Packer v. Board of Educ. of Town of Thomaston

• Decision Date: 04 August 1998
• Docket Number: No. 15862,15862
• Citation: 717 A.2d 117,246 Conn. 89
• Parties: , 129 Ed. Law Rep. 400 Kyle P. PACKER et al. v. BOARD OF EDUCATION OF the TOWN OF THOMASTON.
• Court: Connecticut Supreme Court

Page 117

717 A.2d 117

246 Conn. 89, 129 Ed. Law Rep. 400

Kyle P. PACKER et al. v. BOARD OF EDUCATION OF the TOWN OF THOMASTON.

No. 15862.

Supreme Court of Connecticut.

Argued March 26, 1998.

Decided Aug. 4, 1998.

George J. Kelly, Jr., with whom was Dana Shaw MacKinnon, Hartford, for appellant (defendant).

William A. Conti, with whom was James A. Zeller and, on the brief, Steven H. Levy, Torrington, for appellees (plaintiffs).

Richard Blumenthal, Attorney General, with whom were Seth R. Klein, Assistant Attorney General, and, on the brief, Bernard F. McGovern, Jr., Assistant Attorney General, for the Attorney General as Amicus Curiae.

Ann M. Parrent and Katerina M. Rohner filed a brief for the Connecticut Civil Liberties Union Foundation as Amicus Curiae.

Patrice McCarthy and Joan Libby, Wethersfield, filed a brief for the Connecticut Association of Boards of Education as Amicus Curiae.

Before CALLAHAN, C.J., and BERDON, NORCOTT, KATZ, PALMER, McDONALD and PETERS, JJ.

CALLAHAN, Chief Justice.

The dispositive issue in this interlocutory appeal is whether the defendant, the board of education of the town of Thomaston, acted lawfully when it expelled the named plaintiff, Kyle P. Packer, ¹ from Thomaston High School for possession of marijuana off the school grounds after school hours.

The following facts and procedural history are uncontroverted. The plaintiff is a senior at Thomaston High School. On September 24, 1997, a Connecticut state trooper stopped the plaintiff's car as the plaintiff, who was not wearing a seat belt, drove through the town of Morris. At the stop, the trooper observed a marijuana cigarette in the ashtray of the plaintiff's car. A subsequent search of the vehicle revealed drug paraphernalia and approximately two ounces of marijuana hidden in the trunk of the car. ² The plaintiff was arrested and charged with possession of marijuana and possession of drug paraphernalia. ³

Pursuant to General Statutes § 10-233h, ⁴ the plaintiff's arrest was reported to the superintendent of the Thomaston school system. School administrators investigated the circumstances of the arrest and, after meeting with the plaintiff and his parents, recommended to the defendant that the plaintiff be expelled ⁵ from school for the remainder of the then current semester and that he be excluded from extracurricular activities for the remainder of the school year.

On October 8, 1997, after providing the plaintiff with appropriate notice, the defendant held a hearing pursuant to General Statutes § 10-233d (a)(3). ⁶ The plaintiff attended the hearing and was represented by counsel. At the hearing, Robin Willink, the principal of Thomaston High School, testified that the incident had disrupted the educational process in the following ways: (1) the plaintiff's younger brother, also a student at Thomaston High School, was present when the plaintiff was arrested, causing students in the brother's class at the school to become aware of the incident; (2) a former student at Thomaston High School, who was known to have been involved in the past with distributing drugs, also was present when the plaintiff was arrested; and (3) teachers had approached Willink expressing concern over the plaintiff's arrest and asking what action would be taken in response to the incident. ⁷ Willink also stated that, at the beginning of the school year, the school administration had informed the student body that students would be held accountable for out-of-school conduct that "has some impact on what happens [in school]," and that "the whole tone [the school] set ... [would be] made a sham of" if the school did not hold the plaintiff accountable for violation of the administration policy against illegal drug use. There was no other evidence that the day-to-day operation of the school had been affected by the incident.

At the close of testimony, the defendant made the following findings of fact: (1) the plaintiff was a senior at Thomaston High School; (2) the plaintiff was seventeen years old; (3) the plaintiff had possessed marijuana off the school grounds; (4) the plaintiff had possessed two ounces of marijuana off the school grounds; (5) the defendant had a policy against possession of illegal drugs; (6) the plaintiff's conduct off the school grounds had violated the defendant's policy against possession of illegal drugs; and (7) the plaintiff's conduct off the school grounds seriously had disrupted the educational process at Thomaston High School. On the basis of those findings of fact, the defendant voted, pursuant to § 10-233d (a)(1), ⁸ to expel the plaintiff from school for the remainder of the first semester of the school year and to prohibit him from participating in extracurricular activities, except for graduation, for the remainder of the school year. ⁹

The plaintiff subsequently brought this action ¹⁰ against the defendant in the Superior Court, seeking orders restraining and enjoining the defendant from expelling him and seeking damages. Specifically, the plaintiff claimed that: (1) the defendant lacked authority to expel the plaintiff and to prohibit his participation in extracurricular activities because § 10-233d (a)(1) is unconstitutionally vague; (2) the defendant's actions in expelling the plaintiff violated the plaintiff's rights, under the United States and Connecticut constitutions, to due process and equal protection; and (3) the defendant lacked authority to expel the plaintiff because the defendant did not have a publicized policy against the use of illegal drugs off school grounds, as required by § 10-233d (a)(1).

The trial court initially entered an ex parte order temporarily restraining the defendant from expelling the plaintiff, and subsequently, after a hearing, the court concluded that the defendant lacked authority to expel the plaintiff because § 10-233d (a)(1) is unconstitutionally vague. The trial court also concluded that the plaintiff's expulsion violated his rights, under the United States and Connecticut constitutions, to procedural due process because the plaintiff had been denied his right, at the expulsion hearing pursuant to § 10-233d (a)(3), to meaningful cross-examination of the witnesses. The trial court further concluded that the plaintiff's expulsion was unlawful because there was no evidence in the record to support the defendant's determination that the incident seriously had disrupted the educational process as required by § 10-233d (a)(1). ¹¹ The court consequently issued an order temporarily enjoining the defendant from enforcing the plaintiff's expulsion.

The plaintiff subsequently filed a motion for clarification as to whether the trial court's order enjoining the defendant from expelling him also enjoined the defendant from excluding him from extracurricular activities for the remainder of the school year. After a hearing, the trial court granted the plaintiff's motion for clarification and issued a memorandum stating that its order granting the plaintiff's application for a temporary injunction required the defendant to restore full rights and privileges, including participation in extracurricular activities, to the plaintiff.

Despite the absence of a final judgment; see General Statutes §§ 52-263 and 51-197a (a); see also Practice Book § 4000, now § 61-1; the defendant sought a direct appeal to the Supreme Court, pursuant to General Statutes § 52-265a ¹² and Practice Book § 4180, now § 83-4, from the trial court's order granting the plaintiff's application for a temporary injunction. "Section 52-265a allows the chief justice to certify a direct appeal to the Supreme Court from an interlocutory order of the Superior Court on an issue of law that involves a matter of substantial public interest and in which delay may work a substantial injustice." (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Hall v. Gilbert & Bennett Mfg. Co., 241 Conn. 282, 298, 695 A.2d 1051 (1997). Justice Borden, acting in place of the Chief Justice, who was unavailable, granted certification to appeal. Thereafter, the defendant appealed from the order of the trial court granting the plaintiff's application for a temporary injunction.

On appeal, the defendant claims, inter alia, that the trial court improperly concluded that the defendant lacked authority to expel the plaintiff for the incident because the statute pursuant to which the defendant acted is unconstitutionally vague. ¹³ Specifically, the defendant maintains that § 10-233d (a)(1) is not unconstitutionally vague, either as applied to the facts of this case or on its face. ¹⁴ We are not persuaded that the statute is facially infirm, but agree that it is unconstitutionally vague as applied to the facts of this case.

We begin by noting that we ordinarily "eschew unnecessary determinations of constitutional questions"; (internal quotation marks omitted) Stamford Hospital v. Vega, 236 Conn. 646, 663, 674 A.2d 821 (1996); DeBeradinis v. Zoning Commission, 228 Conn. 187, 195, 635 A.2d 1220 (1994); McConnell v. Beverly Enterprises-Connecticut, Inc., 209 Conn. 692, 706, 553 A.2d 596 (1989); and that we generally have declined to engage in constitutional analysis when we have been able to decide a case either on the basis of an established common-law principle or in reliance on a statutory provision. Binette v. Sabo, 244 Conn. 23, 51, 710 A.2d 688 (1998). In this case, however, the trial court's conclusion that the school expulsion statute is incapable of having any constitutionally valid application has raised "a matter of substantial public interest ... in which delay may work a substantial injustice." See General Statutes § 52-265a. Consequently we consider it appropriate to confront the constitutional issue raised in this appeal. We, therefore, address the trial court's conclusion that § 10-233d (a)(1) is unconstitutionally vague without first considering whether there exists an alternate common-law or statutory basis for resolving the...