Padden v. Local No. 90 United Ass'n of Journeymen Plumbers
| Decision Date | 19 July 1951 |
| Citation | 168 Pa.Super. 611,82 A.2d 327 |
| Parties | PADDEN v. LOCAL 90 UNITED ASS'N OF JOURNEYMEN PLUMBERS. |
| Court | Pennsylvania Superior Court |
Action by Patrick F. Padden against Local 90 United Association of Journeymen Plumbers for intentionally and wrongfully preventing plaintiff from keeping or procuring the services of qualified journeymen plumbers. The Common Pleas Court Lackawanna County, Thomas Linus Hoban, P. J., No. 984 November Term, 1948, rendered judgment for plaintiff and defendant appealed. The Superior Court, Rhodes, P. J., No. 1 February Term, 1951, held that evidence sustained finding that the union engaged in concerted action which deprived employer of the services of journeymen plumbers.
Judgment affirmed.
Alphonsus L. Casey, Myron A. Pinkus, Scranton, for appellant.
Walter L. Hill, Jr., O'Malley, Harris, Harris and Warren, of Scranton, for appellee.
Before RHODES, P. J., and HIRT, RENO, DITHRICH, ROSS, ARNOLD and GUNTHER, JJ.
In this action of trespass plaintiff, a master plumber, claims that the defendant union, by concerted action, intentionally and wrongfully prevented him from keeping or procuring the services of qualified journeymen plumbers to plaintiff's financial loss. Defendant's motion for nonsuit was denied, and the jury rendered a verdict for plaintiff in the sum of $1,000. Defendant's motions for new trial and for judgment n. o. v. were overruled, and defendant has appealed from judgment on the verdict.
Appellant now contends that its motion for judgment n. o. v. should have been granted as appellee failed to establish a cause of action, and as the jury's findings were not supported by the evidence. We are unable to agree with appellant in either respect. The evidence established that appellee had been engaged in business in Scranton as a master plumber and contractor for twenty-seven years. Since 1947 appellee had employed one Anthony Cherundolo, a journeyman plumber and member of appellant union. In June, 1948, appellee and the union entered into a collective bargaining contract which defined the terms of employment where members of the union were hired by master plumbers. The controversy centers about a dispute between appellee and the appellant union as to the use of iron bends rather than lead bends in plumbing installations. Appellee claimed the union induced Cherundolo to quit appellee's employment for the sole purpose of forcing appellee to use lead bends. Appellee further claimed that the installation of lead bends rather than iron bends was not a proper object of concerted action by the union, since iron bends were legal under state and municipal law. Further appellee claimed that the union, by such concerted action, was not interested in the public health and safety, or in the betterment of working conditions for its members, but only in having employment for the longer hours necessary to install lead bends.
Appellee's evidence showed that Cherundolo quit appellee's employ on July 21, 1948, because of disputes with the union over appellee's use of apprentice plumbers, and the use of iron bends instead of lead bends. Under a temporary adjustment, Cherundolo resumed work for appellee on July 26, 1948, and continued in appellee's employ until July 30, 1948, when Cherundolo again quit. Cherundolo then told appellee he could not resume work until such time as appellee ceased to use iron bends. Thereafter appellee was unable to hire any journeyman plumber until January 18, 1949. Appellee's alleged loss of profits from prospective plumbing contracts amounted to approximately $2,495.
The trial judge submitted three questions to the jury. The first question waz: The jury answered the question in the affirmative. The jury answered the second question in the negative: The third question read: The jury answered ‘ Yes.’ There was sufficient evidence to establish that plaintiff had suffered a monetary loss of at least $1,000.
Appellant asserts there is no proof that the union engaged in concerted action which deprived appellee of the services of journeymen plumbers. A review of the record shows ample evidence to support the jury's finding on this issue. Appellee's evidence showed the union control over its members and over the employment of Cherundolo with appellee. Cherundolo's own statements were evidence that he quit because of union pressure on the question of bends, and there was corroboration of this by appellee, as well as by admissions on the part of other officers and members of the union. Appellee testified that at a meeting of the executive committee of the union he was informed that no plumber in the union would install iron bends for him.
The legal basis of appellee's cause of action is clear. The action is based on appellant's intentional interference without justification, with appellee's known contractual rights or business relations with third parties. Such interference constitutes a tort for which damages may be recovered. Eddyside Company v. Seibel, 142 Pa.Super. 174, 180, 181, 15 A.2d 691; Keifer v. Cramer, 356 Pa. 96, 99, 51 A.2d 694; Restatement, Torts, § 766. Appellant's principal contention, however, is that the object of its concerted action, that is, to force appellee to use lead bends rather than iron bends, was, as a matter of law, a proper object of concerted action, and that this Court must declare appellant not liable in the present action. Under the evidence in this case it was for the jury to determine whether the object of appellant's concerted action was privileged. Whether an object of concerted action is proper and privileged is not subject to exact definition. Are the employes demanding something which is reasonably related to employment and to the purposes of collective bargaining? See Restatement, Torts, § 783, pp. 117, 118. Appellant contends that the use of iron bends created a condition dangerous to health and safety. On...
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