Pacho v. Enterprise Rent-a-Car Co.
| Decision Date | 07 August 2008 |
| Docket Number | No. 05 CV 10687(CM).,05 CV 10687(CM). |
| Citation | 572 F.Supp.2d 341 |
| Parties | Maria PACHO, Plaintiff, v. ENTERPRISE RENT-A-CAR COMPANY, Elrac, Inc., Alberto Garcia and `John Doe,' Defendants. |
| Court | U.S. District Court — Southern District of New York |
Dayton Peter Haigney, III, Dayton P. Haigney, New York City, for Plaintiff.
Carolyn Sicuranza Rankin, Peter M. Khrinenko, Brand Glick & Band, P.C., Garden City, NY, Stephanie Lauren Boden, Carman, Callahan & Ingham, LLP, James M. Carman, Farmingdale, NY, for Defendants.
DECISION AND ORDER GRANTING IN PART AND DENYING IN PART PLAINTIFF'S MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT AND GRANTING IN PART AND DENING IN PART DEFENDANTS' CROSS-MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT
Plaintiff Maria Pacho ("Plaintiff') seeks summary judgment on the issue of liability against Defendant Alberto Garcia for injuries suffered during a hit and run car accident. Pacho also seeks to dismiss the affirmative defense of Defendant Enterprise Rent-A-Car Company ("Enterprise") and Defendant Enterprise Leasing & Rent-A-Car, Inc. ("ELRAC"), and to amend the original summons to list ELRAC as a named party.
Garcia, Enterprise and ELRAC (collectively, "Defendants") argue that Pacho has failed to establish a prima facie case of liability against Garcia. Additionally, Enterprise and ELRAC filed a cross-motion for summary judgment, arguing that (1) the Graves Amendment to the Federal Transportation Equity Act, 49 USC 30106, preempts the Plaintiffs claims, (2) that Plaintiff has released her claims against ELRAC and Enterprise, (3) Enterprise is not liable to Plaintiff under the New York Vicarious Liability Statute, and (4) ELRAC and Enterprise are entitled to summary judgment on Plaintiffs "negligent entrustment" claim.
For the reasons stated below, Pacho's motion for summary judgment as to Garcia's fault is granted, but because the issue of Plaintiffs contributory negligence must be tried, the court cannot enter judgment in favor of Pacho on the issue of liability. Pacho's motion to dismiss the affirmative defense of Enterprise and ELRAC based on the Graves Amendment is granted. Defendant's cross-motion for summary judgment on the issue of Enterprise and ELRAC's liability is granted in part and denied in part. Pacho's motion to "amend the summons" is denied as moot.
There is no genuine dispute about the following material facts, except where noted.
On October 28, 2003, Plaintiff Maria Pacho was struck by a car at the corner of West 176th Street and Audubon Avenue in New York, New York. (Pl. Rule 56.1 Stmt. ¶ 1.) The car that struck Pacho was a White Nissan Maxima bearing New Jersey registration number JDT78H. (Id. ¶ 12.) Pacho suffered severe injuries from the accident; she was in a coma and was hospitalized for more than 3 months. (Id. ¶ 2.)
Garcia pled guilty to the hit and run. In his plea allocution, he admitted that he was the driver of the car that struck Pacho. (Id. ¶ 14.) He has since recanted that version of events and testified under oath that the car was actually stolen from him in the parking lot of a Kentucky Fried Chicken, and that he was not actually the driver. (Garica Dep. ¶¶ 10-14.)
ELRAC, a subsidiary of Enterprise, is the title owner of the vehicle that struck Pacho. (Id.) Originally, Pacho was told that the car had been rented from Defendant Enterprise. (Id. ¶ 12.) The car was actually rented from ELRAC in Hawthorne on October 28, 2003. (Def. Rule 56.1 Stmt. ¶ 12.)1 Both Enterprise and ELRAC are incorporated in the state of Delaware. (12/22/05 Notice of Removal ¶ 5.)
Because Pacho was unaware of the identity of the driver who hit her, she originally filed a claim with the New York Motor Vehicle Accident Indemnification Corporation (MVAIC), a statutorily created body that compensates victims of hit and run accidents who cannot identify their assailants. See N.Y. Ins. Law § 5213(a). MVAIC is funded by contributions from insurance companies doing business in New York. Id. § 5203. MVAIC states, "as a condition to the payment of the amount of the settlement the qualified person ... shall assign his claim to [MVAIC] which shall then be subrogated to all of the rights of the qualified person against the financially irresponsible motorist." Id. § 5213(b).
Under the statute, Pacho was entitled to receive $25,000. See id. § 5210(a)(1). On March 25, 2004, Pacho settled her claims with MVAIC in exchange for $25,000. (Garcia Rule 56.1 Stmt., Ex. G.)
On October 19, 2004, the District Attorney informed Pacho's attorney via email that the driver who had struck her was Defendant Alberto Garcia. (Haigney Aff. 10/16/07, ¶ 8.) The DA withheld this information during the investigation and prosecution of Garcia for a number of crimes, one of which was the assault charge stemming from the October 28, 2003 accident. (Id. ¶ 7-13.) On May 27, 2005, Garcia pled guilty to Assault in the First Degree for striking Pacho with his car, and received the maximum sentence of 10 years imprisonment. (Id. ¶ 14.)
Under New York law as it existed at the time of the accident, a lessor of a motor vehicle was vicariously liable for the negligence of his lessee, even in the absence of fault on the part of the lessor. See Murdza v. Zimmerman, 99 N.Y.2d 375, 379, 756 N.Y.S.2d 505, 786 N.E.2d 440 (2003). Vehicle and Traffic Law Section 388 governs vicarious liability, and reflected a policy decision to ensure that victims of car accidents involving rented or leased cars could get compensation from a financially responsible defendant. Veh. & Traf. Law § 388 (2007).
Because the $25,000 she had received from MVAIC was insufficient to cover the costs of her injuries, and because she had identified a solvent defendant, Pacho decided to sue Garcia and Enterprise. She first asked permission from MVAIC, offering it a $25,000 lien on any eventual recovery against Garcia and Enterprise in order to repay the statutory funds she had received. (Haigney Aff. 12/22/07 ¶ 4.) MVIC agreed to this arrangement. (Id.)
On July 28, 2005, Pacho's attorney learned that Congress was poised to pass a bill that would preempt Section 388. (Def. Rule 56.1 Stmt. ¶ 29.) This bill, known as the Graves Amendment, expressly preempts state law liability for an owner/lessor based on the torts of his lessee, if such liability is not premised on some fault of the lessor (such as negligent entrustment). 49 U.S.C. § 30106. Sec. 30106 explains:
(a) In General. An Owner of a motor vehicle that rents or leases that vehicle to a person (or an affiliate of the owner) shall not be liable under the law of any State or political subdivision thereof, by reason of being the owner of the vehicle (or an affiliate of the owner), for harm to persons or property that results or arises out of the use, operation, or possession of the vehicle during the period of the rental or lease, if—
1) the owner (or an affiliate of the owner) is engaged in the trade or business of renting or leasing motor vehicles; and
2) there is no negligence or criminal wrong doing on the part of the owner (or an affiliate of the owner)
The Graves Amendment took effect on August 10, 2005. It specifies that, "this section shall apply with respect to any action commenced on or after the date of enactment of this section without regard to whether the harm that is the subject of the action, or the conduct that caused the harm, occurred before such date of enactment." Id. § 30106(c).
On July 29, 2005 plaintiff's attorney filed a "bare" summons with notice with the Court Clerk of New York County. (Pl. Rule 56.1 Stmt., Ex. N.) The summons named Garcia and Enterprise as Defendants. (Id.) On November 18, 2005, Pacho filed her complaint. (Pl. Rule 56.1 Stmt., Ex. O.) On November 21, 2005, Pacho filed an amended complaint, adding ELRAC, the title owner of the vehicle Garcia was driving when he struck Pacho. (Pl. Rule 56.1 Stmt., Ex. P.)
Defendants removed this action to federal court on the basis of diversity on December 20, 2005 (12/22/05 Notice of Removal ¶ 5) and filed an answer on December 23, 2005. (Pl. Rule 56.1 Stmt., Ex. R.)
On October 16, 2007, Plaintiff filed the instant Motion for Summary Judgment, seeking (1) to hold Garcia negligent as a matter of law on the basis of his guilty plea and the doctrine of res judicata, (2) to dismiss Enterprise and ELRAC'S Affirmative Defenses, and (3) seeking to amend the original summons to list ELRAC as a named party. (Pl.Mem.Supp.Summ. J.) On December 10, 2007, ELRAC and Enterprise opposed the motion and crossmoved, arguing that the Graves Amendment foreclosed any cause of action against them, and that in any event Pacho had already assigned her claims to MVIC. (Enterprise/ELRAC Mem. Opp. Summ. J.) Garcia separately opposed the Motion for Summary Judgment. (Garcia Mem. Opp. Summ. J.)
This case was assigned to me from the late Judge Richard Conway Casey on May 17, 2007. (5/17/07 Order.)
Under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 56(c), the court will grant summary judgment if the evidence offered shows that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and that the movants are entitled to judgment as a matter of law. See Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 106 S.Ct. 2548, 91 L.Ed.2d 265 (1986). If a plaintiff fails to establish an essential element of his claim, "there can be `no genuine issue as to any material fact,' since a complete failure of proof concerning an essential element of the nonmoving party's case necessarily renders all other facts immaterial." Id. at 322-33, 106 S.Ct. 2548. On a motion for summary judgment, the court views the record in the light most favorable to the non-movants and resolves all ambiguities and draws all reasonable inferences against the movants. See United States v. Diebold, Inc., 369 U.S....
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