Paden v. Baker Concrete Const., Inc.

• Decision Date: 16 May 1995
• Citation: 540 Pa. 409,658 A.2d 341
• Parties: John C. PADEN, Appellee v. BAKER CONCRETE CONSTRUCTION, INC., et al. Appeal of BAKER CONCRETE CONSTRUCTION, INC.
• Court: Pennsylvania Supreme Court

Page 341

658 A.2d 341

540 Pa. 409

John C. PADEN, Appellee v. BAKER CONCRETE CONSTRUCTION, INC., et al.

Appeal of BAKER CONCRETE CONSTRUCTION, INC.

Supreme Court of Pennsylvania.

Submitted March 27, 1995.

Decided May 16, 1995.

Peter J. Speaker, Harrisburg, for Baker Concrete Const., Inc.

Leah B. Graff, York, for John C. Paden.

Before NIX, C.J., and FLAHERTY, ZAPPALA, CAPPY, CASTILLE and MONTEMURO, JJ.

OPINION OF THE COURT

FLAHERTY, Justice.

The issue is whether a trial court may dismiss a plaintiff's amended complaint against a party defendant joined after the commencement of the action without leave of court in violation of Pa.R.Civ.P. 1033, even when the improper joinder works no prejudice against the improperly joined defendant or the other parties to the action. We hold that the court may penalize the violation by dismissing the complaint.

Appellee John C. Paden, a construction worker, was injured on the job when he fell through a hole in the second floor of a construction site on May 1, 1991. Paden sued the general contractor and its parent corporation. Pleadings proceeded until April 30, 1993, one day before the statute of limitations expired, when Paden filed an amended complaint adding as a defendant the alleged flooring sub-contractor, Baker Concrete Construction Company, appellant.

The amended complaint was filed without leave of court or the consent of the other parties. Baker filed preliminary objections challenging the joinder as improper, seeking to be stricken as a party defendant. The trial court sustained the preliminary objections and struck the joinder of Baker as a defendant. Paden appealed, and the Superior Court reversed, holding that it was an abuse of discretion for the trial court to penalize the improper procedure utilized to add Baker as a defendant because the court should have implemented Pa.R.Civ.P. 126, which permits a court to "disregard any error or defect of procedure which does not affect the substantial rights of the parties." Baker sought allowance of appeal which we granted to review the sole question: May a trial court dismiss a plaintiff's complaint against a party defendant joined after commencement of the action without leave of court in violation of Pa.R.Civ.P. 1033, even where the improper joinder works no prejudice against the improperly joined defendant or the other parties to the suit?

The Superior Court correctly stated that its standard of review was for abuse of discretion. This court recently had occasion to expound on review of discretionary decisions of a trial court:

Where the discretion exercised by the trial court is challenged on appeal, the party bringing the challenge bears a heavy burden. As stated in Echon v. Pennsylvania Railroad Co., 365 Pa. 529, 534, 76 A.2d 175, 178 (1950) (quoting Garrett's Estate, 335 Pa. 287, 292-93, 6 A.2d 858, 860 (1939)),

When the court has come to a conclusion by the exercise of its discretion, the party complaining of it on appeal has a heavy burden; it is not sufficient to persuade the appellate court that it might have reached a different conclusion if, in the first place, charged with the duty imposed on the court below; it is necessary to go further and show an abuse of the discretionary power. "An abuse of discretion is not merely an error of judgment, but if in reaching a conclusion the law is overridden or misapplied, or the judgment exercised is manifestly unreasonable, or the result of partiality, prejudice, bias or ill-will, as shown by the evidence or the record, discretion is abused." Mielcuszny et ux. v. Rosol, 317 Pa. 91, 93, 94, 176 A. 236.

Accord Commonwealth v. Powell, 527 Pa. 288, 297 n. 8, 590 A.2d 1240, 1244 n. 8 (1991) (A conclusion or judgment constitutes an abuse of discretion if it is so lacking in support as to be clearly erroneous.).

In re Milton S. Hershey Medical Center, 535 Pa. 9, 13-14, 634 A.2d 159, 161 (1993). We emphasize that an abuse of discretion may not be found merely because the appellate court might have reached a different conclusion, but requires a showing of manifest unreasonableness, or partiality, prejudice, bias, or ill-will, or such lack of support as to be clearly erroneous.

In concluding that the trial court abused its discretion, the Superior Court first analyzed the relevant rules of procedure, viz., Rules 126, 1033, 2229, 2232, 2251 et seq., reaching the inescapable conclusion that the procedure utilized by Paden was improper:

Paden's lawyer elected to ignore the applicable procedural rules, run roughshod over the rules intended to guarantee orderly proceedings and play the game according to his or her own dictates. Where this has occurred, the law clearly permits a trial court to strike an amended complaint which attempts to join an additional person as a party defendant without leave of court.

Paden v. Baker Concrete Const., Inc., 437 Pa.Super. 59, 61-62, 648 A.2d 1227, 1228 (1994). The court then addressed the reason for the rule requiring leave of court or the consent of the other parties, stating that the "rule was not intended to benefit a party such as Baker.... Baker, or a party similarly situated, could always have been sued in a separate action without prior leave of court." 437...