Pack v. State, 00-736

Decision Date14 March 2001
Docket Number00-736
Citation41 S.W.3d 409
PartiesApril PACK, v. STATE of Arkansas. CA 00-736 Court of Appeals of Arkansas Division I Opinion delivered
CourtArkansas Court of Appeals

Appeal from Washington Chancery Court, Juvenile Division; Stacey Zimmerman, Chancellor; affirmed.

1. Criminal law -- juvenile delinquency -- standard of review same as in criminal case. -- In resolving the question of the sufficiency of the evidence in a juvenile delinquency case, the standard of review is the same as in a criminal case.

2. Motions -- directed verdict -- treated as challenge to sufficiency of evidence. -- On appeal, the reviewing court treats a motion for a directed verdict as a challenge to the sufficiency of the evidence; when the appellate court reviews a challenge to the sufficiency of the evidence, it will affirm the conviction if there is substantial evidence to support it, when viewed in the light most favorable to the State; substantial evidence is that which is of sufficient force and character that it will, with reasonable certainty, compel a conclusion one way or the other, without mere speculation or conjecture.

3. Evidence -- substantial evidence -- only evidence tending to support verdict considered. -- In determining whether there is substantial evidence, the appellate court considers only that evidence tending to support the verdict.

4. Evidence -- appellate court does not weigh evidence presented at trial --matter for fact-finder. -- The appellate court does not weigh the evidence presented at trial, as that is a matter for the fact-finder.

5. Criminal law -- accomplice liability -- evidence sufficient to support finding that appellant was liable as accomplice. -- The appellate court held that the evidence favoring the State was sufficient to support a finding that appellant was liable as an accomplice in this case; an accomplice is one who directly participates in the commission of an offense or who, with the purpose of promoting or facilitating the commission of an offense, or aids, agrees to aid, or attempts to aid the other person in the planning or committing the offense [Ark. Code Ann. §§ 5-2-403(a)(1)-(2) (Repl. 1997)]; further, each accomplice is criminally liable for the conduct of the others.

6. Criminal law -- accomplice liability -- relevant factors in determining connection of accomplice to crime. -- The relevant factors in determining the connection of an accomplice to a crime are the presence of the accused in the proximity of the crime, the opportunity to commit the crime, and an association with a person involved in the crime in a manner suggestive of joint participation; further, because this was a juvenile case, the State was not required to show corroborating evidence to independently establish the crime.

7. Criminal law -- accomplice liability -- evidence sufficient to hold appellant criminally responsible as accomplice to felony criminal mischief. -- The appellate court held that the trial court did not err in denying appellant's motions for a directed verdict because the evidence was sufficient to hold her criminally responsible as an accomplice to felony criminal mischief.

8. Witnesses -- conflicting testimony & witness credibility -- issues for fact-finder. -- The resolution of conflicting testimony and an assessment of the credibility of witnesses are issues given wide discretion to the fact-finder.

9. Motions -- motion to suppress -- standard of review. -- In reviewing a trial court's ruling on a motion to suppress, the appellate court makes an independent determination based on the totalityof the circumstances.

10. Motions -- motion to suppress -- when denial will be reversed. -- Where a trial court has denied a defendant's motion to suppress, the appellate court will reverse only if, in viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the State, the trial court's ruling is clearly against the preponderance of the evidence.

11. Criminal law -- Miranda safeguards -- when applicable. -- The safeguards prescribed by Miranda become applicable as soon as a suspect's freedom of action is curtailed to a degree associated with formal arrest; a policeman's unarticulated plan has no bearing on the question of whether a suspect was "in custody" at a particular time; the only relevant inquiry is how a reasonable person in the suspect's position would have understood his situation.

12. Motions -- motion to suppress -- trial court did not err in denying where statement was neither custodial nor product of State interrogation. -- The appellate court held that the trial court did not err in denying appellant's motion to suppress; the purpose of Miranda warnings is to protect defendants from custodialinterrogations by the State, not by third parties; here, appellant was not entitled to Miranda warnings because her statement was the result of prompting that was neither custodial nor the product of interrogation by the State.

13. Criminal law -- Miranda warnings -- not required under circumstances. --Where there was nothing in the record to suggest that a reasonable person in appellant's position would assume that she was in custody, and where appellant's statement was prompted by her mother, not the State, Miranda warnings were not required under the circumstances; affirmed. [wbj]

Everett Law Firm, by: Elizabeth E. Storey, for appellant.

Mark Pryor, Att'y Gen., by: Valerie L. Kelly, Ass't Att'y Gen., for appellee.

Wendell L. Griffen, Judge.

April Pack appeals from her adjudication as a delinquent in connection with two charges of felony criminal mischief. She argues that the trial court erredin denying her motions for a directed verdict on the criminal mischief charges and erred in failing to suppress an inculpatory statement taken in violation of her Mirandaarights. We disagree and affirm.

On Friday, October 8, 1999, at approximately 8:00 p.m., Officer Richard Jensen of the Lincoln Police Department was patrolling the Lincoln Square when he received a report that some potted plants had been destroyed at a doctor's office located on the square. When Jensen went to investigate the report, he saw appellant, Terrence Brunner, Krystle Murphy, and Brad Olsen near the Veterans of Foreign Wars Building (VFW), which stands approximately fifty to seventy-five feet from the doctor's office.

Later that night, appellant's mother, Sandra Bowman, telephoned Jensen to determine why he was looking for appellant. As a result of this conversation, Bowman took appellant to the police station on October 9, where they both signed a Miranda rights form. Appellant then gave Jensen the following statement concerning the incidents that occurred on the Square on October 8:

I, April Pack, Krystle Murphy, [and] Brad were walking around by the Square at p.m.[sic] and Brad keyed a car and yanked up flowers by the office so we went the other way and left him [sic] then Krystle's mom picked her up, and so I called my mom and had her come pick me up and she took me home and then she called the cops and said something and I had to go to the police station and talk about something.

The next day, Jensen received criminal mischief reports for damages that occurred to two vehicles that were parked on the Square in a parking lot adjacent to the VFW Building and the doctor's office. These reports indicated that between 8:00 p.m. and 9:00 p.m. on October 8, Mary Barnes' green Ford Aerostar Van was scratched from the front to the back on the passenger side, and the "F word" was scratched across the fender. The reports also indicated that the words "F*ck Lincoln" were written in nail polish on the right front fender of Joann Wyatt's white Pontiac Bonneville.

Jensen testified that after he received the reports on the damaged vehicles, he telephoned appellant's mother. He stated that appellant and her mother voluntarily returned to the police station on October 13 on an unrelated matter. He said that after appellant and her mother had been there about fifteen minutes, he told them that he needed to get another statement from appellant. He then asked her why she did not tell him about any cars being keyed in her October 8 statement.1 Appellant responded, "You didn't ask me." At this point, appellant's mother became upset and indicated to appellant, "You better tell him what you know." Jensen then handed appellant a "Suspect's Statement" form and said, "Write down what happened that night." At this point, appellant gave the following statement:

April Pack, Krystle Murphy, Brad Olsen, Terrence Brunner were walking around Friday '99 [sic] and we got in the bad attitude mood and decided to key cars and bust plants and paint on cars and then Terrence went home, Krystle went home, Brad went home, then so did I.

Jensen admitted that he did not advise her of her Miranda rights.

Appellant was charged with two counts of felony criminal mischief, based on the damage to the vehicles, and one count of misdemeanor criminal mischief, based on the destruction of the plants. Appellant filed a motion to suppress her October 13 statement, arguing that when Jensen questioned her on October 13, he knew that she was a suspect in the incidents; therefore, it was improper for him to interrogate her without advising her of her Miranda rights. The State argued that Miranda warnings were not necessary in this case because appellant was not in custody. The trial court found that there was no evidence appellant was in custody and further found that her mother was a participant in the conversation with Jensen, and was the actual person who prompted her daughter to provide the statement. Thus, the trial court denied appellant's motion to suppress.

At trial, Jensen testified to the events as noted above. In addition, the State presented testimony from the owners about the damage caused to their vehicles. Mary Barnes testified that her van was scratched by a key or a knife, causing approximately $1,443.17 in damages. Barnes stated that her vehicle was scratched from front to back on the...

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  • T.C. v. State
    • United States
    • Arkansas Court of Appeals
    • September 23, 2009
    ... ... The standard of review for sufficiency of the evidence in a juvenile proceeding is the same as in a criminal case. Pack v. State, 73 Ark.App. 123, 41 S.W.3d 409 (2001). In reviewing a juvenile-delinquency case, we look at the record in the light most favorable to the ... ...
  • M.T. v. State
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    ... ... Hunt v. State, 92 Ark.App. 342, 344, 213 S.W.3d 667, 667 (2005) (citing Pack v. State, 73 Ark.App. 123, 41 S.W.3d 409 (2001)).On appeal, a motion for directed verdict is treated as a challenge to the sufficiency of the ... ...
  • Barriga v. Arkansas and Missouri R. Co.
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    ... ... See, e.g., Pack v. State, 73 Ark. App. 123, 41 S.W.3d 409 (2001) ...         However, as the majority ... ...
  • D.F. v. State
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    ... ... v. State, 2012 Ark. App. 666, at 8, 424 S.W.3d 887, 892 (citing Green v. State, 2012 Ark. App. 315, at 6, 416 S.W.3d 765, 768 ).9 Pack v. State, 73 Ark. App. 123, 130, 41 S.W.3d 409, 414 (2001).10 L.C., supra. (Internal citations omitted).11 Ark. Code Ann. 1689111(e)(1)(A) (Supp ... ...
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