Pacific Ins. Co. of New York v. Fireman's Fund Ins. Co.

• Citation: 247 S.C. 282,147 S.E.2d 273
• Decision Date: 16 February 1966
• Docket Number: No. 18465,18465
• Court: United States State Supreme Court of South Carolina
• Parties: PACIFIC INSURANCE COMPANY OF NEW YORK, Respondent, v. FIREMAN'S FUND INSURANCE COMPANY, Willie Brunson, Mary Kennedy, MitchellHopkins, and LeGrand Altman, Ronald Feagin and Luther B. Hardee, Three MinorsOver the Age of Fourteen, of whom Fireman's Fund Insurance Company is, Appellant.

Page 273

147 S.E.2d 273

247 S.C. 282

PACIFIC INSURANCE COMPANY OF NEW YORK, Respondent, v. FIREMAN'S FUND INSURANCE COMPANY, Willie Brunson, Mary

Kennedy, MitchellHopkins, and LeGrand Altman, Ronald Feagin

and Luther B. Hardee, Three MinorsOver the Age of Fourteen,

of whom Fireman's Fund Insurance Company is, Appellant.

No. 18465.

Supreme Court of South Carolina.

Feb. 16, 1966.

Willcox, Hardee, Houck, Palmer & O'Farrell, Florence, for appellant.

Bridges, Bridges & Whisenhunt, Florence, for respondent.

Waddell Byrd, Marion, for defendant-respondent Hopkins.

BUSSEY, Justice.

This appeal, in a Declaratory Judgment action, raises the question of whether one Willie Brunson was an insured under a standard automobile liability policy issued by the appellant Fireman's Fund Insurance Company to one Peter Gibson, on April 3, 1964. Admittedly he was not such an insured under the terms of the policy and the appeal is from an order of the circuit court holding that he was such an insured by virtue of the provisions of Act No. 312 of the 1963 Acts of the General Assembly, approved the 14th day of June 1963, now codified as Sections 46--750.31 and 46--750.32, Title 46, Chapter 8, Article 5, of the 1965 Cumulative Supplement to the 1962 Code of Laws.

As pointed out in the brief of plaintiff-respondent, the appellant's brief does not comply with Section 3 of Rule 8 of this court. Under 'questions involved' appellant purportedly sets forth four such questions. The argument portion of the brief does not state any question or questions, has no division into parts or separation as to particular points, and nowhere in the brief is there any reference to any specific exception or exceptions, as required by the above cited rule. The transcript of record shows appellant's exceptions to be seven in number, and from its brief, it cannot readily be determined just which exceptions are being argued and which have been abandoned.

In the fairly recent case of U.S. Fidelity and Guaranty Co. v. First National Bank, 244 S.C. 436, 137 S.E.2d 582, we had occasion to point out the importance of, and the reasons for, compliance with the provisions of Section 3, of Rule 8, but refrained from dismissing the appeal for noncompliance in that case for the reason stated in the opinion. In the instant case we would be fully justified in dismissing and would dismiss, the appeal for noncompliance were it not for the fact that the basic issue involved is one which we deem of sufficient importance to the bar and bench of the state to warrant our passing thereupon, even though appellant's brief fails to comply with the rule.

Willie Brunson in July 1964, while driving an automobile owned by one Mary Kennedy, upon which automobile there was no liability insurance, was involved in a collision which resulted in some property damage and personal injuries to several parties. Brunson is the stepson of Peter Gibson, appellant's policy holder, and at all relevant times lived with his mother and stepfather. It is apparently conceded that, under the terms of the policy issued to Gibson, liability coverage was extended to Brunson while driving the Kennedy automobile if he was an insured. The contention of the appellant is simply that Brunson was not such an insured by virtue of the statutory provisions above mentioned.

Code Section 46--750.31 reads as follows:

'Definitions.--As used in this article:

'(2) The term 'insured' means the named insured and, while resident of the same household, the spouse of any such named insured and relatives of either, while in a motor vehicle or otherwise, and any person who uses, with the consent, express or implied, of the named insured, the motor vehicle to which the policy applies and a guest in such motor vehicle to which the policy applies or the personal representative of any of the above.'

Section 46--750.32 of the Code is as follows:

'No policy or contract of bodily injury liability insurance or of property damage liability insurance, covering liability arising from the ownership, maintenance or use of any motor vehicle, shall be issued or delivered in this State to the owner of such vehicle, or shall be issued or delivered by an insurer licensed in this State upon any motor vehicle then principally garaged or principally used in this State, unless it contains a provision insuring the persons defined as insured, against loss from the liability imposed by law for damages arising out of the ownership, maintenance or use of such motor vehicles within the United States of America or the Dominion of Canada, subject to limits exclusive of interest and costs, with respect to each motor vehicle, as follows: ten thousand dollars because of bodily injury to or death of one person in any one accident, and, subject to such limit for one person, twenty thousand dollars because of bodily injury to or death of two or more persons in any one accident, and five thousand dollars because of injury to or destruction of property of others in any one accident.'

The effective date of the foregoing statutory provisions, as above mentioned, was June 14, 1963. All statutory provisions relating to an insurance contract are part of the contract; hence, the provisions of the foregoing sections must be considered as though they were written in the policy here involved, which was issued long subsequent to the effective date of such statutory provisions. Williams v. Penn. Nat. Mut. Ins. Co., 246 S.C. 396, 143 S.E.2d 797.

The...