.2d 819 (); Century Bank v. Hymans, 1995-NMCA-095, ¶ 10, 120 N.M. 684, 905 P.2d 722 (...
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