Pacific Gas Electric Co v. City and County of San Francisco Same v. City and County of San Francisco

Decision Date02 June 1924
Docket NumberNos. 34-36,s. 34-36
PartiesPACIFIC GAS & ELECTRIC CO. v. CITY AND COUNTY OF SAN FRANCISCO. SAME v. CITY AND COUNTY OF SAN FRANCISCO et al. (two cases). Re
CourtU.S. Supreme Court

Messrs. Louis Titus and Wm. B. Bosley, both of San Francisco, Cal., for appellant.

Mr. R. M. Searls, of San Francisco, Cal., for appellees.

[Argument of Counsel from page 404 intentionally omitted] Mr. Justice McREYNOLDS delivered the opinion of the Court.

Since 1905 appellant has been the sole producer and general distributor of heating and illuminating gas in the San Francisco district. By three separate ordinances passed in June of 1913, 1914, and 1915, the board of supervisors directed it to supply such gas during the fiscal year commencing July 1st thereafter at not more than 75 cents per 1,000 feet. Claiming that the rate so prescribed would not yield fair return, appellant brought suits in July, 1913, 1914, and 1915, to prevent enforcement of the respective ordinances. Restraining orders issued upon condition that monthly statements should show each consumer's account, and bond should be given to secure proper repayments, with interest. The maximum rate in the schedule thereafter maintained was 85 cents per 1,000.

December 15, 1916, the causes were consolidated and referred to a master. After taking much testimony he presented an elaborate report, March 2, 1920, which recommended dismissal of the bills and repayment of whatever had been collected above the prescribed rate. The District Court affirmed the report and directed an appropriate decree.

The master found that not less than 7 per centum net upon the value of the property devoted to public use was necessary for a fair return; also that, if observed, the prescribed rate would have yielded more than 7 per centum—for 1913-1914, an excess of $21,402.95; for 1914-1915, $89,446.12; and for 1915-1916, $171,464.48.

We think the evidence supports the finding that a net return of 7 per centum was necessary in order to avoid confiscation.

The inventory of the many items making up appellant's manufacturing and distributing plant with their reproduction cost new was agreed upon by the parties. In order to determine accrued depreciation and ascertain true values during the years 1913-1916, the master applied the 'modified sinking fund method.' Concerning this he said:

It involves 'an estimate of the lives of the different structural units, and an annual allowance set aside from the rates received as a reserve for future replacement on a 5 per cent. compound interest curve, the capital basis of return to the owner being depreciated each year in an amount exactly corresponding with yearly additions to the reserve. It is assumed that loss of plant units by obsolescence and inadequacy, as well as by physical decay, can be forecast with substantial accuracy and provided for in advance of abandonment and replacement.'

Appellant objects to the application of this method and insists that depreciation should have been ascertained upon full consideration of the definite testimony given by competent experts who examined the structural units, spoke concerning observed conditions and made estimates therefrom. As these examinations were made subsequent to the alleged depreciation for the definite purpose of ascertaining existing facts, we think the criticism is not without merit. Facts shown by reliable evidence were preferable to averages based upon assumed probabilities. When a plant has been conducted with unusual skill, the owner may justly claim the consequent benefits. The problem was to ascertain the probable result of the specified rate, if applied under well-known past conditions, not to forecast the probable outcome of a proposed rate under unknown future conditions.

Counsel do not insist that the estimated accrued depreciation is 'grossly excessive,' if confined to the result of physical causes. But they do maintain that the master should have ascertained and stated what depreciation was due to such causes and how much followed obsolescence resulting from the introduction of certain patented inventions, and we think such a finding should have been made unless some undisclosed reason prevented. The claim is that, in order to lower cost of production, it became necessary to abandon certain valuable property under conditions not reasonably susceptible of anticipation. The material and relevant facts ought to be disclosed.

The objection to the report most seriously urged is that in his estimate of total value the master failed properly to appraise certain patent rights through which manufacturing costs had been greatly reduced; also that he failed to make proper allowances for the successful use of such rights. This objection is well taken. The following excerpts from the master's long and rather involved report disclose the contested points with the relevant facts and indicate his conclusions:

'The company contends that its plant capital, as a basis of earnings, should suffer no deduction because of supposed depreciation due to age, but only, if at all, by the amount of 'deferred maintenance.' And where, as here, there have been abandonments of large units due to obsolescence, the loss should be reimbursed by amortization over a period of years after, rather than before, the replacement, this amortization being effected by dividing the economies resulting from new machines and processes between owner and consumer, thus allowing a partial reduction in the rate. * * *

'Until this case it had not occurred to me that, so far as theory is concerned, reimbursement of the owner could take place after abandonment. It would not seem fair if it involved a raise of rates. Physical depreciation, for example, if an accumulation is necessary to provide for replacement, ought to be provided beforehand from the rates of users of the service which caused the machine to wear out. But where replacement is made on account of obsolescence or inadequacy and economy is effected in costs, that economy can with fairness be devoted to reimbursement for the replacement cost, the rates remaining unchanged. I know of no well-considered method to meet this reimbursement after the fact. The installments would have to include interest on the unpaid principal and capital would thus not be depreciated for purposes of return. An estimate of the period of amortization would not have to be made if all economies of the new machine were devoted to the amortization; it would work itself out. If the economies were shared with the rate payer, as plaintiff here suggests, the period should not extend beyond the estimated life of the new machine; a plan which is subject to the objection on the grounds of uncertainty common to all such estimates. * * *

'But where, as here, and as is generally the case, there is nothing to show what, if any, consideration has been given the question of depreciation methods by the state authorities, or anything beyond a bare schedule of rates to be charged, then the court must determine the proper methods by its own independent judgment. I have tried to make it clear that in the usual case the modified sinking fund method would seem most applicable. Notwithstanding this, in cases where it had not been the practice to accumulate a reserve, and where the cost of replacements has shown itself to be a fairly uniform amount, or a fairly uniform percentage of income or of capital, then there is no objection in sound reasoning, nor, as I believe, in the law as laid down, why the court should not adopt a replacement method in determining proper costs of production; and in such event it would rate at replacement cost new to determine the owner's reasonable return and include actual average replacement requirements in the yearly costs, without reserves. Or it might figure on a reserve for part of the plant, and a replacement method for the balance apparently adapted to it. Conceivably, also, the court might amortize the loss by obsolescence after abandonment had taken place, as plaintiff urges here. But I imagine that any court will feel the same hesitation in so doing that I feel here, for it involves reimbursement as to structures no longer in the inventory of units in service, and is without precedent except where the rate-fixing body has laid it down as a proper policy. * * *

'Mr. E. C. Jones, chief gas engineer of plaintiff, also testified that the plant was worth cost new less only the deferred maintenance and the amount of abandonments immediately in prospect. He estimates the amount of this deduction at $828,916.41 (Exhibit 43), or 6.3 per cent. of his appraisement at $13,066,201.55 (Exhibit 3). His estimate includes no consideration of approaching obsolescence; it does include replacement reasonably in view, due to physical deterioration and to ordinary inadequacy. * * *

'I have referred several times to plaintiff's contention that obsolescence should be amortized after rather than before abandonment of a unit of plant. Specifically applied, it is urged that when it is seen that Martin station or other obsolete generator has been superseded by new Jones generators, using the improved Jones process for oil gas, the demonstrated economies thereby effected are justly to be devoted to reimbursing the company for the loss of capital occasioned by the obsolescence, continuing each year until the loss is made good, with interest. On this settled program the new generator would, of course, be rated for return at replacement cost new at all times. To give the consumer a part of the advantages of the improvement, the company proposes that only half of the very considerable economies of operation shall be devoted to its reimbursement. Many advantages are urged for this plan: That it throws upon the consumer, who has the benefit of the new equipment in the shape of reduced charges, the burden of the loss by supersession of equipment otherwise in...

To continue reading

Request your trial
62 cases
  • Cardle v. Indianapolis Water Co 16 19, 1926
    • United States
    • U.S. Supreme Court
    • November 22, 1926
    ...on averages and assumed probabilities. The deduction made in the city's estimate cannot be approved. Pacific Gas Co. v. San Francisco, 265 U. S. 403, 406, 44 S. Ct. 537, 68 L. Ed. 1075; Standard Oil Co. v. So. Pacific Co., supra, 159 (45 S. Ct. 465); Landon v. Court of Industrial Relations ......
  • Baltimore Co v. United States
    • United States
    • U.S. Supreme Court
    • May 18, 1936
    ...1151, Ann.Cas.1916A, 18; Missouri Rate Cases, 230 U.S. 474, 507, 33 S.Ct. 975, 57 L.Ed. 1571. Cf. Pacific Gas Co. v. San Francisco, 265 U.S. 403, 406, 44 S.Ct. 537, 68 L.Ed. 1075; McCardle v. Indianapolis Co., 272 U.S. 400, 416, 47 S.Ct. 144, 71 L.Ed. 316. 40 Chicago, Milwaukee & St. P.R. C......
  • Los Angeles Gas Electric Corporation v. Railroad Commission of California
    • United States
    • U.S. Supreme Court
    • May 8, 1933
    ...318, 42 S.Ct. 486, 66 L.Ed. 941; Brush Elec. Co. v. Galveston, 262 U.S. 443, 43 S.Ct. 606, 67 L.Ed. 1076; Pacific Gas Co. v. San Francisco, 265 U.S. 403, 44 S.Ct. 537, 68 L.Ed. 1075; Railroad and Warehouse Commission of Minnesota v. Duluth St. Ry., 273 U.S. 625, 47 S.Ct. 489, 71 L.Ed. 807; ......
  • State ex rel. City of St. Louis v. Publ. Serv. Comm.
    • United States
    • Missouri Supreme Court
    • February 17, 1932
    ...examined the property and made estimates in respect to its condition. McCardle v. Water Co., 272 U.S. 400; Pacific Gas & Electric Co. v. City & County of San Francisco, 265 U.S. 403; New York Tel. Co. v. Prendergast, 300 Fed. 822; Westinghouse Electric & Mfg. Co. v. Denver Tramway Co., 3 Fe......
  • Request a trial to view additional results

VLEX uses login cookies to provide you with a better browsing experience. If you click on 'Accept' or continue browsing this site we consider that you accept our cookie policy. ACCEPT