Paddock v. Watts

• Decision Date: 15 November 1888
• Parties: Paddock et al. v. Watts.
• Court: Indiana Supreme Court

116 Ind. 146

18 N.E. 518

Paddock et al.

v.Watts.

Supreme Court of Indiana.

November 15, 1888.

Appeal from circuit court, Vigo county; William Mack, Judge.

Action for malicious prosecution by James W Watts against William, Benjamin F., and David E. Paddock. The thirteenth instruction, after defining probable cause, proceeded as follows: “Now, if you find from the evidence that the defendants, or either of them, instituted the prosecution complained of, and that it was false, and that they or either of them, maliciously, and without first having made reasonable inquiry, and without the existence of such an apparent state of facts as would have induced a reasonably intelligent and prudent man to believe Watts guilty of the crime charged, then you should find for Watts, and assess his damages accordingly.” On a general verdict against defendants, judgment was rendered against William and Benjamin F. Paddock, over their motion for new trial, and they appeal; the separate motion of David E. Paddock having been sustained.I. N. Pierce, T. W. Harper, and John G Williams, for appellants. Davis & Davis, for appellee.

Mitchell, J.

This was an action by James W. Watts against William, Benjamin F., and David E. Paddock, to recover damages for an alleged malicious prosecution instituted by the Paddocks against the plaintiff, Watts, in the Vigo circuit court. The plaintiff charged that the defendants unlawfully, wrongfully, maliciously, and without probable cause, procured an indictment to be found and returned against him by the grand jury of Vigo county, in which the plaintiff was charged with the crime of embezzlement. It was alleged that the plaintiff had been arrested and tried upon the charge so preferred, and that he had been found not guilty, and discharged accordingly. The defendants joined in pleading the general issue. There was a verdict for the plaintiff against all the defendants for $750, upon which judgment was rendered against William and Benjamin F. Paddock, over their joint motion for a new trial, while David E. Paddock was awarded a new trial upon his separate motion.

It is contended on behalf of the appellants, with much earnestness, that the verdict is not sustained by the evidence. It appears that the defendants were partners in the summer of 1882, engaged in the milling business in the city of Terre Haute. They employed the plaintiff to purchase wheat, the defendants agreeing to furnish the money, and to pay the plaintiff a commission of three cents per bushel on one kind of wheat, and to share the profits equally with him on all the wheat of another kind which he should purchase for them. Considerable quantities of wheat were purchased, and a large sum of money furnished, under this arrangement, which was continued until in the autumn of 1882. After the plaintiff ceased purchasing wheat, an accounting was attempted between the parties, and a dispute arose concerning a certain check drawn by Paddock & Co. in favor of the plaintiff for $1,000, upon the First National Bank of Terre Haute. That a check for that amount was drawn, payable to Watts or bearer, on the 26th day of July, 1882, and that it was paid by the bank on that day to some one, is not disputed. Watts had no account of it on his books, and, according to his testimony, disputed the fact of ever having received the check or the money it called for, although the amount was charged to him on the books of Paddock & Co. Failing to arrive at a satisfactory adjustment of their affairs, Watts commenced a civil suit against Paddock & Co. for damages growing out of an alleged violation of their contract; after which, at the instigation and upon the testimony of the appellants, the grand jury of Vigo county returned an indictment, charging him with having embezzled the appellants' money and checks. After hearing the evidence on behalf of the state, the court directed a verdict of acquittal, and this ended the criminal prosecution, which is now alleged to have been begun maliciously and without probable cause.

In order to sustain an action to recover damages for instigating or prosecuting a criminal action, which has terminated in the plaintiff's acquittal, it must be shown that the defendant instituted the action in malice, and without probable cause. The essential ground of the action is that a criminal prosecution has been instituted and carried on without probable cause. In the absence of probable cause, malice may be implied. Pennsylvania Co. v. Weddle, 100 Ind. 138;Stone v. Crocker, 24 Pick. 81. Whether there was probable cause for the criminal prosecution instituted by the defendants depends...