Pacific Legal Foundation v. Goyan
| Citation | 500 F. Supp. 770 |
| Decision Date | 05 November 1980 |
| Docket Number | Civ. No. Y-79-2243. |
| Parties | PACIFIC LEGAL FOUNDATION v. Jere E. GOYAN. |
| Court | U.S. District Court — District of Maryland |
Paul H. Chappell, Chevy Chase, Md., Ronald A. Zumbrun, Sacramento, Cal., Raymond M. Momboisse and Eileen B. White, Washington, D. C., for plaintiff.
Alice Daniel, Asst. Atty. Gen., Ann F. Cohen and Lewis K. Wise, Washington, D. C., U. S. Dept. of Justice, Russell T. Baker, Jr., U. S. Atty., and John F. Hyland, Jr., Asst. U. S. Atty., Baltimore, Md., for defendant.
Nancy L. Buc and Edward M. Basile, Rockville, Md., Food and Drug Administration-Dept. of Health, Education and Welfare, of counsel.
This action was brought by the Pacific Legal Foundation (PLF) seeking declaratory and injunctive relief in order to invalidate a new Food and Drug Administration (FDA) program providing federal funds to reimburse persons for their expenses incurred in participating in certain FDA proceedings. The plaintiff has filed a motion for summary judgment and the defendant has filed a motion to dismiss, or in the alternative, for summary judgment. The case was originally assigned to Judge Thomsen who had scheduled a hearing before discovering he had a conflict. There are no genuine issues as to any material facts and the case can be disposed of on summary judgment.
On August 25, 1976, FDA issued an advance notice of proposed rulemaking concerning agency payment to participants in administrative proceedings (41 Fed.Reg. 35855). In that notice, the agency set forth a petition submitted by Consumers Union containing a specific proposal to provide reimbursement for attorneys' fees, expert witness fees and other reasonable costs incurred by public participants in certain FDA administrative proceedings. On April 17, 1979, the FDA issued its proposed rule. (44 Fed.Reg. 23044). On October 12, 1979, the FDA published its final rule establishing this program. (44 Fed.Reg. 59174).
The rule established a demonstration program whose purpose is to determine whether FDA's administrative decisionmaking will be enhanced by reimbursing participants in many different types of FDA proceedings. The rule sets out criteria and procedures for an evaluation board to authorize the reimbursement of participants for reasonable attorneys' fees, expert witness fees, clerical services, travel, studies, demonstrations and other costs in certain administrative proceedings that result in a hearing. FDA allocated up to $250,000 for this demonstration program. (44 Fed.Reg. 59177).
PLF filed comments in response to FDA's advance notice of proposed rulemaking in 1976 and, again, in 1979, in response to the issuance of the proposed rule. PLF has objected to the rule on the basis of a number of allegations including: the FDA's lack of express statutory authority to spend federal funds in this manner; the programs's potential waste of government resources; and, the biased effect the program would have on the record in FDA proceedings. PLF participates frequently in FDA proceedings but has not applied for funds available under this program.
The FDA has asserted that this case is non-justiciable because PLF lacks standing in its associational capacity, or as representative of citizens and taxpayers. Furthermore, the FDA asserts that to the extent PLF may be injured by this new program, such injury has not yet occurred and plaintiff's case is not ripe. An examination of the controversy presented by this case, in light of the existing legal standards concerning justiciability, reveals that the plaintiff in this action has alleged a sufficient personal stake to justify granting standing. The issue of ripeness is also considered insufficient to prevent the Court from reaching an adjudication on the merits.
The Supreme Court has addressed the question of standing from the point of constitutional limitations arising from the Article III requirement of a and the prudential principles by which the judiciary confines itself to cases considered well-suited to the exercise of the judicial power. The Court has summarized the doctrine of standing as follows:
Warth v. Seldin, 422 U.S. 490, 498, 95 S.Ct. 2197, 2204, 45 L.Ed.2d 343 (1975).
The Court has interpreted the constitutional limits on standing to eliminate claims in which the plaintiff fails to make out a case or controversy between himself and the defendant. Gladstone v. Village of Bellwood, 441 U.S. 91, 99 S.Ct. 1601, 1608, 60 L.Ed.2d 66 (1979). In that case, the Court cited a line of standing cases for the proposition that:
"In order to satisfy Art. III, the plaintiff must show that he personally has suffered some actual or threatened injury as a result of the putatively illegal conduct of the defendant." 441 U.S. at 99, 99 S.Ct. at 1608.
The Court went on to explain that these constitutional limitations upon the standing of litigants were only the first step in a proper standing analysis:
"Even when a case falls within these constitutional boundaries, a plaintiff may still lack standing under the prudential principles by which the judiciary seeks to avoid deciding questions of broad social import where no individual rights would be vindicated and to limit access to the federal courts to those litigants best suited to assert a particular claim." 441 U.S. at 99-100, 99 S.Ct. at 1608.
Thus, the issue of the standing of PLF must be addressed in terms of both constitutional limitations and prudential considerations.
As standing is being challenged largely on the basis of the pleadings, it is appropriate to accept as true all material allegations of the complaint and to construe the complaint in favor of the complaining party. Warth v. Seldin, 422 U.S. at 500, 95 S.Ct. 2205.
An association seeking to bring an action in federal court may assert standing on its own behalf or on behalf of its members. Hunt v. Washington State Apple Advertising Commission, 432 U.S. 333, 343, 97 S.Ct. 2434, 2441, 53 L.Ed.2d 383 (1977). PLF makes clear in its Memorandum Opposing Defendant's Motion to Dismiss or, in the Alternative, for Summary Judgment that "PLF asserts injury in its own right." (p. 6, n.7.) Therefore, the consideration of whether PLF possesses adequate standing to maintain this action should be based on the position of the association, itself, as plaintiff.
The injuries which PLF alleges it will suffer as a result of the FDA program are both economic and institutional. PLF asserts that it will be injured financially because the length of FDA proceedings will increase in order to comply with the new reimbursement procedures and PLF's costs will therefore also increase. In addition, PLF alleges that it will be faced with the added costs of monitoring the procedures for determining what person or group is eligible for reimbursement in a particular proceeding. The record reveals that PLF has participated in numerous FDA proceedings to this date and if it is to maintain its institutional presence in these proceedings it is quite possible that it will suffer increased costs as a result of the new reimbursement procedures. While the extent of this injury is difficult to predict, that does not prevent PLF from maintaining standing. The Supreme Court has rejected any attempt to limit standing to those who have been "significantly" affected by agency action and has indicated that "an identifiable trifle" can be enough for standing. United States v. SCRAP, 412 U.S. 669, 689 n.14, 93 S.Ct. 2405, 2417 n.14, 37 L.Ed.2d 254 (1973). Since the plaintiff in this case has alleged "injury in fact" at least equal to that found sufficient to confer standing in previous Supreme Court decisions, there seems to be no reason to deny PLF standing to raise these important legal issues.
It is also significant that FDA regulations provide for judicial review of final agency action by persons who have submitted comments or objection in administrative proceedings. 21 C.F.R. § 10.45(d)(a)(ii) provides that "Any interested person is affected by, and thus has standing to obtain judicial review of, such final agency action." Interested person is defined in 21 C.F.R. § 10.3(12) which provides: "`Interested person' or `any person who will be adversely affected' means any person who submits a petition or comment or objection or otherwise requests an opportunity to participate in any informal or formal administrative proceeding or court action." The FDA has attempted to argue that 21 C.F.R. § 10.45(d)(1)(ii) is inapplicable because here the challenge is not to a FDA rule "directly affecting all members of the public" but rather to a rule concerning FDA's administrative practice and procedure. Such an argument is unpersuasive. In adopting the rule at issue, the FDA expressed the hope that "increased diversity in the views presented to the agency is likely to lead to more sensitive, better informed, more effective, and wiser decisions." (44 Fed.Reg. 59174). It seems clear that such improved decisionmaking directly affects all members of the public and that PLF is qualified as an "interested person" to challenge the rule at issue. See Reade v. Ewing, 205 F.2d 630 (2d Cir. 1953).
It is, of course, true that not even Congress can confer standing on a party that does not satisfy "the Article III minima." Gladstone v. Village of Bellwood, supra, 441 U.S. at 100, 99 S.Ct. at 1608. However, the plaintiff in this case has been shown to meet both the constitutional and prudential requirements for standing in the federal courts an...
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Pacific Legal Foundation v. Goyan
...it is quite possible that it will suffer increased costs as a result of the new reimbursement procedures." Pacific Legal Foundation v. Goyan, 500 F.Supp. 770, 773 (D.Md.1980). We find that plaintiff has alleged the requisite "direct injury" to give it standing because of the increased time ......
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