Pacific R.R. Co. v. Cass Cnty.

Decision Date31 March 1873
Citation53 Mo. 17
PartiesPACIFIC RAILROAD CO., Appellant, v. CASS COUNTY, et al., Respondents.
CourtMissouri Supreme Court

Appeal from St. Louis Circuit Court.

J. N. Litton, for Appellant.

I. The mode provided by the Act of December 25th, 1852, § 12, was, when accepted by appellant on January 1st, 1853, the only legal method for collection of taxes for State as distinguished from county purposes.

II. This Act of December 25th, 1852, provided for the collection of taxes due the State for county purposes, not less than for those more technically known as State. (Hannibal & St. Joe. Railroad vs. Shacklett, 30 Mo., 550; State to use of Pacific R. R. vs. Dulle, 37 Mo., 265.)

The tax-bills at bar are identical in all respects with those before the court in the Hannibal & St. Joe. Railroad cases.--Both were for county, as well as other taxes.

No intimation was given in those cases of any distinction between taxes for county and taxes for State purposes.

In the case in 30 Mo., 555, the court says, this act “expressly exempts the Pacific Railroad from taxation, unless in the mode and at the time specified.”

The charter of the Hannibal & St. Joe. Railroad, at the time the tax bills which were discussed by this court in those cases were made, was the same in its provisions as this Act of December 25th, 1852.

This Act of December 25th, 1852, continues the complete immunity from taxation granted by the Act of March 1st, 1851, by declaring that the road shall be ““exempt from taxation” until completed. This includes county taxes. (Southern R. R. vs. The Mayor, 38 Miss., 334; O'Donnell vs. Barly, 24 Miss., 386.)

The legislature having provided for all taxes up to the completion of the road, in the same breath declares how taxes shall be collected after that time. This special mode of collection must be held to include all taxes. There could be no object in having taxes for county purposes levied in one way, and for State in another. (N. Y. & Erie R. R. vs. Sabin, 26 Penn., 244, is directly in point.)

To still leave the road liable to be taxed and sold by counties in sections, was to inflict the very evils that the mode provided by this act for taxing the road as an entirety was designed to prevent.

The only warrant for the taxation of the road after completion, is the clause that it shall then be “subject to taxation at the rate assessed by the State on other real property,” etc. The word “State” here, it is insisted, means counties, townships and other municipalities. But that when the same sentence provides how these taxes shall be collected, it is insisted that the word State means only for taxes for State purposes.

Taxes levied by the State for county and other local purposes, are no less State taxes than those levied for what are technically known as State purposes. (3 Harrison, (N. J.,) 72.)

Either appellant is exempt from all except the latter class of taxes, or all taxes must be collected by return to the State Auditor.

The provision in the Hannibal & St. Joe. R. R. charter was narrower than this, and yet this court held that to provide for all taxes.

The mere fact that the tax is paid into the State Treasury, has been repeatedly held to be no ground for construing similar acts not to include county taxes. (3 Rich. Law, 342; 1 Zabr., 558; 9 Yerger, 499; 5 Ills., 304; 6 Bush. Ky., 127.)

III. There never has been any express repeal of the Act of December 25th, 1852, nor any by implication. (City of St. Louis vs. Insurance Co., 47 Mo., 146.)

IV. If the appellant is taxable for county purposes under the general revenue law, it is clearly taxable under 2 W. S., (1870,) p. 1169, §§ 23, 24, through its capital stock.

Assuredly this court will not hunt for a pretext for double taxation. The Constitution, (Art. II, § 30,) forbids it, and the Hannibal & St. Joe. Railroad cases, before cited, are express and decisive on the point that it cannot be taxed on its property, and through its capital stock also.

If other authorities be desired they are numerous and uniform. (Bangor R. R. vs. Harris, 21 Maine, 534; Gordon's Ex. vs. Baltimore, 5 Gill. Md., 236; Rome R. R. Co. vs. Rome, 14 Geo., 275; New Haven vs. City, 31 Conn., 106; Mayor of Baltimore vs. Balt. & Ohio R. R., 6 Gill. Md., 295; 51 Ills., 304; 3 Rich. Law, 342; Gardner vs. State, 1 Zabr., 558; 5 Ired., 516; 3 Zabr., 500; Farmers' Bank vs. Commonwealth, 6 Bush, Ky., 127.)

V. Cass County had no right to tax any part of the rolling stock. (17 Gratt., 176; Morgan Co. vs. R. R., 14 Ills., 163; 21 Gratt., 604; Wiggins Ferry Co. vs. St. Louis, 11 Wall., U. S., 423.)

VI. The assessment and levy of taxes for 1869, was entirely without warrant.

The county Board of Equalization had no authority to assess property which is not returned to them.

A verbal order is no order.

Lackland Martin & Lackland, for Respondent.

I. The charter of the plaintiff contains no provision exempting plaintiff's property from taxation. (Sess. Acts 1849, p. 219.) The exemption allowed by the act approved March 1, 1851, (Sess. Acts 1851, p. 271, § 6.) expired March 1, 1856.

II. By section 12 of the act approved December 25, 1852, (Sess. Acts of 1852, 10,) the road-bed, buildings, machinery, engines, cars, and other property of plaintiffs are liable to be taxed two years after the completion of the road, whether any dividend shall have been declared or not. The agreed case admits that the road was completed, &c., April 6, 1866. Two years after this date the road-bed, buildings, machinery, engines, cars, and other property, as such are taxable, as the property of the corporation, and nothing whatever is said in any part of the act indicating that the property of the Company shall be taxed through its stock. The property above named belonged to the corporation. The stock is the property of the stockholders and does not belong to the corporation at all.

This 12th section of said act of December 25, 1852, only applies to the State tax. No tax was ever assessed by the auditor, or paid by the company, under this section. The provisions of this section are only cumulative and the act does not pretend to restrict the power of County Court to levy and collect taxes for State and County purposes.

III. Section 9, page 1161, Vol. 2, Wagner's Statutes provides “that all property, personal, by the laws of this State, situate, in the county other than the one in which the owner resides, shall be assessed in such last mentioned County.”

The court in this connection is referred to the sections 27 and 28, of the Revenue Statute. (2 W. S., 1169.)

It is apparent that the mode therein prescribed, is only a mode by which taxes are levied and collected of the owners of stock upon the shares of stock owned by them as their own private property. It is in effect the money of the owners of stock which goes to satisfy taxes due upon their own private property, collected through the instrumentality of the corporation. (State of Mo. ex rel. N. M. Cent. R. R. Co., vs. Linn Co. Court, 44 Mo., 504; 42 Mo., 425.) The first section of the Revenue Act, (W. S., 1159,) declares in substance that all property, real and personal, except as stated in the next section shall be liable to taxation.

The exception does not cover the property taxed in this case.

IV. Section 13 Revenue Act, Wagner's Statute, p. 1163, provides for a county board of equalization, consisting of County Clerk, County Surveyor, presiding justice of the County Court and the County Assessor.

The 15th section provides that in case the valuation of property is raised, public notice shall be given by publishing in a newspaper or by posters. There is no raising of valuation in the case.

The 16th section provides that “The County Clerk shall keep an accurate record of the proceedings and orders of the board, and the Assessor shall correct all erroneous assessments, and the Clerk shall adjust the tax books according to the orders of said board, and the orders of the State board of equalization.”

If the Assessor omitted the property of plaintiff, this was an error of omission, which could be corrected under section 16, which was accordingly done.

V. Both of these tax bills appeared upon the collector's book, and neither he nor the County of Cass is liable for any irregular or erroneous assessment, if any such there was. See the cases above cited. (Pacific Railroad vs. Dulle, 48 Mo., 282; Walden vs. Dudley, 49 Mo., 419; North Mo. R. R. Co. et al. vs. Maguire, 49 Mo., 468; St. Louis Mut. Life Ins. Co. vs. Charter, 47 Mo., 483.)

EWING, Judge, delivered the opinion of the court.

The respondent having levied certain taxes for State and county purposes against the appellant for the years 1869 and 1870, payment of which was enforced by the seizure and sale of its property as to the taxes of 1870, the object of this proceeding is to determine certain questions of law in relation to the liability of the road to taxation, and the proper mode of assessment.

The cause was submitted to the Circuit Court at special term, upon an agreed statement of facts upon which a judgment pro forma was rendered for the defendant, and again at, General Term; from which the cause is brought here by appeal The material facts are that the road was completed and in operation in April, 1866, and has never declared a dividend; that on 1st of February, 1868, it made, through its president, its first return to the State Auditor, as required by the act of December 25, 1852; that no taxes were ever assessed thereon by the Auditor, that the road is a continuous line extending from St. Louis to Kansas City, 283 miles, through eleven counties, and operates connecting lines of rail in the State of Kansas. The principal office of the company is in the City of St. Louis, where its directors reside, and hold their meetings, where also its managing officers live and attend to the business of the company, and where its records are kept and its business transacted; that its principal machine shops, car sheds, and repair shops are...

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